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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO. IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

BRIAN L. ARMSTRONG and GLENDA A.
ARMSTRONG, husband and wife,

Case No. CV- 03

qd/Y

Plaintiffs,
vs.

FAR~V~ERSINSURANCE COMPANY OF
IDAHO, an Idaho corporation; CORPORATE
DOES I - X, whose true names are unkown;
Defendants.

COMPLAINT AND DEMAND
FOR JURY TRIAL
Fee Category: A 1.
Fee: $77.00

COMES NOW the above-entitled Defendants, Brian L. Armstrong and Glenda A.
Armstrong, husband and wife, by and through their attorney of record, Douglas S. Marfice, of
Ramsden & Lyons, and for a cause of action, state and allege as follows:
PARTIES

1.

Plaintiffs, Brian L. and Glenda A. Armstrong (herein "Armstrongs") are, and at

all times relevant to this action, were residents of Kootenai County, State of Idaho.
2.

Defendant, Farmers Insurance Company of Idaho ("Farmers") is, and at all times

OI
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relevant to this action was, a corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of the
State of Idaho with its principal place of business is located in the City of Pocatello, Bannock
County, State of Idaho. Farmers now is, and at all times material hereto was, conducting the
business of insurance within the State of Idaho.
3.

Corporate Does I through X are corporate entities where true names are

unknown. Corporate Does I through X are believed to be corporate entities that breached
certain duties to the Plaintiffs and thereby caused the Plaintiffs to suffer damages in an amount
to be proven at trial.
4.

Jurisdiction is proper pursuant to LC.

3 5-514 and venue is proper pursuant to

LC. 3 4-404.
GENERAL ALLEGATIONS

5.

The Armstrongs are owners of real property commonly located at 3259 N. 14'~

Street, Coeur d'Alene, Idaho.
6.

The Armstrongs purchased Protector Plus homeowner's insurance policy

number 91828-03-27 from Farmers to insure their home located at 3529 N. 14th Street.
Farmers policy 91828-03-27 had a stated policy period from March 24, 2003 to March 23,
2004.
7.

At all times material hereto, the Armstrongs were the insureds of Farmers. As

insureds of Farmers, a specla1 relationship of insurer and insured existed between Farmers and
the Armstrongs.
8.

Sometime prior to July 2, 2003, the Armstrongs contacted Farmers' general

agent, David Nipp and informed him that they were purchasing an above-ground swimming
pool. Nipp assured the Armshongs that the installation of the swirnming pool was covered
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under their Farmers policy. Based on agent Nipp's representations, the Armstrongs reasonably
believed the swimming pool was covered under their Farmers homeowner's policy.
9.

On July 2,2003, the Armstrongs' home was damaged when the swimming pool

unexpectedly collapsed and caused water to suddenly flood into their home. Immediately
thereafter, the Armstrongs contacted agent Nipp to report that the swimming pool had collapsed
causing water to flood into and damage their home. Nipp explained he would report the same
to Farmers.
10.

Sometime thereafter, agent Nipp contacted the Armstrongs and informed them

that he had been informed by Farmers that the collapse of the swimming pool and the resulting
damage to their home was not covered under their homeowner's policy. Nipp explained to the
h s t r o n g s that Farmers would deny any claim the Armstrong's made under their
homeowner's policy for the damage caused by the collapse of the swimming pool.
11.

By letter dated September 17, 2003, Farmers' agent or employee, Joel Bunis,

wrote the Armstrongs stating "[iJn light of the above, Fire Insurance Exchange respectfully
declines coverage for the water damages to your home." By this letter, Farmers claimed that
the Armstrongs' reported loss was not covered under their Farmers homeowner's policy.
12.

By letter dated September 26, 2003, the Armstrongs responded to Farmers'

agentlemployee, Joel Bums, and explained their disagreement with Farmers' denial of
coverage. The h s t r o n g s informed Bums that "[wle advised our Farmers agent of the fact
that we had installed an above-gromd pool and were assured that we had adequate coverage.
Neither our agent nor the company ever informed us that we would not be covered if the pool
collapsed and damaged our home." The Armstrongs requested the appropriate form in which
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to submit a signed statement (Proof of Loss) as required by their policy ("Your Duties After
Loss) and asked that Farmers reconsider its prior denial of claim.
13.

By letter dated October 2,2003, Farmers through its employeelagent Joel Bums,

responded to the Armstrongs and again informed them that Farmers was denying coverage
under their homeowner's policy. Farmers expressly rejected the Arrnstrongs' request for proof
of loss forms in violation of Idaho law.
14.

Despite Farmers' written denial of their claim, on October 24, 2003, the

Armstrongs prepared and submitted a sworn statement in Proof of Loss to comply with

5 41-

1839, Idaho Code, and the policy.
15.

By letter dated November 14, 2003, Farmers through its employeelagent, Joel

Bums, acknowledged receipt and review of the Armstrongs' Proof of Loss dated October 14,
2003. Burns informed the Armstrongs that Fanners was not changing its earlier position and
that Farmers was still denying the Armstrongs claim.

16.

At all times material hereto, the Armstrongs have fulfilled all the terms of their

homeowner's policy in that all policy premiums were paid and current and that more than thirty
(30) days have elapsed since the receipt by Fanners of satisfactory Proof of Loss, in accordance
with the terms and conditions of the policy and Idaho law.
COUNT ONE
BREACHOFCONTRACT

17.

Plaintiffs reallege the allegations in paragraphs 1-16 as though l l l y set forth

18.

Farmers' failure to take action or otherwise pay against all direct loss and

herein.

damage to the Armstrongs' home is a breach of Fanners' contract of insurance.
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19.

As direct and proximate result of Farmers' breach of its contract of insurance,

Armstrongs have suffered general and special damages and other expenses incidental to the
prosecution of this action.
20.

The Armstrongs have been forced to hire an attorney to prosecute this action and

is entitled to an award of reasonable attorney fees pursuant to Idaho Code § 41-1839 as well as
his costs incurred herein.
21.

The Armstrongs are entitled to immediate payment of policy benefits owing in

an amount consistent with the Proof of Loss provided to Farmers and in an amount reflecting
the costs and attorney fees reasonably incurred to prosecute this action which amounts are
greater than $10,000.00.

COUNT TWO
BREACH OF COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH
AND FAIR DEALING
22.

Plaintiffs reallege the allegations in paragraphs 1-21 as though fully set forth

23.

At all times material hereto, Farmers' agents and employees including, but not

herein.

limited to, David Nipp and Joes Bums were acting within the scope of their agency and/or
employment with Farmers. Thereafter, Farmers ratified and approved the acts andlor omissions
of its agents and employees.
24.

The acts and omissions of Farmers constitute a breach of Farmers' covenant of

good faith and fair dealing owed to the Armstrongs as an insured of Farmers.
25.

The acts and omissions of Farmers were done intentionally and with a conscious

disregard of the rights of the Armstrongs and in a manner intended to deprive the Armstrongs
of their rights under contract of insurance and the intended protections and benefits flowing
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therefrom. The conduct of Farmers, its agents andlor employees, was oppressive, fraudulent,
wanton, malicious, outrageous and in bad faith.
26.

The Armstrongs have been forced to hire an attorney to prosecute this action and

is entitled to an award of reasonable attorney fees pursuant to LC.

4 41-1839 andlor I.C. 4

12-

120 as well as their costs incurred herein.
27.

As a direct and proximate result of the aforementioned wrongful conduct of

Farmers, the Armstrongs have suffered damages, including costs and attorney fees necessary to
prosecute this action, in an amount in excess of $10,000.00.

COUNT THREE
NEGLIGENT INVESTIGATION AND CLAIM ADJUSTMENT
28.

Plaintiffs reallege the allegations of paragraphs 1-27 as though fully set forth

29.

At all times material hereto, Farmers had a duty to acknowledge and act

herein.
,

promptly upon the Armstrongs' claim for insurance benefits. Farmers had a duty to provide the
Armstrongs proof of loss forms and to reasonably evaluate the Armstrongs' claim before
denying coverage for the same.
30.

Farmers breached its duty by failing to accept, acknowledge and act promptly to

investigate and adjust the Armstrongs' claim. Farmers breached its duty by failing to conduct a
reasonable investigation prior to denying the Armstrongs' claim. Farmers breached its duty by
refusing to provide proof of loss forms.
3 1.

As a direct and proximate result of Farmers' breach of duty, the Armstrongs had

to undertake to repair and replace the damage to their home without the benefit of insurance
proceeds to cover such loss.
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32.

As a direct and proximate result of Farmers' breach of duty, the Armstrongs

have been forced to hire an attorney to prosecute this action and are entitled to recover
reasonable attorney fees.
33.

As a result of Farmers' breach of duty, the Armstrongs have suffered general and

special damages in an amount in excess of $10,000.00. Farmers' breach of duty was
oppressive, wanton, malicious and outrageous.
COUNT FOUR
UNFAIR TRADE PRACTICES
34.

Plaintiffs reallege the allegations of paragraphs 1-33 as though fully set forth

35.

Idaho Code 8 41-1329 sets forth unfair claim settlement practices applicable to

herein.

the insurance claim settlement practices of Farmers and, as such, defines the standard of care
for insurers. The acts of Farmers, its agents andlor employees, as described herein, were unfair
and deceptive acts and practices in contravention of the standards of care set forth under I.C.

$5

41-1329(1); 41-1329(2); and 41-1329(4). Farmers' actions were also in direct contravention of
I.C. 8 41-1831.
36.

As a direct and proximate result of Farmers' breach of duty, the Amtrongs

have been forced to hire an attorney to prosecute this action and are entitled to recover
reasonable attorney fees.
37.

As a direct and proximate result of Farmers' violations of LC.

$9 41-1329 and

41-183 1, the Armstrongs have suffered and continue to suffer general and specific damages in
an amount in excess of $10,000.00 and in an amount to be proven at trial.
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COUNT FIVE
CONSTRUCTWE FRAUD
38.

Plaintiffs reallege the allegations of paragraphs 1-37 as though fully set forth

39.

A special relationship of insurer and insured existed between the Armstrongs and

herein.

Farmers. The Armstrongs trusted and relied upon Farmers agent Nipp to provide them with
adequate insurance coverage and to provide them with true and correct information regarding
the insurance coverage they were purchasing from Farmers. The Armstrongs did inquire and
ask agent Nipp as about the status of their insurance coverage under their Farmers
homeowner's policy prior to the installation of their swimming pool.
40.

Farmers, acting through agent Nipp, did represent and promise the Armstrongs

that they would have insurance coverage following the installation of the swimming pool at
their home. Farmers' representations and promises were material and Farmers knew it was
important to the Armstrongs that they have adequate insurance coverage following the
installation of the swimming pool at their home.
41.

Farmers' representations and promises were false and made with the knowledge

of their falsity or in ignorance of their truth.
42.

The Armstrongs trusted Farmers and agent Nipp. The Armstrongs relied on the

representations of Farmers and agent Nipp to their detriment. Farmers' representations did
deceive and falsely mislead the Armstrongs into a false belief concerning the nature and status
of their homeowner's coverage with Farmers.
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43.

As a result of Farmers' misrepresentation, the Arrnstrongs have suffered

consequent and proximate injury in an amount in excess of $10,000.00 and in an amount to be
proven at trial.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs pray that:
1.

They be awarded those policy benefits pursuant to his contract of insurance with

Farmers in an amount in excess of $10,000.00 and in an amount to be proven at trial;
2.

They be awarded special and general damages for Farmer's contractual breach,

bad faith and other fraudulent conduct in an amount in excess of $10,000.00;
3.

They be awarded attorney fees and costs pursuant to I.C. $41-1839 andfor I.C. $

12-120, including all applicable prejudgment interest and costs; and
4.

For such other and further relief that the Court deems proper.

DATED this

of December 2003.
RAMSDEN & LYONS

By:
A&Douglas S. harfice, 0 f 6 e Firm
~ t t o k e for
~ splaintiffs

PLAINTIFFS DEMAND A TRIAL BY JURY OF TWELVE PERSONS.
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VERIFICATION OF PLAINTIFFS

STATE OF IDAHO )
) ss.

County of Kootenai' )
GLENDA ARMSTRONG, being first duly sworn on oath, deposes and says:

I am one of the Plaintiffs in the above-entitled action; I have read the foregoing
COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL; I know the contents thereof, and I state
the same to be true to the best of my knowledge, information, and belief.

0

GLENDA ARMSTRONG

&d'ay
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this -

of December 2003.

7

PUBLIC fofthe State of Idaho
NOT
R e s i d z a t &ff-d
Commission Expires ~/a/d7
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PATRICK E. MILLER
Attorney at Law
701 Front Avenue, Suite 101
P.O. Box E
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-0328
Telephone: (208) 664-8 115
Facsimile: (208) 664-6338
ISBA# 1771

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FlRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

BRIAN ARMSTRONG and GLENDA
ARMSTRONG, husband and wife,

)
) Case No. CV-03-92 14

1
Plaintiffs,

) NOTICE OF APPEARANCE
)
VS. ,
) FEE CATEGORY: I(l)(a)
) FEE: $47.00
FARMERS INSURANCE COMPANY OF
)
IDAHO, an Idaho corporation; CORPORATE )
DOES I-X, whose true names are unknown,
)
)
Defendants.
)

NOTICE IS HEREBY GWEN that Patrick E. Miller, 701 Front Avenue, Suite 101, Coeur
d'Alene, Idaho, appears,in the above-entitled matter as attorney of record for defendants.
DATED this

Attorney for Defendants

-

NOTICE OF APPEARANCE 1

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTwY that on the &day
of
served a true and correct copy of the foregoing by
the following:
Douglas S. Marfice
Michael A. Ealy
Ramsden & Lyons
618 North 41h Street
P. 0 . Box 1336
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-1336

& U.S.MAIL
- HAND DELIVERED
- OVERNIGHT MAIL
- TELECOPY (FAX) to: 664-5884

-

NOTICE OF APPEARANCE 2

,2004, I caused to be
and addressed to

PATRICK E. MILLER
Attorney at Law
701 Front Avenue, Suite 101
P.O. Box E
Coeur d' Alene, ID 83816-0328
Telephone: (208) 664-81 15
Facsimile: (208) 664-6338
ISBA# 1771

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF TI32 FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

BRIAN ARMSTRONG and GLENDA
ARMSTRONG, husband and wife,
Plaintiffs,
VS.

1
) Case No. CV-03-9214

) ANSWER
)

FARMERS INSURANCE COMPANY OF
)
IDAHO, an Idaho corporation; CORPORATE )
DOES I-X, whose true names are unknown,
)
Defendants.
j

COMES NOW the defendant, Farmers Insurance Company of Idaho, and admits, denies
and alleges as follows:

In answer to Paragraph I, this defendant admits the allegations contained therein.

-

ANSWER TO COMPLAINT 1

11.
In answer to Paragraph II, this defendant admits the allegations contained therein.

111.
In answer to Paragraph

ID,this defendant

alleges that the paragraph fails to set forth a

justiciable claim as to this defendant; therefore, no response is required of this defendant.

IV.
In answer to Paragraph

N,this

defendant alleges that the paragraph sets forth legal

conclusions to which no response is required and upon which plaintiff retains the burden of proof.

v.
In answer to Paragraph V, this defendant admits the allegations contained therein.

VI.
In answer to Paragraph VI, this defendant admits that plaintiffs purchased a policy of
insurance referred to as a protector plus homeowner's insurance policy, with policy number 9182803-27, which had a policy period from March 24,2003, to March 23,2004. This defendant alleges
that any and all obligations pursuant to the terms of the policy of insurance were in accordance with
the specific, stated terms and conditions of the policy.

VII.
In answer to Paragraph VII, this defendant alleges that plaintiffs purchased a policy of
insurance, policy number 91828-03-27, with a stated policy period of March 24,2003, to March 23,
2004, and that the terms, conditions and obligations were set forth within the policy of insurance.
This defendant denies any and all remaining allegations stated therein.
ANSWER TO COMPLAINT. 2

VIII.
In answer to Paragraph VIII, this defendant denies that David Nipp was a general agent of
this defendant. This defendant alleges that it is without knowledge or information sufficient to form
a belief as to the truth of the remaining allegations stated therein; therefore, this defendant denies
said allegations and leaves plaintiffs to their proof.

IX.
In answer to Paragraph

IX,this defendant admits, upon information and belief, that the

plaintiffs' home was flooded with water from the swimming pool. This defendant alleges that it is
without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of any and all remaining
allegations contained therein; therefore, this defendant denies said allegations and leaves plaintiffs
to their proof. This defendant specifically denies any allegations intended, by the language of this
paragraph, to assert that David Nipp constituted a general agent of the defendant.

X.
In answer to Paragraph X, this defendant denies any and all allegations stated therein that
Davrd Nlpp was a general agent of this defendant. In answer to any and all remaining allegations
stated therein, this defendant alleges that it is without knowledge or information sufficient to form
a belief as to the truth of the remaining allegations; therefore, this defendant denies said allegations
and leaves plaintiffs to their proof.

XI.
In answer to Paragraph XI, this defendant admits the allegations stated therein.

-

ANSWER TO COMPLAINT 3

XII.
In answer to Paragraph XlI, this defendant admits that plaintiffs responded to the coverage
denial. This defendant alleges that the paragraph fails to set forth a justiciable claim upon which
relief can be granted.

XIII.
In answer to Paragraph Xm[,this defendant admits that this defendant responded to the
request, anddeniedcoverage. This defendant denies any and all remaining allegations stated therein.
This defendant alleges that the paragraph fails to set forth a justiciable claim upon which relief can
be granted.

XIV.
In answer to Paragraph XIV, this defendant admits that plaintiffs submitted a document,
whlch plitintrffs asse~tedconstituted a proof of loss. This defendant denies any and all remaining
allegations contained therein. This defendant alleges that the paragraph fails to set forth a justiciable
claim upon which relief can be granted.

xv.
In answer to Paragraph XV, this defendant admits the allegations contained therein.

XVI.
In answer to Paragraph XVI, this defendant admits that plaintiffs paid their policy premium.
This defendant denies any and all remaining allegations contained therein.

-

ANSWER TO COMPLAINT 4

XVII.
In answer to Paragraph XVII, this defendant restates and reaffirms its response to all prior
paragraphs of plaintiffs' Complaint as though fully set forth herein.

XVIII.
In answer to Paragraph XVIII, this defendant denies the allegations contained therein.

XIX.
In answer to Paragraph

XU(,

this defendant denies the allegations contained therein.

XX.
In answer to Paragraph XX, this defendant denies the allegations contained therein.

XXI.
In answer to Paragraph XXI, this defendant denies the allegations contained therein.

XXII.
In answer to Paragraph XXII, this defendant restates and reaffirms its response to all prior
paragraphs of plaintiffs' Complaint as though fully set forth herein.

XXIII.
In answer to Paragraph

XXZD[,

this defendant denies that David Nipp was an agent or

employee of this defendant and that, as alleged by plaintiff, he acted in a manner so as to bind this
defendant. This defendant admits that Joel Bum acted within the course and scope of his
employment with this defendant. This defendant denies any and all remaining allegations contained
therein.

XXIV.

-

ANSWER TO COMPLAINT 5

In answer to Paragraph XXIV, this defendant denies the allegations contained therein.

xxv.
In answer to Paragraph XXV, this defendant denies the allegations contained therein.

XXVI.
In answer to Paragraph XXVI, this defendant denies the allegations contained therein.

XXVII.
In answer to Paragraph XXVII, this defendant denies the allegations contained therein.

XXVIII.
In answer to Paragraph XXVDI, this defendant restates and reaffirms its response to all prior
paragraphs of plaintiffs' Complaint as though fully set forth herein.

XXIX.
In answer to Paragraph XXIX, this defendant denies the allegations contained therein.

XXX.
In answer to Paragraph XXX, this defendant denies the allegations contained therein.

XXXI.
In answer to Paragraph XYXI, this defendant denies the allegations contained therein.

XXXII.
In answer to Paragraph XXXII, this defendant denies the allegations contained therein.

XXXIII.
In answer to Paragraph XXXIII, this defendant denies the allegations contained therein.

-

ANSWER TO COMPLAINT 6

XXXIV.
In answer to Paragraph XXXIV, this defendant restates and reaffirms its response to all prior
paragraphs of plaintiffs' Complaint as though fully set forth herein.

xxxv;
In answer to Paragraph XXXV, this defendant denies the allegations contained therein.

XXXVI.
In answer to Paragraph XXXVI, this defendant denies the allegations contained therein.

XXXVII.
In answer to Paragraph XXXVII, this defendant denies the allegations contained therein.

XXXVIII.
In answer to Paragraph XXXVIII, this defendant restates and reaffirms its response to all
prior paragraphs of plaintiffs' Complaint as though fully set forth herein.

XXXIX.
In answer to Paragraph XXYIX, this defendant denies the allegations contained therein.

XL.
In answer to Paragraph XL, this defendant denies the allegations contained therein.

XLI.
In answer to Paragraph XLI, this defendant denies the allegations contained therein,

AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES
COMES NOW the defendant, by way of affirmative defense, alleges as follows:

-

ANSWER TO COMPLAINT 7

I.
Plaintiffs' Complaint fails to state a claim against this defendant upon which relief can be
granted.

11.
That the terms andconditions of the policy of insurance, policy number 91828-03-27, policy
period March 24, 2003, through March 23,2004, defined the terms, conditions and obligations of
this defendant.

111.
That this defendant complied with the terms and conditions of the policy of insurance.

IV.
That the asserted claim by the plaintiffs was not covered by the terns and conditions of the
policy of insurance as entered into with this defendant.

WHEREFORE, having answered, this defendant prays that plaintiffs' Complaint be
dismissed; that this defendant be awarded its costs and attorney fees occurred herein; for such other
and further relief as the court deems just.
Pursuant to Rule 38(b), Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, this defendant herein demands a trial
by a jury of no less than twelve (12) persons in the above-entitled case.
DATED this &day

of

h dJ

,2004.

Attorney for Defendant

-
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
,2004. I caused to be
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the @day of
served a true and correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to
the following:

Douglas S . Marfice
Michael A. Ealy
Ramsden & Lyons
618 North 4* Street
P. 0. Box 1336
Coeur d'Afene, ID 83816-1336
U.S. MAIL
HAND
DELIVERED
- OVERNIGHT MAIL
- TELECOPY (FAX) to: 664-5884

-
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DOUGLAS S. MARFICE, ISB #4072
MICHAEL A. EALY, ISB #5619
RAMSDEN & LYONS
6 18 North 41h Street
Post Office Box 1336
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816-1336
Telephone: (208) 664-5818
Facsimile:
(208) 664-5884

L"I_,_lIi

Attorneys for Plaintiffs

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

BRIAN ARMSTRONG and GLENDA
ARMSTRONG, husband and wife,

Plaintiffs,
VS.
FARMERS INSURANCE COMPANY OF
IDAHO, an Idaho corporation; CORPORATE
DOES I - X, whose true names are unknown,

Case No. CV- 03-92 14
AFFIDAVIT OF DOUGLAS S.
MARFICE IN SUPPORT OF
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR
PARTIAL SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

Defendants.

STATEOFIDAHO
County of Kootenai

)
) ss.
)

Douglas S. Marfice, having been first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and states:
1.

I am an attorney for the Plaintiffs herein, and I have personal knowledge of the

matters set forth in this affidavit.
2.

I make the Affidavit of my own personal knowledge.

3.

Attached hereto is a true and accurate photocopy of the following:
Exhibit "A": The Armstrongs' Protector Plus Homeowner's Insurance Policy
Number 91828-0327

AFFIDAVIT OF DOUGLAS S. MARFICE I N SUPPORT OF
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY 3UDGMEMP- 1
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4.

Attached hereto is a true and accurate photocopy of the following:
Exhibit "B": The Armstrongs' swom statement of Proof of Loss

5.

Attached hereto is a true and accurate photocopy of the following:
Exhibit "C": Farmers letter of November 14, 2003 denying the Armstrongs'
claim.

6.

Exhibit C provides in material part:
Specifically, coverage afforded is stated as
"Sudden and accidental discharge or overflow of
water from within a plumbing, heating or air
conditioning system, or from within a household
appliance." Your swimming pool is not part of a
plumbing, heating or air conditioning system, nor
is it a household appliance. Therefore, our original
decision to decline coverage will remain.

7.

Attached hereto is a true and accurate photocopy of the following:
Exhibit " D : excerpts from the deposition transcript of Brian Armstrong and
exhibits thereto.

8.

Attached hereto is a true and accurate photocopy of the following:
Exhibit " E : excerpts from the deposition transcript of Glenda Armstrong and
exhibits thereto.
FURTHER YOUR AFFIANT SAYETH NOT.

me before this

$2

V a y of January 2005.

&&do

Noh& ~ u b f i cfor Idaho
~ K s i d i nat~Coeur d' Alene
MY Commission expires:

//-2.
-6'7

AFFIDAVIT OF DOUGLAS 5. MARFICE I N SUPPORT OF
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 2

02:5

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certifL that on the M a y of January 2005, I served a true and correct copy of
the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:
Patrick E. Miller, Esq.
701 Front Avenue, Suite 101
PO Box E
Coeur d'Alene ID 838 16-0328

-US Mail

-2

vemight Mail
and Delivered
-Facsimile (208) 664-6338

AFFIDAVIT OF DOUGLAS S. MARRCE I N SUPPORT OF
PWNTIFFS' MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT 3
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EXHIBIT "A"

Non-Assessable

4TH EDITION
YOUR PROTECTOR PLUS PACKAGE POLICY

IDAHO

-

Farrnkrs Insurance Group of Companie8
4680 Wilshire Boulevard, Los Angeles, California 90010
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Dear customer:

=

The member Companies and Exchanges of the Farmers lnsurance Group of
Companies would like to take this opportunity to say "Thank You" for your recent
business.

E!=!e!E

=

=5~!!=
=cE!!!E

.

Your needs for insurance protection are very important to us. We are committed to
providing you with the best customer service at the lowest cost possible.
If you haven't already done so, please take a moment to review your policy to
assure you understand the coverages. This is a very important document that
you'll want to keep in a safe place.

=_

Ifyou have any questions regarding your policy or if you would like information
about other coverages, feel free to contact me.

=
=

Again, thank you for choosing us for your insurance protection. We look forward
to sewing you.

%?==?
!=

Sincerely,

=cE!!!E

-,=

!
=

David R. Nipp LUTCF
Your ~ a r m e r s " ~ ~ e n t
( 2 0 8 ) 773-8484

DECLARATIONS

PROTECTOR PLUS
FARMERS INSURANCE COMPANY O F IDAHO, POCATELLO,

HOMEOWNERS

IDAHO

Replaces all prior Declarations, if any

TRANSACTIONTYPE: NEW B U S I N E S S
The Policy Periodis effective(notpriorto time appliedfor) at described residence premises.
..

,~
..
P&I~Y&MB6R;:,..:. :.

.
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FROM:

91828-03-27
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ISSUING OFFICE:
P . O . BOX 4 8 2 0
POCATELLO, I D 8 3 2 0 5

STANDARDTIME

TO'

03-23-1999

.

..I
. . . P O ~ I C y ~ v I p p ;. , : . ,

03-23-2000

1 2 : O l A.M,
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This policy will continue for successive policy periods, if: (1) we elect to continue this insurance, and (2) if you pay the renewal
premium for each suocessivepolicy period as required by our premiums, rules and forms then in effect.
LOCATIONOR DESCRIPTION OF RESIDENCE PREMISES:

INSURED'S NAME & MAILING ADDRESS:
BRIAN L ARMSTRONG AND GLENDA A ARMSTRONG
3259 N 14TH S T
C D ALENE I D

(Some as mailing address unless othewisestnted.)

DESCRIPTION OF PROPERTY
;, ; . , . . . . . . . : . . . .
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ASPHALT COMPOSITION

1

001

OWNER

-

I

AMENDING PERSONAL I N J U R Y
PROTECTOR PLUS
AMENDING D E B R I S REMOVAL COVERAGE AND POLLUTION EXCLUSION
EXCLUSION AMENDING S E C T I O N II - L I A B I L I T Y
SEWER AND DRAIN WATER DAMAGE COVERAGE ENDORSEMENT
ENDORSEMENT AMENDING S E C T I O N I - WATER DAMAGE
S P E C I A L L I M I T S ON S P O R T S CARDS
OPTIONAL PAYMENT PLAN ON RENEWAL O F POLICY
S P E C I A L STATE P R O V I S I O N S - IDAHO
WAIVER O F DEDUCTIBLE
R E S I D E N C E GLASS ENDORSEMENT

-

DISCOUNTS
NEW HOME, AUTO/HOME,

AND NON SMOKER DISCOUNTS HAVE BEEN A P P L I E D TO YOUR P O L I C Y .

DEDUCTIBLES

POLICY ACTIVITY

Deductible is applicableto coveredlosses under
CoverageA, 8, C.
THE FOLLOWING DEDUCTIBLE(S)
APPLIES TO THE
P E R I L S NAMED:
GLASS: $ 5 0 0

Previous Balance
Premium
Fees
24 5 . 5 2CR Paymentsor Credits
235.52
10.00

$ NONE
I

ANY 'TOTAC
~&C;~P,IT,~$;~;~~~

AGENT: David R. Nipp LUTCF
AGENTPHONE: ( 2 0 8 ) 7 7 3 - 8 4 8 4
AGENTNUMBER: 7 5 6 7 3 3 0

nr) 7

LI
(Continued on the yeverse Stde)

BALANCE

TO YOUR NEXT BILLING.
BALANCES OVER $7.00
AREDUE UPON RECEIPT.

Total

iI

This Declarations page is part of your policy. It supersedes and controls
anything to the contrary. It is otherwise subject to all other terms of the policy.
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Coverages:
.....................
Coverage A - Dwelling
Coverage B Separate Structures
Coverage C - Personal Property ....................................
Special Limits on Certain Personal Property-.--.
.
Personal Property not covered
Coverage D Loss of Use
Additional Coverages

-

-

-

SECTION I.-LOSSES NOT INSURED
Applying to
Coverage A and I3 - Dwelling and
Separate Structures and
Coverage C - Personal Property

.

4
4
5
5
6
6
6

7
7
8

................ 11

Your Duties After Loss ..................

SECTION 11- LIABILITY

SECTION I PROPERTY

Losses Insured:
Coverage A .Dwelling
Coverage B .Separate Structures
Coverage C Personal Property

-

SECTION I CONDITIONS
,

Coverages:
Coverage E - Personal Liability ......................... . .
13
Coverage F .Medical Payments to Others .............. 13
.. 14
Additional Coverages -

-

SECTION If EXCLUSIONS
Applying to Coverage E
Applying to Coverage F
Applying to Coverage E and F
Applying to Additional Coverages

14
........... 15
15
16
.

-

SECTION I1 CONDITIONS
Duties After Loss

.

16

GENERAL CONDITIONS
... 17

Applying to the Entire Policy

9

RECIPROCAL PROVISIONS

.

This policy is a legal contract between you (the policyholder) and us (the Company)
IT CONTAINS CERTAIN EXCLUSIONS.
READ YOUR POLICY CAREFULLY.

19

AGREEMENT
We will provide the insurance described in this policy. In return you will pay the premium and comply with all policy
conditions.

DEFINITIONS
Throughout this policy. "you" and "your" mean the "named insured" shown in the Declarations and spouse if a
resident of the same household. "We,""us" and "our" mean the Company named in the Declarationswhich provides
this insurance. In addition, certain words appear in bold type. They are defined as follows:

-

1. Actual Cash Value means replacement cost of the property at the time of loss, less depreciation.
2. Aircraft means any device used or designed for flight including self-propelled missiles and spacecraft, except
model or hobby aircraft not used or designedto carry people or cargo.
3. Annual aggregate limit means the total amount we will pay for all occurrences which happen in each 12
month period, beginningwith the inception date of this policy, regardlessof the number of such occurrences.
4. Bodily injury means bodily harm, sicknessor disease, including care, loss of services and death resulting from
that injury.
5. Business means any full or part-time trade, professionor occupation.
6. Business property means property pertaining to or intended for use in business.
7. Earthquake- means shaking or trembling of the earth, whether caused by volcanic activity, tectonic processesor
any other cause.
8. Earth ~ o v e m e n t means movement of earth, inoluding, but not limited to the following:
a. earthquake, landslide or mudflow, all whether combined with water or not.
b. collapse, settling, cracking, shrinking, bulging, subsidence, erosion, sinking, rising, shifting, expanding, or
contractingof earth, all whether combined with water or not.
c. volcanic eruption, including explosion, lava flow and volcanicaction.

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

9. lnsured means you and the following persons if permanent residentsof your household:
a. your relatives,
b. anyone underthe age of 21,
Under Section II - Liability, insured also means:
c. any person or organization legally responsible for animals or watercraft owned by you, or anyone included in
9a or Qb, and covered by this policy. Any person or organization using or having custody of these animals or
watercraft in the course of any business or without permission of the owner is not an insured.
while employed by you or anyone in 9a or 9b with respectto any vehicle covered by this policy.
d. any
10. lnsured location- means:
a. the residence premises;
b. any other premises you acquire during the policy period for use as a residence;
c. that part of any other premisesshown in the Deciarationswhich you use as a residence;
d. any premises you use in connection with the premises includedin 1Oa, 1Ob or 1Oc.
e. that part of a premises not owned by any insured but where an insured is temporarily residing.
f. that part of a premises occasionally rented to any insured for non-business purposes.
g. vacant land, other than farm land, owned by or rented to any insured and shown in the Declarations.
h. land owned by or rented to you and on which you are building a one or two family dwelling to be used as your
residence.
i. cemetery plots or burial vaults of an insured.

-

11. Motor vehicle means:
a. a motorized land vehicle, including a trailer, semi-trailer or motorized bicycle, designed for travel on public
roads.
b. any vehicle while being towed or carried on a vehicle desoribed in 11a.
c. any other motorized land vehicle designed for recreationaluse off public roads.

56-5274 4TH EDITION 4-89

F A R M E RSbWall-to-wallcarpetingattached to the structureis part of the structure.
We do not cover land or the value of land, including land on which the separate structure is located or the cost to
restore, replace, repair or rebuild land. If a covered loss causes damage to a separate structure and to the land on
the residence premises, we do not cover any increased cost to repair or rebuild the separate structure because of
damage to the land.
We do not cover separate structureswhich are intended for use in business or which are actually used in whole or
in part for business purposes.

-

Coverage C Personal Property
We cover personal property owned or used by an insured while it is anywhere in the world. At your request after a
loss we will also cover personal property:
a. owned by others while the property is on the part of the residence premises occupied by an insured. However,
property of tenants not relatedto the insured is not covered.
b. owned by a guest while the property is in any residence occupied by an insured.
c. owned by and in the physical custody of a residence employee while in the service of an insured anywhere in
the world.

Special Limits On Certain Personal Property
The limits shown below do not increase the Coverage C limit of insurance shown in the Declarations.The limit for
each numbered group is the total limit for any one loss for all property in that group.
1. $1,000 or 10% of Coverage C limit (whichever is greater) on personal property usually located at an insured's
residence, other than the residence premises.
This limit does not apply to personal property in a newly acquired principal residence for 45 days after moving
begins.
2. $100 on money, bank notes, medals, coins, bullion, platinum, gold and silver other than goldware and silverware,
and collectionsof all such property.
3. $1,000 on securities, accounts, deeds, evidences of debt, letters of credit, notes other than bank notes,

manuscripts,passports,tickets and stamp collections.
4. $1,000 on watercraft, and windsurfers, includingtheir trailers, furnishings, equipment and outboard motors.
5. $1,000 on trailers not used with watercraft.
6. Jewelry, watches, precious and semi-precious stones, and furs, including articles for which fur represents the

principalvalue, are insured for accidental direct physical loss or damage. The following exclusions and limitations
apply:
a. on loss caused by theft, $1,000 on any one article and $2,500 total limit..
b. on loss caused by perils named under Coverage C of this policy other than theft, the limit shown in the
Declarationfor Coverage C will apply.
c. on loss caused by perils not named and not excluded in this policy, $1,000 on any one article and $2,500 total
limit.
d. We do not cover loss or damage resultingfrom any processof refinishing, renovating, repairing, restoration01
retouching; moths, vermin, insects, wear and tear, deterioration, inherent defects or faulty manufacturing.
7. $2,500 on theft of silverware, goldware and pewtermare, including articles for which such metal represents the
principal value.
8. firearms are insured for accidental direct physical loss or damage. The following exclusions and limitations apply:

a. $1,000 on loss caused by theft.
b. on loss caused by perils named under Coverage C of this policy other than theft, the limit shown in the
DeclarationsforCoverage C will apply.
c. $1,000 on loss caused by perils not named and not excluded in this policy.
d. We do not cover loss or damage resultingfrom any processof refinishing, renovating, repairing, restoration or
retouching; dampness or extremes in temperatures; vermin, insects, wear and tear, deterioration, inherent
defects, faulty manufacturing, rust, fouling or explosion; marring, scratching, tearing or denting unless caused
by fire, thieves or accidentsto conveyances.

,+

FARMERS'.
The limit of insurance, including debris removal, for any one loss will not exceed 5% of the limit applying to the
dwelling, nor more than $500 for any one tree, shrub or plant. This coverage is in addition to the limit applying to
the dwelling.
4. Fire Department Service Charge. We pay up to $500 as an additional amount of insurance for sewice charges
made by a fire department when called to protect covered property from an insured loss. In no event will we pay
more than $500 in charges resulting from any one servicecall. No deductible applies to this coverage.
5. EmergencyRemovalof Property.We pay for direct loss from any cause to covered property:
a. while being removedfrom a premisesendangeredby a loss covered under LOSSES INSURED, and
b. while removed for not more than 30 days from the date of removal.
This coverage does not change the amount of insurance applying to the covered property.

6. Credit Card, Fund Transfer Card, Forgery and Counterfeit Money. We pay up to $1.500 as an additional amount
of insurance for loss to an insured caused by:
a. theft or unauthorized use of credit or fund transfer cards issued to an insured.
b. forgery or alteration of a checkor other negotiable instrument.
c. acceptance in good faith of counterfeit United States or Canadian paper money
No deductible applies to a, b or c above
We do not cover:
a. business pursuits or d~shonestacts of any insured.
b. use of anv card bv a resident of vour household or any. .person entrusted with any card if an insured nas not
met the tdrms under which such 6ard is issued.
Defense of a claim or suit against any insured or any insured's bank for liability under this coverage:
a. We may investigate and settle any claim or suit we consider proper. Our duty to defend any claim or suit ends
when we pay a loss equal to the limit of insurance.
b. We will defend at our expense and with attorneys of our choice a claim made or suit brought against any
insured for payment under Credit or Fund Transfer Card Coverage.
c. At our option and expense we may defend the insured or the insured's bank against a suit to enforce
payment under Forgery Coverage.

7. Collapse of Buildings. We cover accidentaldirect physical loss to covered property covered in A and B if caused
by collapse which occurs due to:
a. weight of ice, snow, sleet or rain which collectson a roof;
b. weight of people, contents or equipment while on a roof.
8. Freezer Food Spoilage. We will pay for the cost of loss or damage to food in a freezer on the residence

premises which thaws due to interruption of power or other utility service which originates off the residence
premises.
9. GuaranteedReplacement Cost Coverage - Buildings. We will settle covered loss to buildings under Coverage A
Dwelling and Coverage B Separate Structuresat replacement cost regardless of the limits of insurance shown
on the Declarations Page, subject to the following provisions:
a. You have insured your dwelling and separate structures to 100% of their replacement cost as determined by
our Building Replacement Cost Guide.
b. You have accepted each annual adjustment in building amounts in accordance with Value Protection Clause
in the policy.
c. You have notified us within 90 days of the start of any physical changes which increase the value of your
insured buildings by $5,000 or more, and pay any additional premium. This includes any new structures and
any additions to or remodeling of your dwelling or other structureson the residence premises.
d. You have complied with all of the "Loss Settlement" provisions shown in Condition 3 of Section I of the policy
applicable to CoveragesA and 5.
We do not cover any costs requiredto replace, rebuild, stabilize or otherwise restore the land.

-

-

LOSSES INSURED
Coverage A Dwelling
Coverage B Separate Structures

-

We insure for accidental direct physical loss to property described in Coverage A and 8, except as provided in
Section I Losses Not Insured.

-
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14. Sudden and accidental tearing apart, cracking, burning or bulging of a steam, hot water or air conditioning

system,or appliance for heating water.
This peril does not include loss caused by or resulting from freezing.
15. Freezing of a plumbing, heating, air conditioning system or household appliance.
This peril does not include loss on the residence premises while the dwelling is unoccupied unless you have
used reasonablecare to:
a. maintain heat in the building, or
b. shut off the water supply and drain the system and appliance of water.
16. Sudden and accidentaldamagefrom artificially generated electricalcurrent.
This peril does not include loss to a tube, transistor, microchipor similar electroniccomponent.

-

SECTION I LOSSES NOT INSURED

-

-

Applying to Coverage A and B Dwelling and Separate Structuresand Coverage C Personal Property
We do not insure for loss either consisting of, or caused directly or indirectly by:
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1. EarthMovement.

Acts or omissions of persons can cause, contribute to or aggravate earth movement. Also, earth movement
can occur naturally to cause loss, or combine with acts or omissions of persons to cause loss. Whenever earth
movement occurs, the resulting loss is always excluded under this policy, however caused; except we do cover
direct loss by fire or explosions resultingfrom earth movement.
The following examples are set forth to help you understand this exclusion and are not meant to be all-inclusive.
EXAMPLE 1:
Rain falls on soil inadequately compacted or maintained by a builder, neighbor or you. As a result, earth
movement occurs,causing loss to the dwelling or personal property. Such loss is not covered by this policy.
EXAMPLE2:
Cracks occur in your dwelling or separate structure because it is built on natural or fill soil which is expansive
and the dwelling or structure is not designed or constructedto withstand the soil movement. Such loss is not
covered under this policy.
EXAMPLE3:
Water leaks from a pipe which causes settling, and the settling causes loss to the dwelling, separate
structure, or personal property. Such loss is not covered by this policy, regardless of the cause or causes of
the water leak.
2. Water damage.
Acts or omissions of persons can cause, contribute to or aggravate water damage. Also water damage can
occur naturally to cause loss or combine with acts or omissions of persons to cause loss. Whenever water
damage occurs, the resulting loss is always excluded under this policy, however caused; except we do cover
direct-loss to the d w s n g , separate structures, or personal property if caused by fire or explos~onres&&n
i g,fro-m
wE!Er!54I"=95
The following examples are set forth to help you understand this exclusion and are not meant to be all-inclusive.

EXAMPLE 1:
Rain water collects on or soaks into the ground surface. Because of faulty design, construction or
maintenance of the residence premises, your neighbor's property or water diversion devices, the water
causes loss to the dwelling, separate structure,or personal property. Such loss is not covered by this policy.
EXAMPLE2:
A pipe under your sink breaks, and water damages your wallpaper, carpeting and personal property. The
water also gets under the dwelling or separate structure causing earth movement which resuits in cracking
of the foundation and walls. The loss to the wallpaper, carpeting and personal property is covered, but the
loss to the foundation and walls is not covered by this policy.
EXAMPLE3:
Water which has backed up through sewers or drains, or water below ground level causes loss to the
dwelling, separate structure or personal property. Such Loss is not covered by this policy.

56-5274 4TH EDITION 4.88
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SECTION I CONDITIONS
1. Insurable Interestand Limit of Insurance.
Even if more than one person has an insurable interest in the covered property, we pay the smallest of the
following amounts.
a. an amount equal to the insured's interest, or
b. the applicable limit of insurance.
2. Your Duties AfterLoss.
If a covered loss occurs, you will perform the following duties:
a. give written noticeto us or our agent without unnecessarydelay. In case of theft, also notify the police. In case
of loss under the Credit or Fund Transfercard Coverage, also notify the issuerof the card.
b. protect the property from further damage. Make any emergency repairs needed to protect the property from
furtherdamage.
- Keep records of repair costs.
c make a list of all damaged or destroyed personal property showing In detall the quantity, descript~on,actual
cash value and amount of loss. Anach all b~lls,receipts and related recordsthat suppon your claim
d. as often as we reasonably require:
(1) exhibit damaged property.
(2) provide us with records and documents we may request, including banking or other financial records, if
obtainable and permit us to make copies.
(3) submit to examination under oath and sign a transcript of same.
e. send us within 60 days after our request your signed sworn statementshowing:
(1) time and cause of loss,
(2) interestof the insured and all others in the property involved,
(3) all legal claims against the property involved,
(4) other insurance which may coverthe loss,
(5) changes in title or occupancy of the propertyduring the term of the policy,
(6) specificationsand detailed repair estimates of any damaged building,
(7) a &stof damaged or destroyed personal property describedin 2c,
(8) receipts and recordsthat support additional living expenses and loss of rents,
(9) evidence which states the amount and cause of loss to support a claim under Credit or Fund Transfer
Card, Forgery and Counterfeit Money Coverage.
3. Loss Settlement.
Coverage A and B
Covered loss to Buildings under Coverage A and B will be settled at replacement cost without deduction for
depreciation, subject to the following methods:
(1) Settlement under replacementcostwill not be more than the smallestof the following:
(a) the replacement cost of that part of the building damaged for equivalent construction and use on the
same premises.
(b) the amount actually and necessarily spent to repair or replace the building intended for the same
occupancy and use.
(2) When the cost to repair or replace is morethan $1,000 or morethan 5% of the limit of insurance in this policy
on the damaged or destroyed building, whichever is less, we will pay no more than the actual cash value of
the damage until repair or replacement is completed.
(3) At your option, you may make a ciaim underthis policy on an actual cash value basis for loss or damage to
buildings. Within 180 days after loss you may make a claim for any additional amount on a replacementcost
basis if the property has been repairedor replaced.
Coverage C a. The following types of property will be settled at full current cost or repair or replacement at the time of loss,
without deduction for depreciation.
(1) personal property and structuresthat are not buildings.
(2) carpeting, domestic appliances, awnings, outdoor equipment and antennas, all whether or not attached to
buildings.

..
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12 SUIIAga~nstUs We may not be sued unless tnsre has been full compliance with all the terms of thrs pollcy Sult
on or arlslng out of th~spol~cymust be brought w ~ t h ~one
n year after the loss occdrs
13. Our Options. We may repair or replace the damaged property with equivalent property. We may also take all or
part of the damaged property at the agreed or appraised value. We will give you written notice of our intention
within 30 days after receipt of your signed sworn statement of loss.
14. Loss Payment. We will adjust all losses with you. We will pay you unless another payee is named in the policy.
We will pay within 60 days after:
a. we reach agreementwith you, or
b. a court judgment, or
c. an appraisal award.
A loss payment will not reduce the applicable limitof insurance.
15. Abandoned Property.We need not accept property abandoned by an insured.
16. Mortgage Clause. The word "mortgagee"includes trustee or loss payee. If a mortgagee is named in this policy, a
covered loss will be paid to the mortgagee and you, as interests appear. If more than one mortgagee is named,
the order of payment will be the same as the order of the mortgagees.
If we deny your claim, such denial will not apply to a mortgagee'svalidclaim ifthe mortgagee:
a knows and notlfres us of any change of ownershrp, occupancy or substantialchange in risk
b Davs on demand anv Dremlum due if vou have faded to do so.
c. submits a signed, sworn statement ofloss within 60 days after we notify the mortgagee of your failure to do so.
Policy conditions relating to Other Insurance, Appraisal, Suit Against Us and Loss Payment apply to the
mortgagee.
We will give the mortgagee 10 days notice before cancelling this policy.
If we pay the mortgagee for any loss and deny payment to you:
a. we have right of recoveryagainst any party responsibleforthe loss, or
b. at our option, we may
. . debt to the mortgagee.
- - In this event. we receive full transfer
. .pay- off the entire mortgage
of the mortgage.
A mortgagee'sclaimwill not be impaired by transferof a right of reoovery
17. No Benefit to Bailee. This insurance will not benefit any person or organization who may be caring for or
handling property for a fee.

-

SECTION II LIABILITY
Coverages
Coverage E Personal Liability
We will pay those damages which an insured becomes legally obligated to pay because of bodily injury, property
damage or personal injury resulting from an occurrence to which this coverage applies. Personal injury means any
injury
arising from:
(1) false arrest, lmprlsonment, rnal~clousprosecutionand detention
=
-(2) wrongfulevlctlon, entry. lnvaslon of rlghts of prlvacy
(3) libel, slander, defamation of,character.
=
=
(4) discrimination because of race, color, religion or nationalorigin. Liability prohibited by law is excluded. Fines
and penalties imposed by law are covered.
At
our
expense
and with attorneys of our choice, we wiil defend an insured against any covered claim or suit. We
=
are not obligated to pay defense costs, including attorneys'fees of any claim or suit where you select an attorney not
chosen by us because there is a dispute between you and us over coverage. We may investigate and settle any
claim or suit that we consider proper. Our obligation to defend any claim or suit ends once we have paid our limit of
liability.

-

-

7

7

'
-

-

Coverage F Medical PaymentsTo Others
We will pay the necessary medical expenses for services furnished to a person other than you or any resident of
your household within 3 years from the date of an occurrence causing bodily injury. Medical expenses mean
reasonable charges for medical, surgical, x-ray and dental services, prosthetic devices, eyeglasses hearing aids,
pharmaceuticals, ambulance, hospital, licensed nursing and funeral services.
This coverage applies to:
(a) persons on the insured location with permission of an insured; or

10. Personal injury arising from or during the course of civic or public activities performedfor pay by an insured.

,

11. Personal injury to any resident of the residence premises.
12. Any loss, cost, or expense resulting from the clean-up, detoxification, or treatment of any site used by you or any
person acting on your behalf for the disposal, storage, handling, processing or treatment of waste.

-

Applying To Coverage F Medical PaymentsTo Others
We do not cover bodily Injury:
1. To you or any resident of your residence premises except a residence employee.

2. To a residence employee who is off the lnsured location and not inthe course of employment by an insured.
3. To any person eligible to receive benefits provided or mandated under any workers'compensation, occupational
disease or non-occupationaldisabilitylaw.
4. Resulting from any nuclear hazard.

-

Applying To Coverage E and F Personal Liability and Medical PaymentsTo Others
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We do not cover bodily injury, property damage or personal injury which:
1. arises from or during the course of business pursuitsof an insured.
But we do cover:
a. that part of a residence of yours which is rented or available for rent:
(1) on an occasional basis for sole use as a residence.
(2) to no more than two roomersor boardersfor sole use as a residence.
(3) as an office, studio or private garage.
b. part-time services performed directly by an insured under age 21 who is a resident of your household.
"Part-timewmeansno more than 20 hours per week.
2. resultsfrom the rendering or failure to render business or professlonalse~ices.
3. is either:.
a. caused Intentionallyby or at the direction of an insured;or
b. results from any occurrence caused by an intentional act of any insured where the results are reasonably
foreseeable.
4. resultsfrom the legal liability of any lnsured because of home care servicesprovidedto any person on a regular
, basis by or at the direction of:
a. any insured;
b. any employee of any insured;
c. any other person actually or apparently acting on behalf of any insured.
Regular basis means more than 20 hours per week.
This exclusion does not apply to:
a. home care servicesprovidedto the relatives of any insured;
b. occasionalor part time home care services provided by any Insured under 21 years of age.
5. resultsfrom an insured transmitting a communicable (including sexually transmitted)disease.
6. resultsfmm an existing condition on an uninsured location owned by or rented to an insured.
7. results from the ownership, maintenance,use, loading or unloading of:
a. aircraft
b. motor vehicles
c. jet skis and jet sleds or
d. any other watercraftowned or rented to an insured and which:
(1) has more than 50 horsepower inboard or inboard-outdrivemotor power; or
(2) is powered by one or more outboard motors with more than 25 total horsepower; or
(3) is a sailing vessel 26 feet or more in length.

565274 4TU EDITION 4.89

c. cooperate with and assist us in any matter relating to a claim or suit.
d. under Damage to Property of Others Coverage, send us a sworn statement of loss within 60 days of the loss.
Also exhibit any damaged property which is within the Insured's control.
e. the insured will not, except at the insured's own cost, voluntarily make any payment, assume any obligation
or incur any expense except First Aid Expenses.
4. Duties of an Injured Person - Coverage F - Medical Payments to Others The injured person or someone acting
on behalf of the injured person will:
a. give us written proof of claim as soon as possible, under oath if required.
b. authorize us to obtain medical records and reports.

The injured person will submit to physicalexamination by a doctorwe choose as often as we reasonably require.
5. Payment of Claim - Coverage F - Medical Payments to Others. Payment under this coverage is not an admission
of liability by an insured or us.
6. Suit Against Us. We may not be sued unless there has been full compliance with the terms of this policy. No one

-

=
7

=

has any right to make us a party to a suit to determine the liability of a person we insure. We may not be sued
under Coverage E - Personal Liability until the obligation of the insured has been determined by final judgment
or agreement signed by us.

=
-

7. Bankruptcy of an insured. Bankruptcy or insolvency of an insured will not relieve us of our duties under this
policy.

=
=
-

8. Other insurance - Coverage E

=
=

=
-

s=
!==!

s

- Personal Liability. This insurance is excess over any other valid and collectible
insurance. But if other insurance is specificallywritten as excess coverage over this policy, the limit of this policy
applies first.
Ifother insurance is written by us, only the highest limit of any one policy applies to the loss.

GENERAL CONDITIONS
Applying To The Entire Policy
1. Entire contract. This policy, the Declarations and any endorsements include all the agreements between you
and us relating to this insurance.
2. Policy Period. This policy applies only to loss under Section I or bodily injury, property damage or personal
injury under Section IIwhich occurs during the policy period as shown in the Declarations.
3. Concealment or Fraud. This entire policy is void if any insured has knowingly and willfully concealed or

misrepresentedany materialfact or circumstancerelating to this insurance before or after the loss.
4. Coverage Changes. We may change this policy or replace it to conform to coverage currently in use. If we
broaden coverages without charge during or within 60 days prior to the policy period, the broadened coverage
will apply immediately. If we restrict any coverages, these restrictionswill not apply until the next renewal date.
The change or new policy will be delivered to you or mailed to you at your mailing address shown on the
Declarations at least 30 days before its effective date.

No other change or waiver in this policy is valid except by endorsement, new Declarations, or new policy issued
by us.

=
-

-

7
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If a premium adjustment is necessary,we will make the adjustment as of the effective date of the change
5. Cancellation.
a. You may cancel this policy by:
(1) returning it to us, or
(2) notifying us in writing when cancellationis to take effect
b. We may cancel this policy by mailing or delivering written notice to you, or your representative. Such notice will
be mailed or delivered to the last address known to us. The mailing of it will be sufficientproof of notice.
Cancellation Reasons
We may cancel this policy only for the following reasons:
(1) Non-payment of premium, whether payable to us or our agent. We may cancel at any time by notifying you
at least 10 days before the date cancellationtakes effect.

56.5274 4TH EDITION d-89
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RECIPROCAL PROVISIONS
(Applicable Only If This Policy Is Issued By The Fire lnsurance Exchange Or Farmers lnsurance
Exchange)
This policy is made an8 accepted in consideration of your premium payment to us. It is also in consideration of the
power of attorney you signed as part of your application and the information you gave to us on your application.
Some of your statementsactuallybecome a part of the policy which we call "The Declarations."
When you signed the power of attorney authority on your application, you authorized the UnderwritersAssociationto
execute interinsurancepolicies between you and other subscribers.
Nothing in this policy is intended, or shall be construed, to oreate either:
1. A partnershipor mutual insurance association.
2. Any joint liability.
We may sue or be sued in our own name, as though we were an individual, if necessarytc enforce any claims which
arise under this policy. In any suit against us, service of process shall be upon the Underwriters Association,
Attorney-in-Fact.
Membership fees which you pay are not part of the premium. They are fully earned when you are granted
membership and coverage is effective. They are not returnable. However, they may be applied as a credit to
membershipfees required of you for other insurance which we agree to write.
We hold the Annual Meeting of the members of the Fire lnsurance Exchange at our Home Office at Los Angeles,
California, on the first Monday following the 15th day of March of each year at 10:OO a.m. If this policy is issued by
the Farmers lnsurance Exchange, we hold suoh meeting at the same place on the same day each year at 2:00 p.m.
The Board of ~ o v e m o r may
s
elect to change the time and place of the meeting. If they do so, you will be mailed a
written or printed notice at your last known address at least ten (10) days before suoh a time. Otherwise, no notice
will be sent to you.
The Board of Governors shall be chosen by subscribersfrom among yourselves. This will take place at the Annual
Meeting or at any special meeting which is held for that purpose. The Board of Governors shall have full power and
authority to establish such rules and regulations for our management as are not inconsistent with the subscriber's
agreements.
Your premium for this policy and all payment made for its continuance shall be payable to us at our Home Office or
such location named by us in your premium invoice.
The funds which you pay shall be placed to your credit on our records. They will be applied to the payment of your
proportion of losses and expenses and to the establishment of reserves and general surplus. The Board of
Governors or its Executive Committee has the authority to deposit, withdraw, invest, and reinvest such funds. You
agree that any amount which the Board of Governorsallocatesto our surplus fund may be retained by us. Also, after
provision is made for all of our liabilities, it may be applied to any purpose deemed proper and advantageous to you
and other policyholders.
This policy is non-assessable.
This policy shall not be effective unless countersignedon the Declarations Page by a duly authorized representative
of the Company named on the Declarations.
The Company named on the Declarationshas caused this policy to be signed by the Officers shown below.

FIRE INSURANCE EXCHANGI~
by Fire UnderwritersAssociation,
Attorney-in-Fact
FARMERS INSURANCE EXCHANGE@
by Farmers UnderwritersAssociation,
Attornevin-Fact
MID-CENTURYINSURANCECOMPANY*

Secretary

Farmers Insurance Company of Arizona
Farmers Insurance Company of Idaho
Farmers lnsurance Company of Oregon
Illinois Farmers Insurance Company
Farmers lnsurance Company, lnc.
Farmers Insuranceof Columbus, Inc.

(

Vice President :J

EXTENDED REPLACEMENT COST AND
BUILDING ORDINANCE OR L A W COVERAGE ENDORSEMENT
PROTECTOR PLUS POLICY

~6047a
1st Edition

When this endorsement is attachedto your policy, the following provisionsapply:

Extended ReplacementCost

-

- Coverage A

Under Section I Property, Additional Coverages, ltem 9. Guaranteed Replacement Cost Coverage Buildingsis deleted and replaced with the following:
9. ExrendedReplacementCost Coverage - Coverage A. We will pay to repair or replace covered loss under
Coverage A - Dwelling up to 125% of the limits of insurance for Coverage A Dwelling.

-

You must agree to and comply with the following additional policy provisions:
a. You must insure your dwelling to 100% of the replacementcost.
b. You must accept each annual adjustment in building amounts in accordance with Value Protection
Clause in the policy.
c. You must notify us within 90 days of the start of any physicalchanges which increase the value of your
insured buildings by $5,000 or more, and pay any additional premium. This includes any new
structuresand any additions to or remodeling of your dwelling on the residence premises.
We do not cover any costs required to repair, replace, rebuild, stabilize or otherwise restore the land

-

This coverage does not apply to Coverage B Separate Structures

-

Under Section I Property, conditions, 3. Loss Settlement, Coverage A and B is deleted and replaced
with the following:
3. Loss Settlement.
Coverage A and Coverage B

-

Covered loss to buildings under Coverage A Dwelling and Coverage B - Separate Structures will be
settUd at replacementcost without deduction for depredation, subject to the following methods:
1. Settlement under replacementcostwill not be more than the smallestof the following:

a. the limit of insurance under this policy that applies to the damaged or destroyeddwelling or separate
structure.
b. the replacement cost of that part of the building damaged for equivalent construction and use on the
same premises.
c. the amount actually and necessarily spent to repair or replace the building intended for the same
occupancy and use.
2. When the costto repair or replace is more than $1,000 or morethan 5% of the limit of insurance in this
policy on the damaged or destroyed building, whichever is less, we will pay no more than the actual
cash value of the damage untilrepairor replacement is completed.
3. At your option, you may make a claim under this policy on an actual cash value basis loss or damage

to buildings. Within 180 days after loss you may make a claim for any additional amount on a
replacementcost basis if the property has been repaired or replaced.
This endorsement replaces any Guaranteed Replacement Cost provision which is currently in your policy

Building Ordinance or Law Coverage

-

Under Section I Property, Losses Not Insured, ltem 5. is deleted.
Enforcement of any ordinance or law regulating construction, repair or demolition of a building or other
structure, unless endorsed on this policy.
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ENDORSEMENT AMENDING DEBRIS REMOVAL
COVERAGE AND POLLUTION EXCLUSION

~6018
1st Edition
'

When this endorsement is attached to your policy the following provisions apply:

-

-

SECTION I PROPERTY ADDITIONAL COVERAGES
1. Debris Removalis deleted and replaced with the following:

1. Debris Removal. We will pay your reasonable expenses to remove debris caused by a covered loss to
covered property under SECTION I PROPERN. However, we will not pay any expenses incurred by
you or anyone acting on your behalf to:
a. extract pollutantsfrom land or water; or
b. remove. restore or replace polluted land or water.
If the amount of loss, including debris removal expense exceeds the limit of insurance, we will pay up to
an additional 5% of the limit of insuranceon the damaged property.

-

-

SECTION II LIABILITY- EXCLUSIONS

-

-

-

Item 8 (Item 12 in Protector Plus) under SECTION II EXCLUSIONS Applying to Coverage E Personal
Liability is deleted and replaced with the following:
8. (12) A. We do not cover bodily injury or property damage resulting from the actual, alleged or

threatened discharge, dispersal, seepage, release, migration or escape of pollutants:
(1) at or from the insured location;
(2) at or from any premises, site or location which is or was at any time owned or occupied by or
rented or loaned to you or any insured;
(3) at or from any premises, site or location which is or was at any time used by or for you or any
person acting on your behalf for the handling, storage, disposal, processing or treatment of
any pollutant;
(4) which are or were at any time transported, handled, stored, treated, disposed of or processed
as waste by or for you or any person or organization for whom you may be legally
responsible; or
(5) at or from any premises, site or location on which you or any person or organization acting
directly or indirectlyon your behalf are performingoperations to:
(a) transport any pollutant on or to any site or location used for the disposal, storage,
handling, prooessingor treatmentof pollutants;or
(b) test for, monitor, clean up, remove. contain, treat, detoxify or neutralize pollutants.

5.We do not cover any loss, cost or expense arising out of any:
1. Request, demand, or order that any insured or others test for, monitor, clean up, remove,
contain, treat, detoxify or neutralize, or in any way respond to, or assess the effects of
pollutants;
2. Claim or suit by or on behalf of a governmental authority for damages because of testing for,
monitoring, cleaning up, removing, containing, treating, detoxifying or neutralizing, or in any
way responding to or assessing the effects of pollutants.
Pollutant or pollutants means any solid, liquid, gaseous or thermal irritant or contaminant.
including smoke, vapor, soot, fumes, acids, alkalis, chemicals and waste materials. Waste
materials include materials which are intended to be or have been recycled, reconditioned or
reclaimed.
Pollutant or pollutants does not mean smoke, soot or fumes from a fire caused by one or more
of the Section I - Losses Insured.
The following exclusion is added:
We do not cover any claim or suit for actual, alleged, threatened or feared bodily injury or property
damage for which you or any insured may be held legally liable because of actual, alleged, threatened or
feared bodily injury or property damage resultingfrom lead or lead poisoning.
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FARMERS:

SPECIAL STATE PROVISIONS ENDORSEMENT
IDAHO

I
I

-

~7581,

IDAHO
2nd Edition

Under General Condition 5, Cancellation, no notice of cancellation is valid unless we notify you at least 20
days before the date cancellation takes effect.
General Cond~tlon10. Polrcy Fees (does not apply to Moblle Homeowners Pol~cy)and the f~hhparagraph of
are deieted and replacedwlth the following
tne Rec!procal Prov~s~ons,
Membership or policy fees which you pay are part of the premium but are fully earned when coverage is
effective. They are not refundable (except as noted in a. and b. below), but may be applied as a credit to
membershipor policy fees required for other insurance accepted by us.

l

a. If we cancel this policy during or at the end of the first policy period, we shall refund all membershipor
policy fees.
b. If you cancel this policy during or at the end of the first policy period because itdoes not agree with the
application and is not as representedby the agent, we shall refund all membershipor policy fees.

This endorsement is part of your policy. It supersedes and controls anything to the contrary. It is otherwise
subject to all other terms of the policy.
90.7581 2NO EDITION 9.89
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SPECIAL LIMITS ON SPORTS CARDS
The following provisionsapply when this endorsementis anached to your policy:
Under SECTION I, Coverage C - Special Limits On Certain Personal Property:
Item 12. is added as follows:

12. $200 per card and $1,000 in the aggregate on sports cards, including but not limited to baseballcards.

This endorsement is part of your policy. It supersedes and controls anything to the contrary. It is otherwise
subject to all other terms of the policy.
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CHILD MOLESTATION EXCLUSION
SECTION II LIABILITY

-

We do not cover actual or alleged injury or medical expenses caused by or arising out of the actual, alleged,
or threatened molestation of a child by:
1. any insured;or
2. any employeeof any insured; or
3. any volunteer. person for hire, or any other person who is acting or who appears to be acting on behalf
of any insured.

Molestation includes but is not limited to any act of sexual misconduct, sexual molestation or physical or
mental abuse of a minor.

-

=
-

We have no duty to defend or settle any molestation claim or suit against any insured, employee of any
insured, or any other person.
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This endorsement is part of your policy. It supersedes and controls anything to the contrary. It is otherwise
subject to all other terms of the policy.

-
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OPTIONAL PAYMENT PLAN ON RENEWAL OF POLICY

=
=
=EsE!

_1_

IDAHO
1st Edition

If we send you an offer to renew any of all of the coverages in your policy, we will send you a Renewal
Premium Notice. You may pay the premium either in full or in two equal installments.
If paid in installments,we will add a servicecharge when the policy is renewed.
The first premium installment, including the service charge, shall be payable on or before the policy renewal
date. The second installmentshallbe payable not later than 60 days afterthe renewal date.

zEE!!z

This endorsement is part of your policy. It supersedes and controls anything to the contrary. It is otherwise
subject to all other terms of the policy.
9 0 . 7 ~ 4ISTEDITION 6.85
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EXHIBIT "B"

October 24,2003

Farmers Insmince Company of Idaho
PO Box 4820
PocatelIo ID 83205

.--- - - -

Anached hereto and incorporated herein by reference are :

__

-

D a t e v

'

(i)

Policy Declarations;

(ii)

Exhibit "1" - Service MastcrMeny Maids invoice

(~ii) Exhibit "2"- F a h a y Floors estimate
(iv) Exhibit "3" -Personal Property lnvcntory

(v)

Exhibit "4" - Modcnl Glass Company invoice

PROOF OF LOSS TO COMPLY WITE(
SECIlON 41-1839, IDAHO CODE
NAME OF POLICY:
D

4" Edition, 'Your Protection Plus Package Policy" Idaho
03/24/03 (Initial issue date 12/01/97)

A ISSUED:
~

DATE EXPLRED:

03/23/04

DATE OF LOSS:

07102103

NAME OF INSUREDS:

Brian L. Armstrong and Glenda A. Armstrong

MORTGAGEE:

GMAC 'Mortgage Corporation or Greenpoint Mortgage
PO Box 79363
PO Box 10430
City of Industry CA
VanNuys CA 91410
91716-9363

NUMBER OF POLICY

9 1828-03-27

AGENT ISSUING POLICY: David R. Nipp

FARMERS CLAIM NO.:

1003763049

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE at the time of the loss hereinatleer described, the above
policy of insurance war; issued by Farmers Insurance Group of Companies (Famers
Insurance Company of Idaho) to Brian and Glenda Armseong.
PROOF OF LOSS

-

1

n.. ? A.

.

Exhibit #
Cas
k.
u F m ' 2
Deponent/&-,+&
Reporter
-r= Naegeli @porti;tgCorporation
(800) F;~X-:ZZF;
F A X (sn:) 227-7123

LIMITS:

COVERAGES:

$

133,000.00

wlExtended Replacement
Cost endorsement (E6047a).

5 -Separate Structures:

$

13,300.00

p o t applicable to this loss.]

C - Personal Property:

$

99,750.00

D -Loss of Use:

S 66,500.M)

p o t applicable to this loss.]

ADDITIONAL COVERAGES: [Applicable to this Loss]

1.

Debris Removal:

s

2.

Emergency Repairs:

% included in limits

3.

Emergency Removal of Property:

S inciuded in limits

5% of Dwelling Limit

AMOUNT CLAIMED UNDER THE TERMS OF TElS POLICY:

a
-

The insureds claim the sum of: [Approximate loss based on estimate]

.$

3,603.83

(Dwelling Repair) Coverage A
See. Exhibit "I, " ServiceMarter invoice.

$

2,691.00

fDwclling Repair) Covcrage A
See, Exhibit "2,"FairwayFloors estimate,

$

23 1.72

(Pmonal Ropeny) Coverage C

$

949.00

See, Exhibit "1,"p.10
(Personal Property) Coverage C
See, Exhibit "3."

$

150.00

$

96.39

$

180.56

$

7.902.50
500.00

7.4025
PROOF OF LOSS

-2

(Emergency repair) Additional Coverages
included in Dwelling Repair invoice.
See. Exhibif "1,"p. 9 as 'Servicecall," also Lnbor Ready iabor.
(Debris Removal) Additional Coverages
Included in Dwelling Repair Invoice,
&e, Exhibit "1,"p.9 as "haul debris."
Residence Glass- Waiver of Deductible Endorsement (E6154 3* Ed.)
Sec,Exhibit "4. "
Subtotal

(Lessdeductible)
Total

The insureds have fulfilled all of the terms of the palicy in that all premiums were paid currcnt.
No attempt to deceive the undmvriter was in any manner made at any time. AU ulformation
heretofore givcn by the insured including prior oral and written notice of the loss to the company is a
part of this Proof of Loss. Any other information that may be required will be furnished and
considered part of this Proof of Loss.

DATED t h i x d a y of October 2003

STATE OF IDAHO

)

Couxity of Kootenai

) ss.
)

The undersigned, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and states:

That they are the insureds in the above-entitled matter, that they have read thc foregoing
document, and based on their information and belief, it contains m e and accurate information.

p&z%hi /&RJ&

GLENDA A. ARMSTRONG

tt

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me t h i s a day of October 2003.
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NON EXOICEB DILICOUWTL] XRVE BEZn A P P L I E D TO YOUR POLICY.

W U C Y ACTMIY(w8un MWNT OUE WlH ENCLOSED INVOICE1

DEDUCTISLES
$500

DBdudiWele appltcaWm wveredtosseeunder
Coverage A. 8, C

$

I

823.75

I
AMY

Tnis Oec~arationspageis pan of your p l i c y It supersodesand conrrols
anytnlngto me mnvary. Itis othemtse sublect to all other terms of ')re poi~cy.

'TOTAL'

WIICE

PaymenteorCredile cn cnnn a.oo an

.- -.---

/1$-'565.53

AGENT

PrwMu~BQlanca
DUE
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W-5
OVER L7.M
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David R . Nipp

AGENTPHONE: ( 2 0 8 ) 773-8484
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ServiceMasterMerrf Maids

Claim Rep.:

Biig
CIpim Number

R&!'

khm

2WAnl~ulr

CDA.TC) R381 J
Poky Number

U

U
Dotes:
Date uf Lous:

07/02n]3

Type uf Lou Water Damage

Dacc h i v e d :

07nM)3

Dtducniie
S U.OU

ServiceMasrer/Merry Maids

Rwm: cbscl

240.00 SF Walls
17.25 SFFlwr
flO0 SF Long Wall

Sf W& & Ceiliay
30.W L F M Pcrimetu
3n.m
CCL p m m n ~ r

287.25

47.25 SF Ceiting

525 SYRooring
0.00 SF short wall

w

Qm

DESUUPnON

o n kom tlwr
~ p p anti-microbial
b
agent
Drying fun (paday) N o ~uciitoring
1 Drying fan lur 3 days
Bifold door sM (sLi@c) dabs o*
DcWh 8:nsct
W md

-

-

-

my17

.. .

TOTAL

4 7 . 3 SF
17.25 SF
3.00FA

liI11
7.56

33.00

K,.lH)

1.00EA
30.00 LF

14.34
1.15

l4.2-b
34.50

0.36
0.16

-

W4.m SF Wall$
ISJ.88 SF Rwr
0.%) SF Lveg Wail

UNI‘T
- .. . . .-Qm
- . .-... .. -...-.-

DESCIUPTIOlS
Waxer cx't~~ctirrn
boa awr

558.88 SF WuUs & Ceiliog
5 0 . 9 30 Floor Pmmeter
50.50 LF Ceil. Pameter

154.88 SF Ceiling
17.21 SY nooriag
0.00 SFShon Wall

,

'

LiR f q c t liudrying
Tesr out wet citrprt pad arid bag f o r ~ v j d
Apply &-microbial agent

TOTAL
.--

4921 Duncan Dr.
C~rewd'Alcae.113 83811
i',08)46i&33 (j09,k927.9-116 Flur(208)GGi47g

Qm

DESCRIPTION
1 Dmgfao for 3 day
STm carpet

Dascbcud - 3 IW" MDF
Paint hiucb~~ardh+ouxis

-

WIT

TOTAL

4.00 Lf
50.50
?'.I

3.29

50.30 LF

0.71

13.16
67.67
33.86

1.34

Rmm Tutnt.: txrrcire m

565.23

1,0924 SF Walk & Ceiling
72.25 1
1 Floor PPimcv~
72.23 LF Cdl. Prrimaa

Qm

.DESCRIPTION
~~~-~

~~

Water e~ructiiunFrom flollr
lift carpa for dr)'mg
Tear out wet urpe( pad and bg for &pod
Appty anti-micmbial a$&

Carpel p3d
CluadnddadnrircoJrpt
D r y q f a n w dq) - No monirwing
1 Drying f w ~ slur I dry wd I fur3 day8
Dehumidifiuunit (psday) No mmiinring
I Dehu for 3 d a p
f*zceboanf 3 tJJ' .WF

-

-

UnT

TOTAL

Se~ccNaster/Nem,Maids
4031 D~mcm
Lh

Coeurdftknc.ID 83615

(20e)-c;Gi4433 (509)-977-9116 Far (20R)ri(i7-174G

DESCRIPTION

-

- two cum

P m l b&ard

QNTY

UNIT

TOTAL

i ? 25 LF

071

51 30

-ROW Total~Wtng mum

1.431.62

Rwm: landing
Il0.W SF Walk
22.99 SFFIW

0.W S F k Wall

DESCRIPTION

-

.

132.99 SF Walls & CclIing
13.75 LFFlmrPCnmetq
13.75 IE CcrL P&M

2299 SFC~iling
2.55 SY Flnrring
0.M) SF Short WaH

Qm

IJNm

TOTAL
.-

Water chnaction tiom Door
.Ln~~fur$?.ing
Tc'cu out wet -1
pad wd bbag fur disposal
App+ mi-microbial +$en1

1.9 cxining caqxt - labor Dnl!
Clcm rmd
carpet

-

Basebniud 3 LiJ' MDF

-

P&t bascbad two ccou

Rwm Totalr: Iandtng

85UO

ServiceMastcr&fcny Maids
4941 D u u m Dr.

CLW d'Alenc. 1U 83815

(208)Gi-G633 (509)-927.94 lG Fax (tOR)GGi-4736

Tax W # 82.0503855
Rwm: hall
370.33 SF Walls & Ceiling
3G.51) LFFI'wr Pnirnera
3G.3 LFC=.ilTPRimerer

DESCRlFTION

.... .. ....--* QNTY

UNlT

TOTAL

Wruer ex-swn tiom tlwr
LiR carpci for *ilg
T m out wet wnpet ped and bag for disposal
Appk ti-microbial agent
Cerpcl pad

Lqv cwriapcnrpcl - 1Dbw cYdy
C i a and &dwize carpet

Rwm: h c d w m I
JinGi SF Walls
IGGZG S F R m
0.00 SF Lme: Wall
DESCRIPTION
Wmix exlritction Crom !lwr
Lin carp1 for dqinp
Tear out wct wrpn pad itnd bag for &spd
AppLy anti-microbial q c n l

1GG.X SFCding
18.47 SY fluwine

636.93 SF W a s & Ceiling
58.83 LF Flow Paboetcr
38.63 LF Ccil P&m

0.00 SF&n W d

Qm
143.94 SF
15394 SF
143.95 SF
287.88 SF

UNIT

TOTAL

0.36
0.21

30.23

0.25

35.90

0 16

46.06

51.82

OPll Y2fXJ3 Page: 5

ServiceMaster/Merrg Maids

m i n g fan (pea dux) - No mmiloring
1 Doing fan fur 3 days
&.d-khluulnsl

DESCRIPTION

t)mr

UNlT

TOTAL

Warcr avwtiun &w1fltur
lift c m p d lor
Tear awci ~arpetpad and bag for d i s p e l
Appk anti-microbid ngmt

wig

C K p n pad

L ~ &b;iuting
J
c a p e - luhK only
Clcan and dcrrforiur carpd
Baseboard -31
and rrat

-

..
be?mTorah clrt bdrm 1

7U37

4911 Uuncoo Dr.
Coax 6Alenc. ID 113815
(308)-667433 (39)-927-9416 Fa (208)(i67JiJG

1ZR.O SF Walls

SFTkxx
0.00 SF Long Wail

854i

DESCRIPTION

.-

413.47 SF Walls &. C e i h g

85.47 SF Ceiling

41 .XI LF Flwr Yenmetcr
41 .W L.F Ceil. Perimeter

9.50 SY FlwMg
0.00 SFSborI Wall

~m

. ...

TOTAL

UNIT

Wnta esuactitm Gum flax

LiH curpr( fur wing
T u r our wer wrpa pad and bag for dispusal
Apply anti-midial a p 1 1

C w t pad

-

La!.csistingcypet l r h r im!v
Clrandriaxkuizcuupl
Dr)'inp fan @aday) - No mwitaing
I Drying ran for 3 d a y
B a l m a d Mach and resit
Dcur t h p (jamb & casing) JTtu3G'widc - S&I ~ s d c

-

-

388.a

Rlrwn Total.: bedroom 2

Rurm: bdrm 2 elst

138.157 SF Walls
ld.08 SF klmr
0.00 SF Luog Wail
DESCRIPTION
....
. . .- ..Wacw extrwti~\11
Gum floor
Ldt ctupet for dqing
Tear nut wcl carpel p;rd mil bag fur dq%d
Apply nnti-microbial agent
.

.

ARMSTRONG-?

132.75 SF Walls & Celiing
17.33 LF nwr Perimasr
17.33 LF Ccil. Pairnet=

14.m SFCeikg
1.56 SY nmring

0.03 SFShort Wail

Qm

UNlT

- -.- ..-. .- TOTAL
-,

-

CONTINUED bdrm 2 ctrr

O

m

WNlT

TOTAL

-

I+ eusrinp +T
labar onir
Clem ;vld~ ~ r i q zc el
B&ad
- k t a c b and reset

-

Room T
&

bdrm 2 dst

48.60

R a w : laundry
,

349.33 SF Walls
ll6.?2 SFRuor
000 SF Lmg W d

DESCRIPTION

-

R a w Toralr-. Isuodry

f 16.92 SF Ceiliog

JGG.2G SF Walls & Cdling
43.67 LF F'iwa P a i m c t ~
43.67 L F C d l P c b d e t

12.99 SYFlmring
0.M) SF Short Wan

QNlY

UNlT

TOTAL

.91.01

ServiceiMasteriMerry Maids
l ? 2l Duncan DL
Carwd'Aiore. ID 83815

(208)*,6i4633 (509)-927-Q4lfiFax (20Rfl67-4746

'Inx D i( 824503853

DESCRlPTiON

Qm

UNIT

Qmy

UNiT

TOTAL

Qm

UNlT

TOTAL

1.0OE.4

18.GI

28.61

LF

Li.41

87.111;

..

TOTAL

Wara cu~ncsioofivm Uwr
Appb and-microbial agmt
fan (prr day) No monitorke
I Drying fan fur I day

-

mini

DESCRlFTION
Senice CaU
If& ddcbris

-

p? pickup

DESCBlPnON

-

mck load including chunp f

.-.

s

~

.. . --.... . .... - -

-

Clean & deoclorirn moiimrp or box apriog nvin
Clnm lvvselrt - pluin fubric

3.M)

..

ServiccMasterDferry Maids
~ 9 2 hincan
1
Dr.

CclcurdAlenr. ID 83815
(559)-927-44iGFe i208)Wji-JifG

(208)&7.fA.i3

-

CONTINUED Perrunal Property

DESCRlPIlON

. ..

Clcan sofa
-

Qm'

UNIT

TOTAL

7.130LF

IG.58

1iGOG

...

Rmm Totab: Persond Pnrpcrty

- ..

-. .

Area Items Tvtal: Mmn Level

-.-. .

UI.72

..

4421.YJ

-

LiDe itcm Tot&: ARMSTRONG3

.f.UZl.')-l

Grand Total Areas:
3.552.00 3
:Wnlls
1.32678 S F R o u
0.00 SF b u r Wall

0.00 S u r f n ~A m
0.00 Tuta) Ridge Lcngtb

1D.78 SFCeiiing
136.31 SYR&g
0.M SF .%aiWaU

000 N u m b ofS q ~ m s
0.m ~ ~ d n i p i m &

4.778.78 SF WaUs & Ceiling
U.(X1

LFRmPcrimcta

W.M LFCdl. Pcrimerer

0.00 Total Peiimerer Len$&
0.00 AruofFace I

ServieeMasterlMerry Maids

Summary for Water Damage
Line itan 'Cad
Mataid Salm Tax

4,031.94

@

S.OD(Phs

685.75

34.20

.-

Subtolal

1,046.23

Grand Total

4#.56J3

..

ESIGW CENTER

Glenda Aimstrang
Re: Carpet replacement
Due to water damage

Install new carpet over existing pad
Thraughout basement Except bedrooms
$1855.00

Install new carpet over misting pad
In bedrooms in basement

Any questions please cafl

Thank you,

G?--

L.4

Ryan Wells

-

208 1777-771 1 FAX 203i777-7722
lGrh & Hwy 41 4065 E. lGch Avc. P a Falls, ID 83854
PO.Box 1946 Uavdcn T aLr TD RlZiqF

06 1

EXHIBIT "3"
INVENTORY OF ACTUAL CASH VALUE AND LOSSLDAMAGE
TO PERSONAL PROPERTY
QUANTITY

DESCRIPTION

ACTUAL
CASH VALUE
(estimate)

L0S.S AND
DAMAGE

1

Antique chair

1

Twin mattress

1

King-size down comforter

200.00 Wafer damaged

2

Twin-size down comforters

120.00 Water damaged

I

Coffee table

274.00 Replacement cost

1

Oriental rug

.I

$

200.00 Re-upholstery
80.00 Water damaged

Unknown Water damaged

Television (service call)

75.00 Electrical damage
-

TOTAL:

U49.OQ

SCOTTY'S ELECTRIC CO.
5319 Mt. Carroll St.
Cowr d'Alcne, ID 83815
(208) 676-8057 !.k LI7IIh
"Beam Me Up SCOW
Ce;iamuwsO*EP

! .*cue

PO.

W F
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1
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-1.
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i TOTAL /
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Codern
' . Glass

Company

I

i

-

COMYERC=L RPIUDENTW
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1
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SEO ID 181Qm7W

INVOICE NO.

Rd.NO.

.i-:
_,

.-.:
.:......
I ... .?:<+i'
.

. . . .
RbnNBM

-

'

Signature o f this receipt a c k n o v h e d g e s material Wed above has b e 9 r a a i v e d a n d inspected.

..

36322

b'?

. .
NOT RESWHYBLE RHI M ~ ~ ~ D & &W&E
; E oJOB. -9
OVhlECTTO CHbNQE WCliCUT NOTIC€
RECEIPT REWhReD FOR WARRANTY CUUYS.

-

Nadonal Document Center
P.0. Box 268994
Okkhoma City, OK 73126.8994

November 14,2003

Brian and Glenda Armstrong
3259 N. 14&St.
Coeur d'Alene, ID 838 14
Re:

Uaim Number:
Policy Number:
Date of h s :

1003763049
75-918280327
7/2/03

Dear Mr. and Mrs.Armstrong:

This l e t m is in response to rhe Proof of Loss you submitted. From our National Document Center, we received
nor6cation of your document on November 7, 2003.
Afcer reviewing your informarion, there is nothing I can see that changes the Facts of loss. Please review cbe
letter to you dated October 2,2003. Without any discrepancies in the kccual information, Fire Insurance
Exchange is unable to reverse irs original decision to dedine coverage for your loss.
In summary, your policy provides coverage for water damage that is 1) sudden and acadental and 2) arises from
a discharge from a plumbing, heating, air conditioning system, or a honsehoid appliance. Items thac are
considered household appliances indude dishwashers, refrigerators and washing machines. Items not
cdasidered household appliances include aquariums, waterbeds, flower pots, Christmas tree stands and standalone swimming pools. If your swimming pool hooked into your plumbing system, it would trigger coverage
under your poliq.
Prior to the dean up and repair of your damages, I am not aware of any detrimental reliance provided by
anyone associated wirh Fire Insurance Exchange. Additionally, rhe fam of your loss were brought to my
arrenuon by your agent several weeks prior to your decision to cum in chis claim. The information we provided
through your agenr has not changed. With a w h e n contract of insurance provided to you when your policy
was issued, thac takes precedent over any lack of oral details provided by any representatives of Fire Insurance
Exchange.

If you have any questions, you are welcome m call me collect at (208) 376-9061
Sincerely,

Fire Insurance Exchan e

VL
Joel B-,
GCA
Field Claims Supervisor
Boise & Coeur d'Alene Propeny

G: David Nipp

8

End: Lare= dated October 2" and September 17&,2003
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EXHIBIT 'aD"

07: 0

October 5, 2004

Brian Armstrong

Page 11

the mortgage.
Q.

Do you recall what month that was?

A.

I don't.

Q.

And did you and your wife actually go to

Mr. Nipp's office to meet with him?
A.

Yes.

Q.

What do you recall you discussed at the

time of that meeting?
A.

Coverages, liabilities, some what-ifs.

Q.

What kinds of what-ifs were referenced in

the meeting if you recall?

A.

We spoke about the above ground pool where

he just basically told us to make sure we had a
locked fence, to put a fence around the house, which
we had a six foot fence around the house which we
had and kept it locked.
Q.

Do you recall what you asked him about the

pool and coverages of and surrounding the pool?
A.

I don't recall.

Q.

Prior to the events of July 2, 2003, had

you ever submitted any claim under any homeowners
policy?
A.

One more time with the question.

Q.

Sure.

Prior to the events of July 2,

2003, had you ever submitted any claims under any

Brian Annstrong

October 5,2004
Page 12

1

homeowners policies?

2

A.

I don't recall.

3

Q.

What do you recall Mr. Nipp said about or

4

in relation to the pool?

5

A.

It would be covered.

6

Q.

Did he say how?

A.

No.

Q.

Did you talk to him about different kinds

of what-ifs in relation to the pool?

The what-if I

think was the phrase you used before.
A.

Worst case scenario.

Q.

What kind of worst case scenario did you

talk to him about?
A.

I believe as we were leaving I just asked

worst case scenario what if it leaked and it caused
damage would we have coverage, and his response was
sure.

Q.

Now as a result of that meeting was a

policy of insurance issued?
A.

Yes.

Q.

And did you get a copy of that policy?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Did you read it over after you got it?

A.

No.

Q.

Now I asked your wife about the renewals

Brtan Armstrong

October 5,2004
Page 15

insurance discussion.
Q.

Was that a separate discussion from

renewal of the homeowners policy?
A.

Yes.

Q.

But with respect to renewal of the

homeowners policy did you do the meetings 'or did
your wife, or did you both do the meetings each
year?
A.

I don't think we had renewal meetings.

Q.

Was it just a conversation we want to keep

going with the policy?
A.

Uh-huh.

Q.

Was that by phone if you recall?

A.

Payment?

Q.

No, just to tell him you wanted to renew

that policy or add anything to it.

Were those by

phone if you recall?
A.

I don't recall.

Q.

When did you first learn there'd been a

problem on July 2?
A.

I came home for lunch like I normally do

and made myself lunch, was sitting down.
rang.

It was my wife.

thought it was fine.

The phone

She said how's the pool.

Went and looked out the back

window, and it had basically fallen apart or

I

Brian Armstrong

October 5,2004
I

I

Page

collapsed which got the memory, the sensories
triggering.

I thought some windows were open in the

house where it smelled kind of fresh, fresh air, and
pretty soon realized what the problem was.
Q.

This was a lunchtime conversation you had

with your wife?
A.

Somewhere thereabouts

Q.

What happened next?

A.

I got off the phone with my wife, called

Shelly, that was a short conversation, and did what
I had to do to start cleaning up my house.

Q.

You said you called Shelly.

say to Shelly in that call?

What did you

She's with Mr. Nipp's

oifice?
A.

Correct.

Q.

What did you say to Shelly if you recall?

A.

I told her that part of my pool ended up

in my basement and part of it in the backyard, and
she said sorry Brian, that's not covered, and that
was the end of the conversation

Q.

Did she say how she knew it wasn't

covered?
A.

No.

Q.

At that time did you ask to speak to Mr

Nipp or just spoke to her?

Bnan Armbong

October 5,2004

I asked to speak to Dave.

Q.

What did she say about Mr. Nipp coming to

the phone?

3

He was not available.
After that did you godownstairs and

Q.

explore the extent of the damage?

6

You bet I did.
Can you tell me what you saw when you went

Q.

downstairs?

11

good idea of what 2,000 gallons of water can do in a

12

basement that's 1,500 square feet.
Was there still standing water in the

Q.

basement at that time?
About how deep was the water at that time?

Q.

One to two inches, three inches in spots.
Q.

After you went downstairs and looked at

the extent of the damage what did you do next?

19

20

A.

!

\

Grabbed a wet vac, grabbed a phone book

P

21

and the phone, went outside, started sucking up

8

22

water, and made some phone calls for help.

1
I

23

Q.

24

office?

25
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EXHIBIT "E'"

Glenda Armstrong

October 5,2004

I don't know.
Q.

What do you recall of your initial visit

in about 1999 with Mr. Nipp in order to acquire
insurance?

I wanted to know what the complete policy
6

was and if we were to install a pool what was

7

necessary.
You discussed that with Mr. Nipp in 1999?
When you purchased the house in 1999 was

11

your plan to install a pool?

Q.

When you discussed this pool with Mr. Nipp

14

did you discuss the configuration of the pool as

15

either an above ground or in-ground pool?

A.

Above ground.
Just for a time reference when did you

18

install the pool at the property?
We install it every spring.
Q.

21

When was the first time you installed it

or set it up?
I don't know.
Q.

24

Do you remember what time of year in 1999

you took possession of the property?

DOUGLAS S. MARFICE, ISB #4072
APRIL M. LINSCOTT, ISB #7036
RAMSDEN & LYONS
6 18 North 4'h Street
Post Office Box 1336
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816-1336
Telephone: (208) 664-5818
Facsimile:
(208) 664-5884
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

BRIAN ARMSTRONG and GLENDA
ARMSTRONG, husband and wife,
Plaintiffs,
VS.
FARMERS INSURANCE COMPANY OF
IDAHO, an Idaho corporation; CORPORATE
DOES I - X, whose true names are unknown,

Case No. CV- 03-9214
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT
OF PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR
PARTIAL SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

Defendants.

COME NOW Plaintiffs, Brian and Glenda Armstrong, and submit this Memorandum

In Support Of Motion For Partial Summary Judgment.
I. NATUKE OF CLAIM

This case concerns the interpretation of a homeowner's insurance policy. Plaintiffs,
Brian and Glenda Armstrong (the Armstrongs), insured their home through the Defendant,
Farmers Insurance Company of Idaho (Farmers). The Armstrongs' home was damaged on
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July 2,2003 when their above-ground swimming pool suddenly and unexpectedly collapsed.
The collapse caused thousands of gallons of water, as well as soil and debris, to flow into the
Armstrongs' finished basement. Farmers denied coverage under the Armstrongs' policy. The
Armstrongs contend that their policy provides for coverage and, by this motion, they seek
partial summary judgment in the form of a declaration interpreting their policy and enforcing
their right to coverage.
11. STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED FACTS
1.

The Armstrongs purchased a "Protector Plus" homeowner's insurance policy

number 91828-0327 (the "Policy") from Farmers' agent David Nipp. The Policy's stated
coverage period was March 24,2003 to March 23,2004. A 8 D. Mnrfice, Ex. A.
2.

The Armstrongs discussed the Policy coverages with Farmer's agent at the

time of purchasing the policy.

Depo. Tr. Brian Armstrong p. 11; Depo. Tr. Glenda

Amstkongp. 9.
3.

The Annstrongs informed Farmer's agent that they had an above-ground

swimming pool and that they wished to be covered for the swimming pool. Depo. Tr, Glenda
Armstrongp. 9.
4.

Farmers' agent told the Armstrongs that damage from the pool would be

covered under the Policy. Depo. Tr. Brian Armstrongp. 12, 11. 3-1 7.

5.

The Policy in Section I - Losses Insured - Coverage A - Dwelling provides

coverage for "accidental direct physical loss to [the Armstrongs' dwelling] except as
provided in Section I - Losses Not Insured." See, Policy, Ex. A to Afl D. Marfice.
6.

The Policy in Section I - Losses Insured - Coverage A - Dwelling provides

coverage for "the dwelling . . . on the residence premises used principally as your private

-
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residence. . . . wall-to-wall carpeting attached to the dwelling is part of the dwelling." Id.
7.

The Policy in Section 1 - Losses Jnsured - Coverage C - Personal Property

provides coverage for:
Sudden and accidental discharge or overflow of
water or steam from within a plumbing, heating or
air conditioning system, or from within a
household appliance, but not for deterioration, rust,
mold, wet or dry rot due to the presence of water
over a period of time.
Id.
8.

The Policy in Section I - Losses Not Insured - paragraph 2 excludes coverage

for loss caused by water damage. Id.
9.

The Policy in Definitions defines water damage. The express definition does

include damage caused by the sudden or accidental discharge of water from within a
household appliance. Id. (See, also, footnote 1 herein.)
10.

The Policy in Section I -Losses Not Insured - states:

"We do not insured for loss . . . caused. . . by:

***
a. wear and tear, marring, deterioration;
b. mechanical breakdown;
C. . . .

If any of the perils listed in a-i above . . . cause water to escape suddenly
and accidentally from a . . . household appliance, we cover loss not
otherwise excluded to the dwelling . . . caused by water . . . "
Id.
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On July 2, 2003, the Armstrongs' home was damaged when their swimming

1 1.

pool suddenly and unexpectedly collapsed causing water to flood into their finished
basement. Depo. Tr. Brian Armstrong, pp. 15-1 7.
12.

The release of water from the pool caused damage to the h s t r o n g s ' dwelling

and its contents. Id., Depo. Tr. B. Armstrong, p. 16, 11.12-20. Armstrongs immediately
notified Famers of the loss. Id.,
13.

7 13.

On September 17, 2003, Farmers wrote to the Armstrongs denying coverage.

See, Depo. Tr. Brian Armstrong, Ex. 3.
14.

On October 2,2003, Farmers again wrote to the Armstrongs denying coverage

for the loss. See, Depo. Tr. Brian Armstrong, Ex.2.
15.

On October 24, 2003, the Armstrongs prepared and submitted a Sworn

Statement in Proof of Loss to comply with Idaho Code $41-1839 and the policy. See, Depo.
Tr. B. h-mstrong, Ex. 4.
16.

By letter dated November 14, 2003, Farmers again informed the h s t r o n g s

that it was denying their claim. See, Depo. Tr. B. Armstrong, Ex. 6.

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56 governs motions for summary judgment. Rule 56(a)
provides that a party, seeking to recover upon a claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment
may, move for a summary judgment in that party's favor. Rule 56(c) provides in pertinent
part that judgment "shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law."

-
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"Whether language contained in an insurance policy is ambiguous is a question of law
to be determined by the trial judge." Gordon v. Three Rivers Agency, Inc., 127 Idaho 539,542,
903 P.2d 128, 131 (Ct. App. 1995); Clark v. Prudential Property and Casualty Ins. Co., 138
Idaho 538, 541, 66 P.3d 242, 245 (2003). "Where the policy language is clear and
unambiguous, coverage must be determined, as a matter of law." Id.

IV. LEGAL ARGUMENT
Farmer's policy is unambiguous and covers the Armstrong's damages, alternatively,
even if Farmer's policy is found to be ambiguous the Armstrongs are still covered for the
losses at issue.
A.

The Armstrongs' Homeowner's Policy expressly provides coverage for loss
caused by the sudden accidental discharge of water from a household appliance.
(i) Where the policy language is clear and unambiguous coverage must be determined

in accordance with the plain meaning of the words used. Nedrow v. Unigard Security Ins.
Co., 132 Idaho 421, 423, 974 P.2d 67, 69 (1998); Mutual of Enumclaw Ins. Co., 128 Idaho
232,235,912 P.2d 119, 122 (1996); Clark v. Prudential Property and Casualty, 138 Idaho at
541, 66 P.3d at 245. Under Farmers' Policy, coverage is expressly provided for personal
property loss if caused by "sudden and accidental discharge or overflow of water ... from
within a plumbing, heating or air conditioning system, or from a household appliance.. ." See,
Afl D. Mafice, Ex.A. Coverage C, 13.
Under the dwelling loss portion of the Policy, Farmers purports to exclude "water
damage." However, the Policy definition of the term "water damage" is such that the
Armstrongs' loss does not fall within that exclusion.' Moreover, the Policy qualifies its

1

The Policy, Defmitions states as follows:

-
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"water damage" exclusion even further making it inoperable to deny coverage here where the
loss occurred from a sudden deterioration or break down of the Armstrongs' pool. See, A$
D. Marfice, Ex.A., Section I - Losses Not Iwured,

fi 13 ("lfany of the perils

listed. . . cause

water to escape suddenly and accidentally from a plumbing, heating, or air conditioning
system or household appliance, we cover loss . . . to the dwelling caused by water . . . '9.
(underline added)

The only rationale offered by Farmers for denying the Armstrongs coverage was,
"Your swimming pool is not part o f a plumbing, heating or air conditioning system, nor is it

... a household appliance. Therefore, our original decision to decline coverage will remain. "
See, Depo. Tr. B. Armstrong, Ex. C. This is an admission by Farmers that the Policy's blanket

exclusion for "water damage" is inapplicable. In its October 2, 2003 denial letter, Farmers
volunteered as much, stating: "Within the water damage exclusion, some coverage is given
back.';~ee,Depo. Tr. B. Armstrong, Ex. 2.
(ii) Since loss caused by water which has escaped from an appliance is clearly not
excluded and is expressly covered, the question becomes: Was the Armstrongs' pool an
appliance under the terms of the policy?

19. Water damage - means loss caused by, resulting from, contributed to or aggravated by any of the following,
whether occurring on or away from the residence premises;
a. water from rain or snow, surface water, flood, waves, tidal water, overflow or escape of a body of
water, or spray from any of these, whether or not driven by wind;
b. water which backs up through sewers or drains;
c. water which escapes from any system designed to drain water away from the dwelling or residence
premises, including but not limited to roof gutters, downspouts, sump-pumps, sump-pump wells, leach
fields, seepage pits, septic tanks or drainage channels;
d. water below ground level whether occurring naturally or not, including water which exerts pressure on,
or seeps or leaks through a building, sidewalk, driveway, wall, foundation, swimming pool, or any portion
of the residence premises.
None of the above descriptions apply to the type of damage at issue in the Annstrongs' loss. While their loss was
caused by water, it was not "water damage" as defmed in the Policy.

08s
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The ordinary, dictionary definition of the word "appliance" is: "An instrument or'
device designed for a particular use." See, WEBSTERS, 9TH COLLEGIATE
DICTIONARY
(1985).

A swimming pool certainly fits that definition. The Idaho Code also provides persuasive
authority on this point. Under the Property Condition Disclosure Act, the statutorily required
Seller Property Disclosure Form contains the following language:
4. All appliances and service systems included in the sale,
(such as refrigeratorlfreezer, rangeloven, dishwasher, disposal,
hoodtfan, central vacuum, microwave oven, trash compactor,
smoke detectors, tv antennaidish, fireplacelwood stove, water
heater, garage door opener,pooNhot tub, etc.).
See, I.C. $55-2508 (emphasis added). If a poolhot tub is an "appliance" for purposes of a
real estate vendor's statutorily mandated disclosure, why would a pool not be an "appliance"
for purposes of the Policy?
"Insurance policies are a matter of contract between the insurer and the insured.
Brinkkan v. Aid Ins. Co., 115 Idaho 346,352,766 P.2d 1227,1233 (1988). In the absence of
ambiguity, an insurance policy must be construed as any other contract and understood in its
plain, ordinary and proper sense, according to the meaning derived from the plain wording of
the contract. Juker v. American Livestock Ins. Co., 102 Idaho 644, 645, 637 P.2d 792, 793
(1981); Bonner County v. Panhandle Rodeo Ass'n, Inc., 101 Idaho 772, 776, 620 P.2d 1102,
1106 (1980)." Gordon v. Three Rivers Agency, Inc., 127 Idaho 539, 903 P.2d 128 (Ct. App.

"If the language of a policy is susceptible to only one meaning this meaning must be
given effect." Mutual of Enumclaw ins. 128 Idaho at 236, 912 P.2d at 123. Under the plain
meaning of the words used in the Farmers' Policy, the Armstrongs' swimming pool is a
household appliance.
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B.

Even if the Policy is ambiguous, the Armstrongs are still entitled to coverage for'
their loss.
If the term "household appliance" used by Farmers in the insurance policy purchased

by the Armstrongs is subject to more than one reasonable interpretation then, the term is
ambiguous, as a matter of law. "[Wlhere there is an ambiguity in an insurance contract,
special rules of construction apply to protect the insured." Foremost Ins. Co. v. Putzier, 102
Idaho 138, 142,627 P.2d 317, 321 (1981). Under these special rules, insurance policies are to
be construed most liberally in favor of recovery, with all ambiguities being resolved against
the insurer. Gordon v. Three Rivers Agency, Inc., 127 Idaho 539, 903 P.2d 128 (Ct. App.
1985) citing Foremost Inc. v. Putzier, supra.
Ambiguity exists only if a policy term is reasonably subject to conflicting
interpretation. Nedrow v. Unigard,, 132 Idaho at 422, 974 P.2d at 68. The term "household
appliance" is not defined in Farmers' Policy (even though the term "water" is!) See, A 8 D.
Marfice, Ex. A. After the loss, Farmers sought to arbitrarily limit the Policy by manufacturing
a self-serving definition of a plain policy term. Writing to the Armstrongs, Farmers stated:
"Items not considered household appliances include aquariums, waterbeds,
flower pots, Christmas tree stands and stand alone swimming pools."
See, Depo. Tr. G. Armstvong, Ex. 5. Where this comes from is a mystery. It is
certainly not from the Policy.
The Court in Foremost held that where two different meanings can be applied to a
term in a contract and one affords coverage and the other does not, the term should be given
the meaning that provides for coverage. Id. "If a reasonable person under the circumstances
would have believed they had coverage under the language of the contract then the test is
satisfied." Id. The Court must construe the provisions of a policy consistently with what a
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reasonable person in the insured's position would have understood the policy language to
mean. Gordon v. Three Rivers Agency, 127 Idaho at 542. While Farmers may not consider a
swimming pool to be an appliance, the Armstrongs do. Moreover, as discussed above, the
Armstrongs are not unreasonable in defining a pool as an appliance.
In this case the Armstrongs reasonably believed the language in the Policy gave them
coverage for their pool. This was because (1) Farmers' agent told them so and (2) the Policy
expressly covers for sudden and accidental discharge or overflow of water from a "household
appliance." In the absence of a contractual definition of the term household appliance, a
swimming pool falls within the reasonable interpietation of that term. In ordinary usage, an
"appliance" is "a device or instrument designed to perform a specific function." See, THE
OF THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE
(4Ih ed. 2000). A pool is a
AMERICAN
HERITAGEDICTIONARY

device that provides for the specific function of aquatic exercise and entertainment. As
mentioned above the Idaho Property Disclosure Act includes a pool in its litany of an
appliances. If the meaning of the term "appliance" includes a swimming pool, then the
Armstrongs are entitled to coverage for loss and damage proximately caused by the "sudden
and accidental discharge or overflow of water . . . from . . . a swimming pool."
Parties to a contract are free to insure exaclness by defining words used in the
contract. Porter v. Farmers Insurance Co., 102 Idaho 132,627 P.2d 31 1 (1981). If Farmers
did not want this type of loss to be covered, it could have expressly excluded it, or it could
have clearly defined "household appliance" as the term is used in the context of its Policy. It
did not do either and it cannot now "create" a coverage exclusion where one does not exist.

V. CONCLUSION
The Farmers policy is not ambiguous as to the meaning of the word "appliance." The

0 8ti
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plain meaning of the term "appliance" includes a swimming pool. The Armstrongs are
covered under their homeowner's Policy. However, even if the Court were to find that the
term "appliance" is ambiguous the Armstrongs are still covered. Idaho law is clear: Where
two different meanings can be applied to a term in an insurance contract and one meaning
will afford coverage whereas the other does not, then the term should be given the meaning
that provides for coverage. Foremost v. Putzier, supra; Shields v. Hiram, 92 Idaho 423,427,
444 P.2d 38, 43 (1968). The Armstrongs are entitled to partial summary judgment in the
form of a declaratory judgment that they are covered under their Farmers Insurance Policy.
DATED this r-/fiday

of January 2005.
RAMSDEN & LYONS

BY

/-5 . 7 % 3 . ? / z ?

~ o u ~ l a s $Marfice,
.
&he Firm
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
1hereby certify that on the y E d a y of January 2005, I served a true and correct copy of
the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:
Patrick E. Miller, Esq.
701 Front Avenue, Suite 101
PO Box E
Coeur dYAleneID 83816-0328

-US Mail
-Overnight Mail
-/Hand
Delivered
-Facsimile (208) 664-6338
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iguity is prer

'ip
/I

isreasonably susceptible toconflicting in
Waho 899.42 P.3d. 692 (S.Ct. 2002).

,

{
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retations. Q

14 rhe court must ask whether the policy
pttv . ~ e ~ e n c e ~shieldof
lue
Idaho,

136
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Absent an ambiguity, an insu
contracts general1y.

208 664 6338;
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e same rules as applied to
ra,Boel v. S~ewa-

, 136 Tdiiho 39.28 P.3d. 380

policy is susceptible ro but

.I84(S.Ct. 2003),
poorly worded. It is further
out what it mans.

u r ~has held that unless s
aning upplied by laymen
to cff~ctuatcdlc intent

, 983 P.2d. 208 (S.Ct.

.3d. 510 (S.Ct. 2002).
a tenn does not create
P.2d. 1333 (S.Ct.

1997').
11 index.

The Policy

relates to propc~qy
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laintiffs' Complaint

and argument, i t is rhis Defendant

relevant; therefore, rhis Defendan
With respecr to the cov

. there is a specific

section for special limits on c
The Policy then lists
Dwelling; Covcrugc B - Scp

lists losses

are not ins

The Policy First de

Water diunuge me
a, water from rain or snow, s.

es, tidal water, overflow or
cther or not driven by wind;

b. water which
c. water which

o drain watcr awty from the

to roolgutters, downspours,
its, septic tanks or &xinags
channels:

which exetts pressure on, or se

ly or nub including watcr
ding, sidewalk, driveway,

foundation. swimming pool or

- Personal Property,
Section 13, as follows:
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Sudden a i d accidental dis
plumbing; heating or air co
but not for deterioration.
a p a i d of time.
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or s t e m from within a
in a household appliance,
e presence of water over

This peril does not inclu
a. to the system or nppli

b. caused by or resultin

c. to personal property on the
discharge or ovorflow

d. caused by sudde
downspouts, sump-p
drainage channels
premises.

overflow from roof gutters,
Ids, seepagepits. septic tanks,
ater sway from the residence

Section I of the Po

s which are nor insured. That section

Slates:
Structures and Coverage C sisting of, or caused directly
by. water damago.

Thc Policy's language is then
Page Y of the Policy

ent which replaces the language at
Endorserncnt Amending Section I

Losses Not lnsured the endorsement itinguige, which
pmvidcs:

Acts or omissions of persons

0 s IDAHO'S

BRIEF IN OPPOSlTiON
MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY

or aggravate water damage.
ss or combine with acts or
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curs, the resulting

water damage resulting

2. loss or damage to the

separate structures caused by
ns of the roof or roof gutters.
parate structures,
ware structures
structures first

sustain loss or dumug
3. dirccl loss to the
if caused by fire or
Thus, Section I -

and personal property. The

section statw that the Po

scd directly or indirectly by,

water damage.

-

, Coverage C Personal Propcay,
Piuitgraph 13, covers chi
the coverage. for Dwelling and Sipa

,even if the Court so finds,
nL {rum the coverage for Personal

Property. The coverage

erry Coverages, Coverage

h -Dwelling. That cove

g" whicbincludes, for example. wall-

to-wall carpeting.
19of that section that the term "waLer
dmngc", for purposes

MOTION FOR PAQTUL SUMMARY

verllow or escape of s body of wuter.
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irhin endorsemen1H6104 also must

rcfcrcnce the definition
ragc for this loss under Coverage C -

which provides in pertinent part as
follows:
described in Covcragc C, but
watcr or s t e m from within 3
ithin a household appliance,

nce of water over
u peric>dof tiine ...

cragc for pcrsnnul pmperty, docs not.
epool, which srored water within the
section of the contract is "household
appliance."
chnical terms are given their ordinary

not by its ordinary usage

reference to Idaho Codc
This DefenQnt submits that it is in

F: 55-2508.

ference to the outside statute for
rcncc; incorporate by reference the
-2501, er seq. In order Fur Lht: cuurl

DEFENDANT FARMERS
OF IDAHO'S BRIEF IN 0
MOTION FOK PARTIAL

: By: P A I N E HAMQLEN CDA;

208 664 6338;

J a n - 1 8 - 0 5 16:41;

Page 9

to utilize that statute, the court rnus

cy. of insurance, as a matter of law,

is ilmbiguous. T h e D e f e n h t sub

guuus, aposition taken by Plainriffs

in their argument.
The Plaintiffs makc re

pliance as "an instrument or device

dcsigned for particular use."

ary (1985). This Defendailt submits

that the proposed definition i

e the referenced tenn is "household

appliance." Moreover, court
fendant submits that
~ h cdefinition applied is neii
detinirion proposed does not
The term "appliance'

manner asserred by the Plaintiffs.
llegiate Dictiortary as follows:
ipment for adapting a tool or

e to time, including interpretations
spccific to insurance coverages.

d in operating it, and is to be
verything of which anything
end. Roberts v. City of Los
nce" is a mechanical device,
Alahama 440.85 Southern

MOTION FOR PARTIAL SIlMMARY

: B y : P A I N E HAMBLEN CDA;

208 664 6338;

Jan-18-05 f 6 : 4 t ;

Page

. 323 (S.Ct. Cat. 1936), the plaintind on certain lots for street lighting

purposes.
definition OF the term "appliance."
There, rhe coun starcd:
s to an end. (Webszer's New

Tn the defined case of

uthern 749, the dispute was over the
css in connection with

!:heillegal

rhar thestate's sulhorily wlaxcd
prohibired liquors orbeverages.

One Black Mule v . Stare, supra, Page

Id that it an automobile, under
"applionccs" includes ihinga

ng supplied to the derendant
e subject of the lawsuit, and
s to an end; therefore, an appliance.
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0 Southern Zd. 34 (Dis. Ct. App. FL,
1992). rhs insured brought suit for w

e decision does not quote the policy
what similarro the Policy a1 issuc in

rhis case. The court stated:
the insured. The insurance
f water ... kom within a
household appliance."

The insured's waterhed appamn
question at h a d was whether the wate

tilled and caused water damuge. The
appliance" and whether the rllirnagc

was lhus covered by the policy.
court overturned. the decision. The
appellate-coun srated:
a "household appliance"
common understunding, n
ork or pcrforms a tmk, such
Murruy v. Royal Indemniry
pliance' i s 'a tl~iiigu ~ e d
as a means to an end.')

policy definition and therc was no
coveragc.
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defined swimming pool was not a

Under the language of thi

lain meaning of the tern.

household appliance, as t.hat term

irh the covemgc claimsundcr

Moreover, Plaintiffs' use o
the Policy, as Plaintiffs assert, to

THE APPL~CATIONo
DISCHARGE OF WATER
APPLY TO COVERAGE C

OR ACCIDENTAL

-

A s noted above, the Plai

loss and the basis of ~heirmonct

of suddcn accidental discharg

IANCE WOULD ONLY
D NOT COVERAGE A -

appropriate affidavit to define l h e i ~
ffs appear to argue that the condi tion

would relate to ail or their

losses; however, such is not

guage of the Policy. The

reference to sudden and. tic

a household appliance is within

Paragraph 13, which relates

. Plaintiffs havc failed to

establish, b y appropriate
coverage. The Policy wou
claimed loss, are pan of rh
The Policy provisions within S
rclntcd to thc dwelling, i
coverage for water ciamag
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y had wluch would be wirhin this
I - t o - d l carperin&" if a
gc A - Dwcllin&.

sured, and specifictllly water damage

, which specified that

there is no

: By: PAINE HAMBLEN CDA;
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As defined by the Policy, Plainti

occasioned by water leekage From a

household appliance would not apply t i

ntiffs' claim, even if it did apply to

the swimming pool collapse.
Undcr the terms of the Policy, th~

overages. Those are Coveragc A for

the dwelling, Coverage B for the separa

ge C for rhe personal property.

The term "water damage" is d

In fact, in rekrzmce to Paragraph

19D of thc Policy, thc Policy thcrc sp

a '‘swimming

pool." Therefore,

it is not proper to define that the Poli

rence a household appliance as

a swimming pool, and vice verfia, since

pa~~iculatly
used at least in,one

place in the Policy.

-

LJvJrrderSection I Properly.

s, coverages for the dwelling

and separale structure are defined

gr, C fur personal property.

The reference to which Plaintiff$

bpliance is under thc sectinn 'Znsses

insured - Covcrage C - Personal Propcit

eu not, therefole, apply to cither the

dwelling or separate structures. The: s

Personal Property begins with thc

.,

l ~ g u s g c "We
:
insure for accidental did

ropexty described in Coverage C, but

only if caused by one or more of the fdli
'.

i

Therefore, IDthe extent that Plaid

otion, or this lawsuit, a loss as n result

i

.'!

of water from a '"household
the separate struclures.

.

:d
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to the loss n l s t ~ d tho dwclling or
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darnqe occurs, The
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all three coverages, by endorsement.

loss not insured: "..whenever waler
howcvcr causcd; GZOCPL wc

do cover..,"

overage in the event of a

that, especially since the

hing to the contrary, by the specific
langusge of tho endorsement.

THE TERM "HOUSEHOLD

by laymen in daily usage.

create an amb'iguity.
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the English Language, 4''' Edition.

2000, defines applianc

uspeciFc function, =specially

an electrical device, such as a toaster,

nced definition defines, as a

synonym for the word
s s commcm tcrm utilized by

laypersons with an

include a swimming pclr,l.

Plaintiffs intend to

nce it is used for the speciric
a reference lu Lwo separate

referenccs. This
word references

rcfcrcnce specific items such as "dish
Plaintiffs assert that thcrc arc

for the term "household uppliancc."
is whether the term is in~crpretedto

y believed that

Ulc tcrm "qplianco"

there is no proof before lhis Coun to
DEFENDANT FARMERS
OF IDAIiO'S BRIEF IN 0
MOTION FOR PARTIAL

t By: PAINE HAMBLEN CDA;

208 664 6338;

J a n - 1 6 - 0 5 16:43;

Page

s do nor contain any language

to

asonablc oxpcctation of coverage.

05,600 P.2d. 1387 (S.Ct. 1979). the
able expectations. As to policies of

Intent is robe dctermined fro
of ambiguity, contracts for ins
in their plain, ordinary, and p

t itself and 'in the absence
d ns any othcr and understood
the meaning derived from the

, 134 Idaho 302, 1 P.3d. 803 (S.CI.

sonahle expectations. These, the

[The p1aintil'I-j invites this
reasonable expectations. T
favor of traditional mles of
N~GS

of contract construction
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and adopi rhc doctrine of
further contract analysis as
i n New York. We dcclinc
lc cxpectations doctrine in
v. Highlands Insurunce
1 (1979). The traditional
creating a new conrraot
nable expecrations. K.C.,100
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a:that they had any personal

As notedabove, the Plainti
expectations with respect to &fin
This Defendant has sub

id Nipp, with respect to asscrted

conversations. Mr: Nipp, by his

agent or employee of this

Defendant. Rather, he is an inde

d insurance ugenl. hk.Nipp further

states that there was no convers
With respect to the qu

aho courts have not held that if a

h would be the adoption ol'

reasonable person would expect cover
the reasonable expeclstion do

tcd that where a policy mily be

ambiguous, which a question

an ambiguous contract, lhe tlicr

of fact must determine what

the language to mean and thc

words used must be constru

ark

v.

hitdentis1 P.rowflv and

Casualty Insurance, 138
Plaintifis strain
propem damage as a m
to the dwelling, includi
personal property.
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appliance" with respect toporsond
not exist either

tn damagc

ith respect to damage to the
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THE ASSERTED C
Plaintiffs Conte
conversation with David Nipp, an insu

Jan-18-05.16:44;
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NCE AGENT DOES NOT
they purpurtedly had a
fcrcnce to the conversation does not

create an undisputed

e, under the policy of insurance. It is

Plaintiffs' reference,

p a g e of their Brief, Lhal here was
ty what wag the asserted "coverage"

that they sooght, int

ver, Mr. DavidNipp has, by affidavit,

stilted that heis not a generd agent or e

ance Company of Idaho. Mr. Nipp

has stared that he i

her disputes that there ever was a

conversation as ass
t as to conversation. Moreover, Lht:

properly before this Court, what the
extcnt of coverage was that was the re
As reflected by the Plaintiffs'

bmilbed herein, the Plaintiffs rcceived
of anyone, following receipi of the

uacr. From the Plilindffs' own
ipp pn?cedwl their purchase of ~ h c
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residential property in 1999. They
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until, allegedly. 2000. Thc cvcnts

su&ounding ihis matter did not occu
From the case authority, it is
language of the Policy, since the Id

s allegcd c o m c n u cannot add LO the

pressly declined to adopt the doctrine

of reasonable expectations. lnte

ed upon the language of the Policy

according to the plain and ordin

ss those terms a n otherwise clefincd.

declaratory judgment of coverage.
PlaintifTs' Complaint does not
want declaratory judgment that they

tory relief. Plaintiffs ussen chat they
olicy. Plainriffs fail to address the

specifics of the Pulicy. ~ hP t

Ic language between the dwelling and

personal property. Under a s

y, there was no coverage for damage

to

thc dwelling, or items defi

not a swimrxting pool is a

ordinary meaning of that phrase.
that a swimming pool i s not a

consistant with dictionary

ects

household appliance. Furth

definition wcn: applied to the Policy,

rhe reference to household
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PATRICK E. MTLLER
Attorney at Law

701 Front Avenue, Suire 101
P.O. Box E
Cocur d' Alcno, I
D 83816-0328
Telephone: (308) 66.1-81 15

CLERI< DISTRICT COURT

Facsimile: (208) 664-6338
ISBA# 1771.

DISTRICT COURT OF TKE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRTCT OF

IN

THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF K00'I'ENAT

BRIAN ARMSTRONG and GLENDA

1

ARMSTRONG, husband und wife,

) Case N o CV-03-9214

)

Pliunriffs,

1
) IIIEFENIIAN'S FARMERS INSURANCE

YE.

FARMBRS [NSURANCE COWANY OF

)
)
)

COMPANY OF IDAHO'S OBJECTTON
TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR
PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGIkEm

TDAHO. an ldaho corpo~ation;CORPORATE )
DOES I-X. whose true names are imknown,
)

1
Dcfcndants.

1

COMES NOW, tha Defendant Pmmsrs insurance Company OF Idaho, and objects

tu the

Plainriffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment,pursu;mttoRule 56(c),I.R.C.P..uponrhegrounds
hat Plaintiffs failed to serve the Xlbtiori upon this Defendant, as required by Kule 56(c) and Rulc
7(h)Ci),I.R.C.P.

Lllr'PENDANTFARMERS XNSURANCE COB4P.ANY OF IDAHO'S
OR9ECTION TO PtAINTIRFS' MOTION FOR PARTIAL SlJMMARY JIlDGMENT 1

-

I

t By: PAINE HAMBLEN CDA;

208 664 6338;

J a n - 1 8 - 0 5 17:06;

Page 313

This Derendant requests oral argumcnr
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FBST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

BRIAN ARMSTRONG and GLENDA
ARMSTRONG, husband and wife,
Plaintiffs,
VS.

.

FARMERS JNSLJRANCE COMPANY OF
IDAHO, an Idaho corporation; CORPORATE
DOES I - X, whose true names are unknown,

Case No. CV- 03-9214
AFFIDAVIT OF DOUGLAS S.
W I C E IN SUPPORT OF EX
PARTE MOTION TO SHORTEN
TIME

Defendants.

STATE OF IDAHO
County of Kootenai

)
) ss.
)

Douglas S. Marfice, having been first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and states:
1.

I am an attorney for the Plaictiffs herein, and I have personal knowledge of the

matters set forth in this affidavit.
2.

I make the Affidavit of my own personal knowledge.

3.

On or about December 8, 2004, my office spoke with Judge Hosack's

and reserved the hearing time of 3.30 p.m. on February 1,2005 to hear Plaintiffs Motion For.
Partial Summary Judgment. The availability of counsel for Defendant was also confirmed at
that time.
Counsel for Defendants was timely served with a Notice of Hearing,

4.

Memorandum In Support and Affidavit of Douglas S. Marfice In Support of Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment on January 4,2005.
Through an oversight, Affiant neglected to file and serve a separate document

5.

"Motion For Summary Judgment" althoug3 the grounds, applicable civil rules and time and
place of hearing were all adequately set forth in the documents referenced in paragraph 4
above.
Defendants' counsel did not notify me until service of the Defendants' response

6.

brief of this oversight. Defendants have however filed an objection to Plaintiffs' motion, but
have not articulated any prejudice resulting therefrom.

In the interests of justice and judicial economy, Plaintiffs' Motion For Partial

7.

Summary Judgment should be deemed properly and timely filed so as to permit hearing as
scheduled on February
Februarv 1,2005.
1.2005.
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DOUGLAS S. M I C E , ISB #4072
MICHAEL A. EAZY, ISB kt5619
APRIL M. LINSCOTT, ISB #7036
RAMSDEN & LYONS
618 North 4" Street
Post Office Box 1336
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816-1336
Telephone: (208) 664-5818
Facsimile:
(208) 664-5884
Atromeys for Plaintiffs

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

BRIAN ARMSTRONG and GLENDA
ARMSTRONG, husband and wife,
Plaintiffs,
vs.

Case No. CV- 03-9214

EX PARTE MOTION TO
SHORTEN TIME FOR FILING
OF "MOTION"

FARMERS INSURANCE COMPANY OF
IDAHO, an Idaho corporation; CORPORATE
DOES I - X, whose true names are unknown,
Defendants.

COME NOW, Plaintiffs BRIAN and GLENDA ARMSTRONG, husband and wife, by
and through counsel of record, and hereby move this Court for an ex parte order shortening
time for hearing of Plaintiffs' Motion For Partial Summary Judgment. Hearing is scheduled to
take place on Tuesday, February 1, 2005. That date was reserved for Plaintiffs' Motion For
Summary Judgment well in advance, and availability of Farmer's counsel for that date was
confirmed in advance. Plaintiffs' Memorandum and Affidavit In Support and Notice of Hearing
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were timely served and filed, but Plaintiffs inadvertently failed to timely filefserve a separate
motion paper as is customary. Farmers has objected to Plaintiffs' Motion, ostensibly on
technicalfnotice grounds because there was no separate Motion filed with the Memorandum,
Affidavit and Notice of Hearing.
Rule 7 requ~resthat an application to the Court for an order shall be made in writing
stating the grounds and applicable civil rule. However, "The requirement of writing is fulfilled

if the motion is stated in a written notice of hearing of the motion."

See, IRCP 7(b)(l). Here,

Plaintiffs' Notice of Hearing and Memorandum In Support which were timely filed and served
(28 days prior to hearing) stated the groucds for the motion and the applicable civil rule.
Accordingly, those filings fulfilled the requirements of Rule 56 and Rule 7(b).
Nevertheless, to cure any technical defect in Plaintiffs' Motion For Partial Summary
Judgment, Plaintiffs hereby move, ex parte, for an order shortening time to permit Plaintiffs'
filing bf a remedial "Motion For Summary Partial Judgment" document in strict conformity
with the Rules of Civil Procedure. This ex parte motion is supported by the Affidavit of
Douglas S. Marfice filed herewith.
DATED this &%aly

of January 2005.
RAMSDEN & LYONS

BY
,
+,.
Douglas 9. Marfice, Cff the Firm
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
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DOUGLAS S. MARFICE, ISB #4072
MICHAEL A. EALY, ISB #5619
APRIL M. LINSCOTT, ISB #7036
RAMSDEN & LYONS
6 18 North 4thStreet
Post Office Box 1336
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816-1336
Telephone: (208) 664-5818
Facsimile:
(208) 664-5884
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

BRIAN ARMSTRONG and GLENDA
ARMSTRONG, husband and wife,
Plaintiffs,
VS.

Case No. CV- 03-9214

MOTION FOR PARTIAL
SXJMMARY JUDGMENT

'

FARMERS INSURANCE COMPANY OF
IDAHO, an Idaho corporation; CORPORATE
DOES I - X, whose true names are unknown,
Defendants.

COME NOW, Plaintiffs B

W aid GLENDA MUvISTRONG, husband and wife, by

and through counsel of record, pursuant to Rule 56(c), Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, and
hereby move this Court for entry of partial summary judgment in favor of said Plaintiffs on the
grounds that there is no genuine issue of material fact and the Court can rule as a matter of law
that Plaintiffs are entitled to coverage under their homeowner's insurance policy for the loss

and damage at issue here.

This motion is further based on the documents and pleadings on file herein and upon'
Plaintiffs' Memorandum In Support and Affidavit was previously filed.
Oral argument is requested.
DATED this &day

of January 2005.
RAMSDEN & LYONS
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Douglas p ~ a r f i c e o, f the Firm
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
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I hereby certify that on the /Bay of January 2005, I served a true and correct copy of
the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:

ASMail

Patrick E. Miller, Esq.
701 Front Avenue, Suite 101
PO Box E
Coeur d'Alene ID 838 16-0328

M n T n N FOR

PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Overnight Mail
-Hand Delivered
,A'acsimile (208) 664-6338

-

-

2

DOUGLAS S. MARFICE, ISB #4072
MICHAEL A. EALY, ISB #5619
APRIL M. LINSCOTT, ISB #7036
RAMSDEN & LYONS
618 North 4" Street
Post Office Box 1336
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 838 16-1336
Telephone: (208) 664-58 18
Facsimile:
(208) 664-5884
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

Case No. CV- 03-92 14

BRIAN ARMSTRONG and GLENDA
ARMSTRONG, husband and wife,
Plaintiffs,

REPLY TO DEFENDANT'S
MOTION IN OPPOSITION TO
PARTIAL SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

VS.

FARMERS INSURANCE COMPANY OF
IDAHO, an Idaho corporation; CORPORATE
DOES I - X, whose true names are unknown,
Defendants.
.
I

1.

Facts claimed by Farmers to be disputed are immaterial.
A.

Even resolving all "questions of fact" raised by Farmers in Farmers' favor, the
Armstrongs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment must still be granted.

In a motion for summary judgment, it is the moving party's burden only to establish the
lack of genuine issues of material fact. Orthman v. Idaho Power Co., 130 Idaho 597, 944 P.2d
1360 (1997). A nonmoving party cannot create a genuine fact issue by simply listing facts that
may be in dispute but that are not material to the motion. The nonmoving party must present

-
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more than speculation or a mere scintilla of evidence to create a genuine fact issue. Sprinkler
Irrigation Co., Inc. v. John Deere Ins. Co., Inc., 139 Idaho 691, 697,85 P.3d 667, 673 (2004).

In its response to Armstrongs' Motion For Partial Summary Judgment, Farmers puts forth a
litany of issues upon which it maintains there are genuine factual disputes. Upon scrutiny,
however, Farmers' disputed facts are all immaterial to the issue of law before the Court on this
motion: to wit, Does Farmers' policy afford coverage for the Armstrongs' loss.
(i)

Facts relating to conversations with the insurance agent are immaterial.

Farmers attempts to confuse the narrow issue raised by the Armstrongs' motion by
raising superfluous factual disputes. Principal among these is Farmers' evidence regarding the
insurance agent who sold Armstrongs their Policy. For purposes of this motion, the Court may
accept Farmers' version of any conversation(s) between the Armstrongs and Farmers'
insurance agent, David Nip. The Armstrongs testified they discussed coverage with Nipp.
Nipp denies those discussions occurred. So be it. The narrow legal issue before the Court does
not require reconciling this conflicting affidavitldeposition testimony. The Policy speaks for
itself. It is clear and unambiguous.
Whether or not Nipp told the Armstrongs anything need not be determined to interpret
the Policy and to find coverage. Only if the Policy is found to be ambiguous, does Nipp's
conversation with the Armstrongs become somewhat relevant and even in that event,
who-said-what-to-who is not dispositive to the coverage question. Rather, it is merely
evidence of the Armstrongs' reasonable understanding of the scope of their policy coverages.

A factual question as to whether or not Nipp told the Armstrongs what they claim he told them
would be material to whether or not the Armstrongs were abjectly unreasonable in believing
that they were covered for losses related to their pool (and again, this is relevant only if the
Policy is ambiguous).
The Armstrongs are entitled to coverage under the Policy because the Policy does not
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clearly exclude loss for the type of damage they suffered. It is that simple. What their
insurance agent did or did not tell them really does not matter in this analysis.
(ii)

The facts related to the Armstrongs' proof of loss are immaterial and irrelevant.

The Armstrongs have moved for partial summary judgment on the issue of coverage,
only. Deciding coverage bears no relationship to the issue of damages. Farmers' discussion of
the Armstrongs' Proof of Loss is a red-herring that has nothing to do with coverage. Evidence
of the Proof of Loss was only offered in the first instance to demonstrate the Annstrongs have
conducted themselves under the belief that they had coverage, which in turn demonstrates the
absence of an ambiguity in the Policy. If the Proof of Loss submitted with the h s t r o n g s '
motion is objectionable, it can be ignored without impairing the Court's ability to determine
coverage.
(iii)

The Armstrongs' understanding, interpretations and expectations under the
Policy are immaterial.

Farmers asserts that the Armstrongs' submissions "fail to establish undisputed material
facts" in that "there are no affidavits or assertions as to how Plaintiffs interpreted the policy or
what Plaintijs expected by the interpretation of the policy." See, Farmers' Brief i n
Opposition, p. 7. However, the Plaintiffs' expectations or interpretation of the Policy are

irrelevant if the Policy is, as alleged in the motion, clear and unambiguous. As Farmers
correctly points out, Idaho has declined to adopt the doctrine of reasonable expectations. K.C.
v. Highland Ins. Co., 100 Idaho 505, 600 P.2d 1387 (1979). Accordingly, what the

Armstrongs' expectations were under the Policy is irrelevant to the issue of whether the Policy
is ambiguous. Again, the Policy speaks for itself.
(iv)

Farmers' "interpretation" of the Policy is immaterial.

Farmers goes a step further in its effort to create a genuine fact issue by offering its own
"interpretation" of the Policy. See, AjEdavit of Marti Gunderson. Just as the Armstrongs'
"reading" of the Policy is irrelevant, so too is Gunderson's, or for that matter any one' else's; so

long as the Policy is construed in compliance with law. To construe the Policy in compliance
with law, the Court simply must determine that it is not ambiguous as to coverage for "sudden
and accidental discharge ofwaterfrom a household appliance." That decision can be reached

just by reading the Policy as written. The Court does not need help from the Armstrongs or
Farmers (vis a vis Gundcrson) to do this.

2.

The predicate legal issue on this motion is whether the Policy is or is not
ambiguous as to coverage for the Armstrongs' loss.

"Where the policy language is clear and unambiguous, coverage must be determined, as
a matter of law." Gordon v. Three Rivers Agency, Inc., 127 Idaho 539, 542,903 P.2d 128, 131
(Ct. App. 1995); Clark v. Prudential Property and Casualty Ins. Co., 138 Idaho 538, 541, 66
P.3d 242, 245 (2003). Here, the Farmers' policy is unambiguous but even if it were ambiguous,
coverage would still exist, as a matter of law.
A.
excludes swimming pools is unconvincing .
Is a swimming pool a household appliance? Apparently-it depends upon who you ask.
The Idaho legislature clearly thinks so. See, LC. $55-2508. However, Farmers makes the bold
assertion that the Court should not consider the Idaho Property Condition Disclosure Act to
assist in determining the meaning of the term "appliance." It is the Court's prerogative to
consider whatever authority it finds persuasive. Remember, if Farmers wanted a term in its
policy to have a particular or limited meaning, all it had to do was define that term in the
policy. It did so with the term "water," so it could have done so with "appliance."
Farmers adds that the Property Condition Disclosure Act should not be considered
because "the language of the Policy does noi, by reference, incorporate by reference the . . .
Act." See, Farmers' Briefin Opposition,p. 14. But then Farmers turns around and cites to the

definition of appliance in Black's Law Dictionary when the Policy does not reference or
incorporate by reference this source either. Moreover, Defendant's own citation to Black's
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(unabridged, revised 4" Edition) definition is far from persuasive because it lists numerous
items that have or have not been considered to be an "appliance" in various jurisdictions.' The
time to apply limiting definitions in a policy is when the policy is written, not after a claim
arises. In short, Farmers offers no evidence, nor any compelling argument that a swimming
pool is anything other than an appliance.
Farmers cites a single Florida case which held that a waterbed was not an appliance. W.

Am. Ins. Co. v. Lowrie, 600 S.2d 34 (Dist. Ct. App. F1. 1992). The Lowrie Court held that a
waterbed is an item of furniture but offered no analysis or rationale whatsoever as to why
something that is furniture cannot also be an appliance (See copy attached). Conversely, in
another waterbed case, a New Jersey Court criticized Lowrie and offered a clear explanation. It
stated that since a fixture can be an appliance, hrniture can also be an appliance (therefore the
terms are not mutually exclusive and thus, waterbed is an appliance at least in New Jersey). See,
Azze v. Hanover Ins. Co., 336N.J.Super. 630,644,765 A.2d 1093, 1102 (Super. CC. N.J. 2001).

Drawing an apropos analogy which seems equally applicable to the facts of this case, the Azze
Court went on to say:
Second, waterbeds, like the one involved here, are generally purchased with
heating units which plug into the household electric current like washing
machines and dishwashers, appliances which also contain water. We draw an
analogy to an electric blanket. Few people would consider a regular blanket to be
an appliance. However, once one modifies a blanket so that it also provides heat
electrically, this new item, an "electric blanket," suddenly takes on the
characteristics of a household appliance. Note the certainly in the tone of the
U.S. District Court in Remington Rancl, Inc, v. Knapp-Monarch Co., 139 F.
Supp. 613,622 (E.D. Pa. 1956), when it proclaims that "A nonexhaustive list of
1

BLACK'S
LAWDICTIONARY
127(Revised 4th ed. 1968) Footnote to Appliance. "The term has been applied to a
railroad track, Hines v. Kelley, Tex. Civ. App., 226 S.W. 493, 496; motor tracks in a coal mine, Jaggie v. Davis
Colliery Co., 75 W.Va. 370, 84 S.E. 941; an automobile, Ross v. Tabor, 53 Cal.App. 605, 200 P. 971, 973; a
telephone lineman's safety belt, Boone v. Lohr, 172 Iowa 440, 154 N.W. 591, 592; and a plank on which a
painting foreman was working, Peterson v. Beck, 27 Cal.App. 571, 150 P. 788,789; but not, however to a station
water tank, rope, or scaffold used thereon, by a painter, McFarland v. Chesapeake & 0.Ry. Co., 177 Ky. 551,
197 S.W. 944, 947; nor to a moving picture machine, Balcom v. Ellintuch & Yarfitz, 179 App. Div. 548, 166
N.Y.S. 841, 842; nor the steps of a caboose, Cincinnatie, N.O. & T. P. Ry. Co. v. Goldston, 163 Ky. 42, 173 S.W.
161, 162.
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appliances are: Electric blankets, blenders, vacuum type coffee makers, hair
dryers, fans, deep fat fiyers, m a n s , hand irons, food mixers, heating pads, com
poppers, vaporizers, massage vibrators, waffle irons, and electric razors." We
find that if a blanket becomes an appliance once it provides heat, so too does a
waterbed.

See, Azze v. Hnnover, 336 N.J. Super. at 644, 765 A. 2d at 1102 (2001).
If containing water and being plugged "into the household electrical current like
washing machines and dishwashers, appliances which also contain water" (Id. at 645) was
enough to make the Azze water bed an appliance, the same considerations apply to the
Armstrongs' pool. It too had a pump and filter which operated off of a household electric
current. See, Depo. Tr. Brian Armstrong, p. 8, 11.3-14.
B.

Evidence of the meaning of a word can be considered without first determining
that the word is ambiguous.

Farmers' argument implies that unless the term "appliance" is first found to be
ambiguous, the Court cannot consider outside evidence of the meaning of the word. This would
only be true if Farmers had taken advantage of its right to define the term in the context of its
Policy. Since it did not choose to do so, Farmers abdicates the right to complain about the
source of definitions used by the Court in deciding (a) what an "appliance" is and (b) whether
that term is ambiguous in the context of the Policy.
While Farmers may parse the definition of "appliance" ad nauseam, after-the-fact,
nothing changes the simple, uncontested reality that the Policy does not offer a definition,
whereas the dictionary, common usage and analogous case law

support Armstrongs'

position that a pool is a household appliance.
C.

The fact that Farmers uses a specific term in one instance and a veneral term in
another does not mean that the general term was meant at the exclusion of the
specific term.

Farmers would like the Court to believe that a swimming pool is not a "household
appliance" without telling it what, precisely, a swimming pool is. If a swimming pool is not an
appliance, then what is it? It is certainly not furniture. It may be a fixture. But, as we have seen,
both a fixture and furniture can also be an appliance. See, Azze, supra. Farmers suggests that
because the Policy refers to an "appliance" in one section and to a "swimming pool" in another,
the terms must be mutually exclusive. This argument requires reading things into the Pohcy
which simply are not there. The term "household appliance" is a general description which in
ordinary usage includes such things as a swimming pool, refrigeratorlfreezer, rangeloven,
dishwasher, disposal, hoodifan, central vacuum, microwave oven, trash compactor, smoke
detectors, tv aritennddish, fireplacelwood stove, water heater, garage door opener, hot tub, etc.
See, I.C. $55-2508.

In the Policy, the term "swinlming pool" is only used in one place. That is in the section
of the' Policy defining of the term "water damage" under the subsubsection describing" water
below ground level . . . or [which] seeps or leaks through a building. . . foundation, swimming
pool. . . " Clearly, below ground level seepage or leakage is not what this case is about. As
more fully briefed elsewhere, the Armstrongs claim does not even involve "water damage" as
that term is defined in the Policy. See, Memorandum In Support of Plaintiffs' Motion For
Partial Summary Judgment, p. 3, Nos. 8-1 0. Instead, this case involves a claim arising from the

"sudden, accidental discharge of water from a household appliance;" a type of loss which is
both expressly covered

& expressly excepted from exclusions to coverage, depending on

which part of the Policy you look at.
4.

If the Court is unwilling to accept the Armstrongs' definition of "appliance" then
it must find that the term is reasonably susceptible to varying interpretation; thus,
it is ambiguous. - If the term is ambiguous; the Armstrongs are entitled to
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Summary Judgment.
Insurance contracts are contracts of adhesion, and therefore subject to liberal
construction so as to benefit the insured. Azze, supra. Ambiguity exists if a policy term is
subject to conflicting interpretation. Nedrow v. Unigard, 132 Idaho at 422,974 P.2d at 68. If
the Court does not find as a matter of law that h s t r o n g s ' swimming pool was a "household
appliance," it must, at the very least, conclude that the term is subject to conflicting
interpretations.
One interpretation is that a swimming pool is a household appliance; another
interpretation is that a pool is something else. However, even if the term "household
appliance" is ambiguous then the Armstrongs are entitled to a summary judgment on the
issue of coverage. "[Wlhere there is an ambiguity in an insurance contract, special rules of
construction apply to protect the insured." Foremost Ins. Co. v. Putzier, 102 Idaho 138, 142,
627 6 2 d 317, 321 (1981). Under these special rules, insurance policies are to be construed
most liberally in favor of recovery, with all ambiguities being resolved against the insurer.
Gordon v. Three Rivers Agency, Inc., 127 Idaho 539, 903 P.2d 128 (Ct. App. 1985) citing
Foremost Inc. v. Putzier, supra. Insurers write the policies, and fairness suggests that

insur*

should receive the benefit of any ambiguities. Azze, supra at 644.(emphasis added)

Applying the special rules of construction requires the Court to find coverage even if it
determines the Policy is ambiguous.

In this event, Farmers may escape liability to the Armstrongs for bad faith denial of
benefits, but it does not avoid responsibility to pay Armstrongs the policy benefits owed.

----
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DATED this a

a

y of January 2005.
RAMSDEN & LYONS

BY
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Douglas 9. Marfice, o f the Firm
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

,

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certifjr that on the aJday of January 2005,I served a true and correct copy of
the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:

'

Patick E. Miller, Esq.
701 Front Avenue, Suite 101
PO Box E
Coeur d'Alene ID 83816-0328

A

S Mail

-Overnight Mail
Hand Delivered
F a c s i m i l e (208) 664-6338
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Douglas 3. Marfice
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DOUGLAS S. MARFICE, ISB #4072
MICHAEL A. EALY, ISB #5619
APRIL M. LINSCOTT, ISB #7036
RAMSDEN & LYONS
6 I8 North 4thStreet
Post Office Box 1336
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816-1336
Telephone: (208) 664-5818
Facsimile:
(208) 664-5884
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JODICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

BRIAN ARMSTRONG and GLENDA
ARMSTRONG, husband and wife,
Plaintiffs,
VS.

.

1

Case No. CV- 03-9214
SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT
OF DOUGLAS S. MARFICE

FARMERS INSURANCE COMPANY OF
IDAHO, an Idaho corporation; CORPORATE
DOES I - X, whose true names are unknown,
Defendants.

STATE OF IDAHO
County of Kootenai

) ss.
)

Douglas S. Marfice, having been fist duly sworn upon oath, deposes and states:
1.

I am an attorney for the Plaintiffs herein, and I have personal knowledge of the

matters set forth in this affidavit.
2.

1make the Affidavit of my own personal knowledge.

3.

Attached hereto are true and accurate photocopies of the following:

Exhibit " A excerpts from the Deposition transcript of Brian Armstrong;
Exhibit"J3": Azze v. Hnnover, 336 N.J. Super. at 644, 765 A. 2d at 1102
(2001);
Exhibit "C": W. Am. Irzs. Co. v. Lowrie,600 S.2d 34 (Dist. Ct. App. F1. 1992).
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of January 2005.
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otary Public for Idaho
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on the &@ay of January 2005,I served a true and correct copy of
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1

time that the pool failed?

.i
!,I

2

A.

No.

3

Q.

Now the pool wasn't connected to the house

4

was it?

5

A.

i
ii
$

6
7

1

a)

1I!
.

Q.

Only through means of electricity.
Was there a pump that worked filtration

for that?
Yes.

Q.

Was that a separate little structure, or

did it fit within the pool itself?
A.

Just outside the pool.

Q.

And this pump, did it just run off of 110

current?
A.

Yes.

Q.

Just a long extension cord to the house?

A.

No extension cord.

It had a long cord to

the pump, about a 20 foot cord probably.
And how big is the backyard for this

residence?
A.

Large.

It's a big backyard.

I can't

really give you a good dimension.
Q.

Does the backyard slope to, away from, or

is it flat?
A.

#

ii'
i
9

A.

Q.

1
i

To, away from the house, or is it flat?

The backyard tapers away from the house.

Where we set the pool I had to do some filling so
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600 So.2d 34, 17 Fla. L. Weekly Dl451
District Court of Appeal of Florida,
Third District.
WEST AMERICAN INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellant,
v.
Carolyn LOWRIE, Appellee.
No. 91-2975.
June 9, 1992.
Insured whose waterbed broke while being filled brought suit under homeowner's policy for water
damage. The Circuit Court, Dade County, Edward S. Kiein, J., granted partial summary judgment on
liability in favor of insured. Insurer appealed. The District Court of Appeal, CLx2.12, 3., held that: (1)
waterbed was not "household appliance" under coverage provision of policy, and (2) leak from
waterbed did not stem from plumbing system.
Reversed and remanded with directions.
West Headnotes

KevCite Notes

I9

0
.
uInsurance

~G=..217XVI Coverage--Property Insurance
*&=217XVIfA) I n Generai
c-217k2139 Risks or Losses Covered and Exclusions
6~217k2142Water Damage
, i.;217k2142(ll
k. I n General. Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 217k417.5(1))

Waterbed was not "household appliance" under provision of homeowner's insurance policy providing
coverage for accidental discharge or overflow of water since waterbed was item of furniture that did
not work or perform task and, thus, no coverage existed for water damage resulting when bed broke
while being filled.

XevCite Notes

i3.7

6-r-217
-Insurance
,2;-217XVI Coverage--Property Insurance
c=217XVI(Al I n General
:;-217k2139 Risks or Losses Covered and Exclusions
;:..217k2142
Water Damage
d:=217k2142(11 k. I n General. Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 217k417.5(1))
"Household appliance," under terms of homeowner's insurance policy providing coverage for
accidental discharge for overflow of water, is household device that does work or performs task.

KevCite Notes

-

~k217
Insurance

a

Page 2 of 2

'1.7~217XVICoverage--Property Insurance
1=217XVI(A) I n General
~:=217k2139Risks or Losses Covered and Exclusions
~:;:.;217k2142 Water Damage
=
.:2-61
k. Sewers and Drains; Plumbing. Most Cited-s
(Formerly 217k417.5(1))
Leak caused when waterbed broke while being filled did not stem from "plumbing system" under
coverage provision of homeowner's policy, even though waterbed was filled by means of plumbing
system, since leak emanated from waterbed itself.
*35 3ones and Zaifert and Tami R. Woife, Ft. Lauderdale, for appellant.
Marc L. Goldman, Miami, for appellee.
Before COPE, LEW and GERSTEN, 31.

COPE, Judge.
Western American Insurance Company appeals a non-final order granting partial summary judgment
on liability in favor of its insured, Carolyn Lowrie. We reverse.

I9 The insurer issued a homeowner's insurance policy to the insured. The insurance policy

L$=L

...

included coverage for "[alccidental discharge or overflow of water
from within a household
appliance." The insured's waterbed broke while being filled, and caused water damage. The trial court
ruled that the waterbed is a "household appliance" and that the insurer must cover the loss.

m'

In our view, a waterbed is an item of furniture, and is not a "househoid appliance" within the
ordinary meaning of that phrase. I n the common understanding, a household appliance is a household
device that does work or performs a task, such as a washer, dryer, vacuum cleaner, or toaster. Cf.
Murray v. Rovai Indemnitv Co., 247 Iowa 1299, 78 N.W.2d 786. 787 0
( "appliance" is "a thing
used as a means to an end"). The waterbed was not within the policy definition and there is no
coverage.

ma

The insured argues alternatively that the leak can be deemed to have stemmed from the
plumbing system, discharges from which are also covered by the insurance policy. Although it is true
that the waterbed was filled by means of the plumbing system, it is undisputed that the leak
emanated from the waterbed itself, which is not part of the plumbing system.
The judgment is reversed and the cause remanded with directions to enter judgment for the insurer.
Fla.App. 3 Dist.,1992.
West American Ins. Co. v. Lowrie
600 So.2d 34, 17 Fia. L. Weekly Dl451
END OF DOCUMENT
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A f f m e d in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

and the time that the insurance company formally
denies coverage, the limitations period in the policy
is tolled.
[3] Insurance -3564(8)
217!d564(8) Most Cited Cases
Letter by insurer could be a formal denial of
coverage and could halt the tolling of the one-year
policy limitations period, even though it lacked a
statement regarding the limitations period or the
need for legal counsel; the insurer denied the claim
in good faith.
[4] Insurance -3564(8)
217k3564(8) Most Cited Cases
Letter by homeowners' insurer denying coverage
for personal property damaged by bursting of
waterbed, but inviting additional information and
providing address for ftling complaint with the
Insurance Department, was not an unequivocal,
formal denial and, therefore, did not halt the tolling
of the one-year policy limitations period; the letter
could reasonably lead a person to conclude that
contact with the Department was actually a
prerequisite to a lawsuit, and the insureds were still
negotiating with the insurer on the dwelling claim.
J5] Insurance @32142(1)
21%?142(1) Most Cited Cases
An electrically-heated waterbed was a "household
appliance" within the meaning of a homeowners'
insurance policy covering damage to personal
property caused by the discharge or overnow of
water &om within a household appliance; the bed
could reasonably be considered a tool, instnunent,
or device adapted for a particular purpose.

West Headnotes
[I] Insurance -3560
217k3560 Most Cited Cases
[I] Insurance -3564(4)
217k3564(4) Most Cited Cases
The six-year statute of limitations for a suit on a
contract applies to insurance actions, but may be
shortened by the terms of an insurance contract.
N.J.S.A. 2A:14-1.
[2] Insurance *3564(8)
217k3564(8) Most Cited Cases
Between the time the insured gives notice of loss

[6] Insurance -1715
217k1715 Most Cited Cases
[6] Insurance -1829
217kl829 Most Cited Cases
[6] Insurance -1831
217k1831 Most Cited Cases
Insurance contracts are contracts of adhesion and,
therefore, are subject to liberal construction so as to
benefit the insured.
**lo94 *631 Chazkel & Associates, East
Brunswick,
attorneys
for
appella&/cross-respondents (Michael Cbazkel, of

H

Superior Court of New Jersey,
Appellate Division.
Joseph B. AZZE and Maureen P. h e ,
Plaintiffs-Appellants/Cross-Respondents,
v.
HANOVER INSURANCE CO., A Corporation of
the State of New Hampshire, DefendantRespondentfCross-Appellant.
Submitted Dec. IS, 2000.
Decided Jan. 30,2001.
Insureds brought action against homeowners'
insurer to recover for damage to personal property
caused by bursti~g of waterbed. The Superior
Court, Law Division, Middlesex County, entered
summary judgment that the suit was time barred.
Appeal and cross-appeal were taken. The Superior
Court, Appellate Division, Wells, J.A.D., held that:
(1)
a matter of first impression, an
electrically-heated waterbed was a "household
appliance" within the meaning of the coverage for
damage to personal property caused by the
discharge or overflow of water from within a
household appliance, and (2) a letter by the insurer
did not halt the tolling of the one-year policy
limitations period.
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counsel, Jeffrey Zajac, on the brief).
*632 Craig M. Terkowitz, Piscataway, attorney for
respondent/aoss-appellant @erek A. Ondis, of
counsel and on the brief).

5. Aircraft, including self-propelied missiles 60m
spacecraft
6. Vehicles.
*633 7. Smoke, meaning sudden and accidental
damage from smoke.

....

This opinion of the court was delivered by

8. Vandalism or malicious mischief.
9. Theft including attempted theft and loss of
property from a known place when it is likeiy that
the property has been stolen. .

WELLS, J.A.D.

10. Falling objects

Plaintiffs Joseph and Maureen Azze appeal from
summary judgment dismissing their claim against
their homeowners carrier, defendant Hanover
Insurance Co. The motion judge determined that the
statute of limitations barred the Azzes' claim.
Hanover cross-appeals from the judge's mlmg that
an electrically-heated waterbed is a "household
appliance" withim the meaning of the policy. We
reverse the judgment dismissing the claim and
a f f i the determination with respect to the
waterbed.

11. Weight of ice, snow or sleet which causes
damage to the inside of a building or property

Before Judges NEWMAN, BRAITHWAITE and
WELLS.

**I095 The facts gleaned from the moving and
opposing papers submitted to the motion judge are:
In 1995, the Azzes purchased a homeowner's
insurance policy from defendant, Hanover
Insurance Company. The policy covered the time
period between midnight, August 1, 1995, and
midnight, August 1, 1996. The policy covered the
following six types of loss: (A) Dwelling; (B)
Other Strucbes; (C) Personal Property; @) Loss
of Use; Q Personal Liability; and (F) Medical
Payments to Others. The policy was accompanied
by a "Homeowner's Policy Reference Guide," which
explained the terms of the Azzes' insurance
coverage. The reference guide made the following
statement with regard to coverage for loss to
personal properly:
We insure for direct physical loss to the property
described in Coverages A and C caused by a peril
listed below unless the loss is excluded in Section
I-- Exclusions.
1. Fire or lightning.
2. Windstom or hail.

....

3. Explosion.
4. Riot or civil commotion.

....

....

12. Accidental discharge or overflow of water or
steam from within a plumbing, heating, air
conditioning or automatic tire protective sprinkler
system or from within a household appliance.
The "Defmitions" section of the homeowner's
policy reference guide did not include a definition
of the term "household appliance ."
In addition, the reference guide contained the
following clause: "8. Suit Against Us. No action
can be brought unless the policy provisions have
been complied with and the action is started within
one year after the date of loss!'

On August 15, 1995, in the Azzes' home, an
electrically-heated king-sized waterbed burst during
routine maintenance. This mishap sparked an
extensive flood throughout the home. Because the
walls and ceiling of the home were constructed
from plaster, water filtered throughout the structure,
resulting in substantial damage to both the home
and much of its contents.
Following this occurrence, the Azies retained an
insurance 'adjuster to help them submit their claim
to Hanover. They submitted both a stmcnual
damage and a personal propern loss claim (covered
as Loss Types "A" and "C" in the homeowner's
policy, respectively).
On September 6, 1995, Jay Vigneaux, a claims
adjuster from Hanover, sent the Azzes a letter in
response to their claim. The letter referred to an
inspection that Mr. Vigneaux had performed on the

:laim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
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residence on August 18, 1995. Mr. Vigneaux
informed the *634 Azzes that, in the opinion of
Hanover, their homeowner's insurance covered the
structural damage (coverage "A") that had occurred
as a result of the waterbed accident, but not the
personal propeny damage (coverage "C"). Mr.
Vigneaux's letter pointed to the language in the
policy, quoted above, which enumerated the twelve
"named perils" covered by the coverage "C"
property damage section of the policy. The letter
stated:
**I096 In refening to the above-named perils,
please address number 12. "Accidental
discharge or overflow of water or steam from
within a plumbing, heating, air conditioning or
automatic fue protective sprinkler system or from
within
a
household
appliance."
Our
investigation, through the use of Property Loss
Research Bureau, defines a waterbed as a means
of supporting the body in a reclining position.
Additionally, a waterbed is considered a
container. It does not seem that the form writers
intended or that the insured could reasonably
expect that the term "household appliance" would
Lmclude such containers.
Since Coverage C--Personal Property is named
peril and there are no perils wltich include the
bursting of a waterbed, we will be unable to
provide coverage for this portion of the claim.
In specifying these grounds for denial, we do not
intend to waive, but rather specifically reserve all
our rights under the contract of insurance
including, but not limited to, other defenses
which may be applicabIe to your claim.
Additionally, we continue to require f i ~ U and
complete compliance with all terms and
conditions of the policy.
If you have any questions or further information
which may become pertinent, please contact us so
that we may consider it.
Should you wish to take this matter up with the
New Jersey State Insurance Department, you can
write them at State of New Jersey Department of
Insurance, Division of Enforcement and
Consumer Protection, CN329, Trenton, New
Jersey 08625-0329.

I

The letter did not contain any information
regarding the one-year statute of limitations, nor did
it suggest that the Azzes should engage the services
of an attorney if they were dissatisfied with the

defendant's position.
The Azzes took no further action regarding the
personal property portion of their claim, focusing
instead on performing the structural repairs
necessary to collect payments fiom the defendant on
their claim for damage to the home, under Coverage
"A" of the policy. The Azzes state that these
repain were completed in 1996, and Hanover paid
for the structural repairs.
*635 In January 1997, one year and three months
from the date of Hanover's letter, the Azzes sent a
letter to Hanover regarding the personal property
loss claim. In that letter, they registered their
objection to Hanover's position that an
elechically-heated waterbed was not a "household
appliance" within the meaning of the term as used
in the policy, and requested reconsideration of that
position. They contended in the letter that, since
no definition of "household appliance" was given in
the policy terms, an ambiguity therefore existed that
must, by New Jersey law, be construed in favor of
the insured.
On January 30, 1997, Hanover replied, stating that
"We will be standing fum behind our decision."
This letter, tike its predecessor, did not suggest that
the Azzes contact an attorney, nor did it aUude to
the contractual one-year statute of litations.

lo an attempt to have the personal property claim
paid, the Azzes Mote to the New Jersey
Department of Insurance, as had been suggested by
Hanover in its fust letter of September 1995. The
Department responded on August 8, 1997, noted
that it was not in a position to act as an arbitrator in
such a dispute, and suggested that the Azzes consult
an attorney.
On October 23, 1997, the Azzes filed a complaint
seeking enforcement of insurance coverage under
their homeowner's policy. Hanover answered on
January 28,1998.
In July 1999, Hanover fded a motion for summary
judgment, asserting that the statute of limitations
precluded the Azzes' claim. The Azzes cross-moved
for summary judgment on August 10, 1999.
'

**1097 On August 20, 1999, oral argument on
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both motions was heard. The judge entered an
order granting Hanover's motion for summary
judgment and denying the Azzes' cross-motion.
The court determined that the one year statute of
limitations contained in the policy barred the Azzes'
suit. However, the court also determined that, under
the insurance policy in question, an electrically-*636
heated waterbed could be considered an
"appliance" for purposes of coverage. The present
appeal and cross-appeal followed.

[I] By its terms, the Hanover policy granted the
Aves one year from the date of this loss in which to
file suit against the insurer. In New Jersey, the
same six-year statute of limitations that applies to
contractual actions would ordinarily apply to
insurance actions. Breen v. New Jersey
Manufacturers Indemnity Ins. Co., 105 N.J.Super.
302, 309, 252 A.2d 49 (Law Div.1969), @d 109
NLSuper. 473, 263 A.2d 802 (App.Div.1970);
N.J.S.A. 2A:14-1. However, that period may be
shortened by the terms of an inswance contract.
James v. Fed Ins. Co., 5 N.J! 21, 73 A.2d 720
(1950). Therefore, as both parties agree, the
contractual one-year statute of limitations found in
the terms of the Azzes' insurance policy is binding
on theni.
What is at issue is whether the operation of the
"equitable tolling doctrine" allows the plaintiff to
bring this suit more than a year after the accrual of
the personal property loss.
According to Scott G. Johnson, The Suit Limitation
Provision and the Equitable Tolling Doctrine, 30
Tort & Is. L.J. 1015 (1995), suit limitation
provisions such as the one in the plaintigs policy
are commonly found in properly insurance policies.
According to Johnson,
Two divergent interpretations of suit limitation
provisions have emerged. Some courts strictly
interpret the suit limitation provision, holding that
the limitation period begins to run on the date of
loss. Other courts have recognized the principal
of equitable tollimg. Under the most common
tolling theory, the suit limitation period is tolled
from the time the insured gives notice of the loss
to the insurer until the insurer formally denies
liability. The New Jersey Supreme Court first

recognized the equitable tolling doctrine in
Peloso v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co .
[Johnson, supra, 30 Tort & Ins. L.J. at 1017.1

In Peloso v. Harlford Fire Ins. Co., 56 N.J. 514,
267 A.2d 495 (1970), the Court determined that
contractual limitation provisions should not be read
literally, with the one-year period nuuting *637
uninterrupted from the date of the loss. According
to the Court, such a reading of these provisions
would be unfair, because it would allow, in effect, a
ticking away of the limitations period while the
insurance company investigated the loss. Peloso
stated that
[TJhe fair resolution ... is to allow the period of
limitation to run from the date of the casualtv but
to toll it from the time an insured gives notice
until liability is formally declined. In this
manner, the literal language of the limitation is
given effect; the insured is not penalized for the
time consumed by the company while it pursues
its contractual and statutory rights to have a proof
of loss, call the insured in for examination, and
consider what amount to pay; and the central
idea of the limitation provision is preserved since
an insured will have only 12 months to institute
suit.
[Peloso, 56 N.J. at 520,267 A.2d498.1
[Z] From the passage above, it becomes evident
that between the time the insured gives notice of
loss and the time that the insurance company
"formally denies coverage," the statutory period is
tolled Peloso does not, however, speciircally
declare what sort of denial of coverage by the
insurer should be considered sufficiently "'"1098
formal" to end the tolling period and restart the
clock on the one-year period.
The Azzes' argument rests upon the contention that
the denial letter sent by defendant in September
1995 did not meet the requirement for "formal"
denial under Peloso, and that, therefore, the one
year limitation should have been tolled fiom the
date of the reporting of the loss, in August 1995,
until January 1997, when the defendant
unequivocally denied coverage. The motion judge
found that "the language of the September 1995
letter was unequivocal and clearly demonstrates a
denial."
[3] We disagree. We, however, reject the fxst
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reason the Aves offer for reversal. They assert
that the September1995 letter does not qualify as a
formal denial because it does not conform to
requirements set out under Bowler v. Fidelily di
Casually Co. of New York, 53 N.3: 313, 250 A.2d
580 (I 969).

In Bowler, plaintiff held an accident insurance
policy purchased from the defendant insurance
company. The terms of the policy *638 dictated
that in case the insured was totally disabled by an
injury, the insurer would pay $50 per week, for up
to 200 weeks. If, by the 200th week, the insured
was found to be permanently and totally disabled,
the insurer would pay $50 per week for an
additional 600 weeks.
In an accidental fall, plaintiff broke his leg, and
subsequently developed a chronic infection, which
resulted in total disability. The plaintiff submitted
a claim to defendant, who paid $50 weekly, for 199
weeks. The insurance company then did not pay
the 200th week, fearing that a payment for that
week would amount to an admission that the insured
was now entitled to the 600 additional weeks for
permanent disability. According to the Bowler
Court, the insurance company,
Instead of fuIfilIing its contractual obligations ...
lapsed into silence, and not only failed to pay the
200th week but ignored the practically conclusive
proof of [plaintiffs] total and permanent
disability ... [Playmeat of benefits was cut off
without a word.... Plaintiffj, a layman obviously
not versed in insurance law, took no legal action
until ... he got into the hands of an attorney, and
this suit was brought--more than six years after
the end of the 200 week total disability period.
When this was done, the insurer pleaded the
six-year statute of limitations ... as a bar. We
regmd such treatment of its policyholder as
shocking and unconscionable.
[ I d at 326,250 A.2d 580.1

The A v e s point to the following language in
Bowler which, they contend, mandates that certain
requirements be fulfilled before an insurance
company's denial letter will be considered to be a
"hue" deniaI:
[The insurance company] must notify the insured
of its decision not to pay his claim. But mere
naked rejection would not be sufficient. The
giving of such notice should be accompanied by a
full and fair statement of the reasons for its
decision not to pay the benefits, and by a clear
statement that if the insured wishes to enforce his
claim it will be necessary for hi to obtain the
services of an attorney and institute a court action
within an appropriate time. The "appropriate
*639 time" means the time remaining under the
policy or the applicable statute of limitations
within which the suit must be brought. Failure
on the insurer's part to follow such a course, will
bar reliance on the statute of limitations or a time
restriction on court action expressed in the policy.
[Id at 328,250 A.2d 580.1
**I099 The A v e s assert that, because the denial
letter sent in September 1995 lacked a statement
regarding the limitations period or the need for legal
counsel, the above passage in Bowler means that, as
a matter of law, the 1995 letter cannot operate as a
legal denial of coverage. This passage, taken out
of context, might well lead one to believe that the
Bowler Court did, in fact, announce a sweeping new
requirement for a11 insurance company denials of
claims. Hanover, however, argues for another
reading of Bowler. It asserts that :the Bowler
Court based [its] decision upon the breach of the
duty of fair dealing. In a situation where there has
been no breach of the duty, the reasoning behind the
Bowler decision is not present."
We agree with Hanover's analysis of Bowler.
When that case is examined as a whole, it becomes
clear that its application is not meant to be nearly as
sweeping as the Azzes imply. Bowler dealt with a
situation in which an insurance company, which had
every reason to believe that it owed coverage to the
insured, avoided its obligation to provide such
coverage by literally dropping out of sight. The
requirements for denial outlimed in the passage
above are meant to remedy only that situation and
others like it, where the insurer's duty of good faith

The Court found that the defendant's actions
constituted an "obvious breach of its duty of good
faith and fairness in the handling of its contractual
undertaking." Id. at 330, 250 A.2d 580.
Consequently, the Court found that the defendant
was estopped from raising the statute of limitations
defense. Id at 337,250 A.2d 580.
1
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and fair dealing are at issue. This becomes much
more apparent when one puts the quoted passage
into the context of the paragraphs that precede it.
Stated the Court in those preced'mg paragraphs:
In situations where a layman might give the
controlling language of the policy a more
restrictive interpretation than the insurer knows
the courts have given it and as a result the
uninformed insured might be inched to be
quiescent about the disregard or non-payment of
his claim and not to press it in a timely fashion,
the company cannot ignore its obligation. It
cannot hide behind the hsured's ignorance of the
law; it cannot conceal its liability. In these
circumstances it has the duty to speak and
disclose, and. to act in accordance with its
contractual undertaking. The slightest evidence
of deception or overreaching will bar reliance
upon time Limitations for prosecution of the
claim.
*640 More specifically, in a situation such as that
present here, if all or part of the benefits provided
by the policy clearly is due, the insurer must
make the payment. If it fails to do so, and the
statute of limitations or a policy limitation
intewenes before suit is started, it will be
estopped to plead the limitation in avoidance of a
trial on the merits of the claim. Further i f the
insurir har factual information in its possession
substantially supporting the policyholder's right
to benefits, but it has a rearonable doubt as to
whether the evidence is sufficient to require
payment, the obligation to exercise good faith,
upon which it knows or should know the insured
is relying, cannot be satisfied by silence or
inaction. were the passage quoted in plaintiffs
brief beings.]
[Id at 328,250 A.2d 580 (emphasis added).]
Clearly, the shingent notification requirements in
Bowler are meant to prevent an insurance company
fiom disclosing the likelihood that it will be held
liable, when such likelihood exists.
Other sources reinforce our reading of Bowler.
For example, William T. Barker and D o ~ a3.
Vobomik, The Scope of the Emerging Duly oj
First-Party Insurers to Infom their Insureds qj
Rights under the Policy, 25 Tort & Ins. L.J. 749
(1990), analyzes Bowler as follows:
Read broadly, [Bowler ] could suggest a duty to
notify the claimant of many things, including the

time period allowed for bringing suit, on every
non-frivolous claim that an insurer declines to
pay. But the New Jersey courts have not read it
so. Indeed, there is hardly any case law citing
Bowler for its statute of limitations holding and
none relying on a failure of notice to preclude use
of the statute of limitations. Thus, Bowler
**I100 should be read to require notice only
where the insurer has received evidence
approximating a prima facie case of entitlement
to benefits and, perhaps, only where the insurer is
on notice (because of policy language that a
layman is likely to misunderstand or otherwise)
that notice is necessary for the insured to exercise
available rights, including the right to deny the
claim.
[Id. at 753,250 A.2d 580.1
Hanover's situation here is clearly distinguishable
fiom the facts in Bowler. Hanover did not possess
any information which substantially supported the
Azzes' rights to recover for damages to personal
property caused by a burst waterbed. Hanover's
letter of September 1995 makes it plain that it knew
that the cause of the property damage was the
sudden release of water from the electrically-heated
waterbed, and that it simply construed the policy to
exclude waterbeds from the category of "household
appliance." Hanover contends that its research
only bolstered this analysis, an assertion not
disputed by the Azzes. Furthermore, *641 the
Azzes never contended that Hanover had any
legitimate reason to believe that it was more likely
than not that the Azzes would prevail at trial in an
argument that an electric waterbed is a "household
appliance." Therefore the good faith of Hanover in
denying the claim is not an issue, making Bowler
distinguishable, and its requirements do not apply to
the defendant's denial letter. W I ]

FN1. PlainWs brief, on page 23, does
assert that "The defendant's conduct
clearly breached the principles of good
faith and fair dedmg required of insurance
companies in this State[.]" However, the
only proof'the plaintiffs offer to show bad
faith is the fact that defendant did not
follow the Bowler requirements. This is a
circular argument, since the Bowler
requirements are clearly limited to
situations where the insurance company
knows or should know that plaintiff will
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prevail if a suit is initiated. If the Bowler
requirements do not apply, then failing to
follow them is hardly a per se showing of
bad faith.
[4] During the motion hearing, the motion judge
stated that:
Plaintiff argues that the defendant did not outright
reject or deny their claim. I think the ... language
of the letter is unequivocal and clearly
demonstrates a denial.
It is on this ruling that we part company with the
motion judge. We f a d that the letter is ambiguous.
The letter of September 1995 contained the
following passage:
Since Coverage C--Personal Property is named
peril and there are no perils which include the
bursting of a waterbed, we will be unable to
provide coverage for this portion of the claim.
In specifying these grounds for denial, we do not
intend to waive, but rather specifically reserve all
our rights under the contract of insurance
including, but not limited to, other defenses
which may be applicable to your claim.
Additionally, we continue to require full and
complete compliance with all terms and
conditions of the policy.
If yoi~have any questions or further information
which may become pertinent, please contact us so
that we may consider it.
Should you wish to take this matter up with the
New Jersey State Insurance Department, you can
write them at State of New Jersey Department of
Insurance, Division of Enforcement and
Consumer Protection, CN329, Trenton, New
Jersey 08625-0329.
First, the letter is ambiguous because it refers to the
submission of new information. One might
reasonably wonder why Hanover would request
more information, if coverage bas already *642
been unequivocally denied due to its definition of
'%ousebold appliance." A very rational conclusion
would be that the denial is not, in fact, final, but
instead represents a preliminary finding that
remains open to revision. A California case
supports this very interpretation. In **I101
Prudential-LMI Comm. Im. v. Superior Court, 5 1
CaL3d 674, 274 CaLRptr. 387, 798 P.2d 1230
(1990), the Califomia Supreme Court was faced

with a situation very similar to the one at hand,
where it bad to determine how long the suit
limitation period on a properiy insurance policy
should be tolled. In that case, the insured plaintiffs
bad received a letter &om the insurer "proposing
that coverage would be denied based on the ...
exclusion unless the insureds bad any additional
information that would favor coverage." Id. at 692,
274 CaLRptr. 387, 798 P.2d 1230. This letter
began a series of negotiations between the insured
and insurer, finally resulting in a formal and
unequivocal denial some months later. The
California Supreme Court elected to toll the running
of the limitation period until the unequivocal denial,
and not the denial that invited the submission of
more information. Id at 693, 274 CaLRptr. 387,
798 P.2d 1230.
Second, the letter also suggests that if the Azzes are
uohappy about the decision, they should contact the
Department of Insurance POI). This language
could reasonably lead a person to conclude that
contact with DO1 was actually a prerequisite to a
lawsuit. Simiily, it could also lead the insured to
believe such a contact would result in the resolution
of the claim, so as to render a lawsuit unnecessary.
The suggestion by the insurer that the insured
contact DO1 gives the distinct impression that the
insurer's denial might in some way be influenced by
DOI, contributing to the general equivocality of the
denial.
Third, the denial letter is not sufficiently
unequivocal, because of the special circumstances
that surrounded the claim in this case. Here, the
Azzes were dealing with Hanover on two separate
claims. At the time that the denial letter regarding
the personal property claim under Coverage "C,"
was sent, the Azzes were concurrently dealing with
Hanover on payment of the Coverage *643 "A"
structural damage claim, which stemmed &om the
same waterbed incident. In fact, the record sbows
that the Azzes' delay in addressing their personal
property claim might well have resulted &om their
attempts to repair their home and obtain
reimbursement from Hanover. Clearly, the record
sbows that the parties were engaged in negotiations
regarding the structural damage claim well into
1996. Because both claims stemmed &om the
same homeowner's policy, and because negotiations
regarding a section of that claim were ongoing well
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By failing to define "accident," PCC has
introduced ambiguity into the defmition of
"occurrence."
Consequently,
in
defining
"accident" and "occurrence" we shall construe
any ambiguity against the insurer and in favor of
the insured.

after the September 1995 denial letter, a reasonable
insured might well believe that the limitations
period would not restart until afier the struckma1
damage claim was settied.
We conclude for the above reasons that the
September 1995 letter was not an unequivocal
denial, and that the tolling of the limitations period
begun in August 1995 thus did not stop until
January 1997. Accordingly, the present action was
timely filed.

161 Furthermore, insurance contracts are contracts
of adhesion, and therefore subject to liberal
constnrction so as to benefit the insured. Meier v.
New Jersty Life Ins. Co., 101 N.J. 597, 61 1, 503 A.
2d 862 (1986). The question, therefore, is whether,
using the standard of liberal consmction, an
electrically-heated waterbed could reasonably be
considered a tool, instrument or device adapted for
a particular purpose. We concur with the motion
judge that it can, for the reasons that follow.

[5] Hanover also denied coverage for the personal
property portion of the claim, asserting that a
waterbed was not a household appliance, and that
therefore the accident was not covered. The
motion judge determined that a waterbed should be
considered a "household appliance" for purposes of
the policy. Hanover argues on cross-appeal that
the motion judge erred in that fmding.

Defendants rest a large portion of their argument
on a Florida case, West American Ins. Co. v.
Lowrie, 600 So.2d 34 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1992),
which asserts that a waterbed is furniture, and not
an appliance. We are, of course, not bound by the
decisions of Florida courts, and our law suggests
that we should treat this particular waterbed
otherwise.

Hanover begins its argument by stating that there is
no case law in New Jersey that defines the term
"household appliance." But in Stone v. Royal Ins.
Co., 211 N.J.Super. 246, 249, 511 A.2d 717
(App.Aiv.1986) we held that "An appliance is a
tool, instrument or device adapted for a particular
use [.I" Stone then applies this definition of
"appliance" as though it also defines "household
appliance." Therefore, we define "household
appliance" as a tool, instrument or device adapted
for a particular use in a house. Bid. The device in
*"I102 Stone was a hose connecting a sump pump
to a draiin in the basement.

First, a waterbed in New Jersey could be both
furniture and a household appliance. We have
noted that Stone v. Royal Ins. Co., 2 I1 N.JSuper.
246, 249, 511 A.2d 717 (App.Div.1986) dealt with
the question of whether a sump pump could be
considered a "household appliance" for purposes of
insurance coverage. The issue in this case was
whether the pump was, in fact, a " f m e . " The
court clearly held that " 'appliance' and ' f ~ t u r e are
'
not mutually exclusive terms. An appliance ... can
be a fixture." Id at 249, 511 A.2d 717. If a f w e
can also be an appliance, then "645 there is no
reason that something ordinarily considered
furniture cannot also be an appliance.

*644 Generic description of "household appliance"
aside, the fact is that the Hanover policy does not
defme a "household appliance." The failure to
define a term in a policy of insurance has been
construed to render it ambiguous. In Property Cas.
Co. of MCA v. Conway. 147 N.J. 322, 326, 687 A.
2d 729 (1997) the C o w stated:
One of the most basic precepts governing judicial
construction of insurance policies is that courts
construe ambiguities liberally in favor of the
insured. Longobardi v. Chubb Ins. Co., 121 N.J.
530, 537, 582 A.2d 1257 (1990). Insurers write
the policies, and fairness suggests that insureds
should receive the benefit of any ambiguities.

Second, waterbeds, l i e the one involved here, are
generally purchased with beating units which plug
into the household electric current like washing
machines and dishwashers, appliances which also
contain water. They provide warmth as well as
support. We draw an analogy to an electric
blanket. Few people would consider a regular
blanket to be an appliance. However, once one
modifies a blanket so that it also provides heat
I
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electrically, this new item, an "electric blanket,"
suddenly takes on the characteristics of a household
appliance. Note the certainty in the tone of the
U.S. District Court in Remington Rand Inc. v.
Knapp-Monarch Co., 139 F.Supp. 613, 622
(E.D.Pa.1956), when it proclaims that "A
nonexhaustive list of appliances are: Electric
blankets, blenders, vacuum type coffee makers, hair
dryers, fans, deep fat fryers, frypans, hand irons,
food mixers, .heating pads, corn poppers,
vaporizers, massage vibrators, waffle irons and
electric razors." We fmd that if a blanket becomes
an appliance once it provides heat, so too does a
waierbed.
For the reasons stated we hold that a "household
appliance" includes an electrically-heated waterbed.
Reversed in parf a f f i i e d in part and remanded to
the trial court.
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STATE OF IDAHO
County of Kootenai

U
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

BRIAN ARMSTRONG and GLENDA
ARMSTRONG, husband and wife,
Plaintiffs,

Case No. CV-03-9214
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND
ORDER DENYING PARTIAL
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

VS.

FARMERS INSURANCE COMPANY OF
IDAHO, and Idaho Corporation;
CORPORATE DOES I-X, whose true
names are unknown,
Defendants.

Douglas S. Marfice, Coeur d'Alene, for Plaintiffs.
Patrick E. Miller, Coeur d'Alene, for Defendants.

1.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On July 2, 2003, Plaintiffs Brian and Glenda Armstrong's, above-ground
swimming pool collapsed, causing approximately 2,000 gallons of water to flood the

Plaintiffs' 1500 square foot finished basement. No one was present when the collapse
occurred. At the time of the pool collapse, Plaintiffs carried a homeowner's insurance
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policy with Farmers Insurance Co. of Idaho (hereinafter Farmers). Plaintiffs notified
Farmers of their loss, but Farmers denied the Plaintiffs' claim in three letters dated
September 17, October 2, and November 14,2003.
On December 23, 2003, Plaintiffs filed their Complaint in this action, alleging
breach of contract, breach of covenant of good faith and fair dealing, negligent
investigation and claim adjustment, and unfair trade practices. In their prayer for relief,
Plaintiffs sought the policy benefits of their insurance contract, special and general
damages, and attorney fees and costs. On January 5, 2005, Plaintiffs filed a notice of
hearing on their Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and a memorandum in support of
their motion. However, Plaintiffs did not file their Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
until January 20, 2005. Over the Defendants' objection, a hearing on Plaintiffs' motion
was held on February 1,2005.

.

In the~rsummary judgment motion, Plaintiffs seek a declaratory judgment of

coverage under their homeowner's policy with Farmers. The Plaintiffs first contend that
the release of water from their pool constitutes a "sudden and accidental discharge" of
water from a "household appliance," which is a peril expressly covered by their insurance
policy. The Plaintiffs argue that the phrase "household appliance" is unambiguous and
includes an above-ground swimming pool within its meaning. The Plaintiffs alternatively
argue that, if the phrase "household appliance" is ambiguous, the rules of construction
nevertheless require all ambiguities to be resolved against the insurer in this instance.
In response, the Defendants contend that the Court may not grant the Plaintiffs'
motion for partial summary judgment, because the Plaintiffs are seeking a declaratory
judgment, a cause of action not pleaded in their Complaint. The Defendants next assert
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that the Plaintiffs' loss is attributable to water damage, as that phrase is defined in the
policy, and is therefore a loss expressly excluded firom coverage. The Defendants further
argue that, because an above-ground swimming pool is not within the plain and ordinary
meaning of the phrase "household appliance," the escape of water from the Plaintiffs'
pool is not a "sudden and accidental discharge" of water from a "household appliance"
that would otherwise be covered under the policy. Like the Plaintiffs, the Defendants
claim that the Plaintiffs' insurance policy is unambiguous. However, the Defendants
assert that the term "household appliance" unambiguously exclt~desfrom within its
meaning an above-ground swimming pool, rather than includes it.
The relevant portions of the Plaintiffs' insurance contract with Farmers are as
follows:

.

[SECTION I-] LOSSES INSURED
Coverage A - Dwelling
Coverage B -Separate Structures
We insure for accidental direct physical loss to property described in
Coverage A and B, except as provided in Section I -Losses Not Insured,
Coverage C -Personal Property
We insure for accidental direct physical loss to property described in
Coverage C, but only if caused by one or more of the following perils: . . .
13. Sudden and accidental discharge or overflow of water or steam from
within a plumbing, heating or air conditioning system, or from within
a household appliance, but not for. . . .

(Policy at 7-8.)
SECTION I -LOSSES NOT INSURED
Applying to Coverage A and B - Dwelling and Separate Structures
and Coverage C -Personal Property
We do not insure for loss either consisting of, or caused directly or
indirectly by: . . .
2. Water damage.
. . . Whenever water damage occurs, the resulting loss is always
excluded under this policy, however caused; except we do cover: . . .
2. loss or damage to the interior of any dwelling, mobile home or
separate structures, or to personal property inside the dwelling,
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mobile home or separate structures caused by water damage if the
property inside the dwelling, mobile home or separate structures
first sustain loss or damage caused by a peril described under
Section I - Losses Insured - Coverage C.
(Policy at 9 and Policy Endorsement H6104.) Water damage is defined within the policy
as:

. . . loss caused by, resulting from, contributed to or aggravated by any of
the following, whether occumng on or away from the residence premises:
a. Water from rain or snow, surface water, flood, waves, tidal water,
overflow or escape of a body of water. . . .
(Policy at 4 (emphasis omitted).)

11.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
A motion for summary judgment "shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings,
depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is
no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law." I.R.C.P. Rule 56(c).

"Generally, when considering a

motion for summary judgment, a court 'liberally construes the record in a light most
favorable to the party opposing the motion and draws all reasonable inferences and
concl~rsionsin that party's favor."' Drew v. Sorensen 133 Idaho 534, 989 P.2d 276 (1999)
(citing Brooks v. Logan, 130 Idaho 574, 576,944 P.2d 709, 71 l(1997)).

111.
DISCUSSION
A.

Coverage for Some of the Loss Claimed bv the Plaintiffs is Expressly
Excluded from the Plaintiffs' Insurance Policv. Because the Claimed Loss
is the Result of "Water Damage" as Defined Within the Policv.

Plaintiffs claim that the loss they have suffered due to the sudden discharge of
water from their swimming pool is not a loss expressly excluded from coverage under
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their homeowner's insurance policy, because their loss was not caused by "water
damage," as that phrase is defined within the policy. The Defendants disagree, arguing
that the type of loss claimed by the Plaintiffs can be called nothing but "water damage,"
as the source of the loss was, in fact, a large spill of water from a swimming pool that
then flooded the Plaintiffs' basement. The Plaintiffs' policy defines water damage in
as "loss caused by, resulting from, contributed to or aggravated by . . .

relevant

[wlater from rain or snow, surface water, flood, waves, tidal water, [or an] overflow or
escape of a body of water." (Policy at 4 (emphasis omitted).) The parties seem to
concede that the only portion of this definition that is at issue is the part pertaining to an
"overflow or escape of a body of water." Thus, before the Court is able to determine
whether or not the Plaintiffs' loss constitutes water damage, the Court must first
determine whether or not the phrase "body of water" is ambiguous,

Clark v.

Prudential Prop. and Cas. Ins. Co., 138 Idaho 538, 540,66 P.3d 242,244 (2003), an issue
not briefed by the parties, but one that nevertheless requires resolution.
When interpreting insurance policies, the Court is to apply the general rules of
contract law, subject to certain special canons of construction,

w,138 Idaho at 540,

66 P.3d at 244 (citing Brinkman v. Aid Ins. Co., 115 Idaho 346, 352, 766 P.2d 1227,
1233 (1988)). The first step is to determine whether or not the policy contains an
ambiguity.

Id. A provision in an insurance policy is ambiguous if it is reasonably subject

to conflicting interpretations. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Mocaby, 133 Idaho 593, 597, 990 P.2d
1204, 1208 (1999). Where the policy language is clear and unambiguous, coverage must
be determined, as a matter of law, according to the plain meaning of the words used.

m,at 541, 66 P.3d at 245 (citing Mutual of Enumclaw Ins. Co. v. Roberts, 128 Idaho
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232, 235, 912 P.2d 119, 122 (1996)). However, where an ambiguity exists, the trier of
fact must determine what a reasonable person would have understood the language to
mean. Id.; Mocabv, at 597,990 P.2d at 1208.
Idaho courts have not expressly defined the phrase "body of water" outside the
context of a "navigable" body of water.

See, gg.,Selkirk-Priest Basin.AssYn,Inc. v.

State es rel. Andn~s,127 Idaho 239, 899 P.2d 949 (1995) (discussing whether or not
I

I

Trapper Creek constituted a navigable body of water for purposes of applying the public
trust doctrine); Kootenai Envtl. Alliance, Inc. v. Panhandle Yacht Club, Inc., 105 Idaho

I

1

!

622, 671 P.2d 1085 (1983)(recognizing Lake Coeur d',Alene's status as a navigable lake).

i

Neither is the phrase defined in Black's Law Dictionary. The courts have, however, used

I

the phrase when discussing lakes, rivers, creeks, and ponds. See, e.&, Selkirk-Priest

I
I

I

j
I

Basin Ass'n, Inc.; Pandandle Yacht Club, Inc.; Rutledge v. State, 94 Idaho 121, 482 P.2d
515 (1981) (discussing the Boise River); Bicandi v. Boise Pavette Lumber Co., 55 Idaho
543, 44 P.2d 1103 (1935) (refemng to "ponds, pools, and other bodies of water" when
discussing whether or not a millpond constituted an attractive nuisance). They have also
used the phrase where the water at issue was collected by way of a man-made dam or
artificial enclosure.

a,
G,

Stott By and Throu~hDougall v. Finnev, 130 Idaho 894,

950 P.2d 709 (1997) (holding that negligence is the proper theory of recovery in tort for
damages due to a "discharge from an artificial body of water").
The courts' usage of the phrase "body of water" clearly indicates that it is used to
I
I

describe some determinable amount of water, standing or flowing, that is somehow
enclosed, contained or bounded. In fact, "body" is defined in relevant part as a "bounded

I

aggregate of matter <a body of water>." WEBSTER'S
U NEWCOLLEGE
DICTIONARY
I24
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(1995). Moreover, even without citation to case precedent, one is able to reasonably
conclude from the common usage of the phrase that it generally refers to quantifiable
amounts of water. Consequently, as there can be no reasonable conflicting interpretations
of the phrase, the phrase is not ambiguous.
While the parties would not liltely dispute whether or not lakes and rivers and the
like are bodies of water

- perhaps

the parties would even agree that the phrase is

unambiguotis - the real question in the present case is whether or not a swimming pool
also constitutes a body of water, according to the plain meaning of the phrase "body of
water," as discussed above. A pool is defined in relevant part as: "1.a. A small body of
still water. . . . 3. A deep place in a river or stream. 4. A swimming pool." WEBSTER'SI1

NEWCOLLEGEDICTIONARY
124 (1995). Thus, it i s clear that a swimming pool is no less
a "body of water" than a small lake or pond.

.

Since the phrase "body of water" is unambiguous and plainly includes swimming

pools within its meaning, the escape or overflow of water from the Plaintiffs' swimming
pool constitutes "water damage" as defined by the Plaintiffs' insurance policy and is
excluded from coverage. Unless one of the policy's exceptions to this exclusion applies,
the Plaintiffs have not shown that, as a matter of law, they are entitled to insurance
benefits for the damage caused to their dwelling as a result of the collapse of their
swimming pool.
B.

Because the Plaintiffs' Swimming Pool is Not a "Household A~pliance,"
the Plaintiffs' Insurance Policy Does Not Othenvise Provide Coverase for
the Remaining Loss Claimed bv the Plaintiffs.

Plaintiffs argue first that, even if the loss they claim was caused by water damage,
the policy nevertheless provides coverage for their loss due to an exception to the water
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damage exclusion and a related provision under Section I - Losses Iilsured - Coverage C
-

Personal Property, which provides coverage for loss that results From a sudden

discharge of water from within a household appliance. The Plaintiffs assert that the ten11
"household appliance" unambiguoi~slyincludes within its meaning a swimming pool
such as the one the Plaintiffs own. Aitematively, Plaintiffs argue thal, if tlie term
"household appliance" is ambiguous, a reasonable person would understand it to include
within its meaning an above-ground swimming pool, so their policy would provide
coverage for the loss they claim.

Conversely, the Defendants argue that tlre term

"household appliance" unambiguously excludes from within its meaning swimmiiig
pools, thereby making the exception to the water damage exclusion and the related
provision in Coverage C inapplicable. If not, the Defendant argues that the term then is
ambiguous and a reasonable person would nevertheless understand it as describing things
or objects other than swimming pools.
The Plaintiffs' policy provides three express exceptions to its water damage
exclusion discussed above. (Policy at 9 and Endorsement H6104.) The only one relevant
is the one providing coverage for "loss or damage to the interior of any dwelling, . . . or
to personal property inside the dwelling, . . . caused by water damage if the dwelling . . .
first sustained loss or damage caused by a peril described under Section I - Losses
Insured - Coverage C." (Endorsement H6104.) The only peril that could encompass the
pool collapse or overflow at issue in the present case is found in paragraph 13 of Section
1 - Losses Insured - Coverage C: "[sludden or accidental discharge or overflow of water

or steam from within a plumbing, heating or air conditioning system, or from within a

household appliance." (Policy at 8.) The parties do not dispute that the pool may not be
considered part of a plumbing, heating, or air conditioning system.
As above, the Court must first determine if the term "household appliance" is
ambiguous. Clark v. Prudential Prop. and Cas. Ins. Co., 138 Idaho 538, 540, 66 P.3d
242, 244; Brinkman v. Aid Ins. Co., 115 Idaho 346, 352, 766 P.2d 1227, 1233. The
Ida110 Supreme Court has previously held that the term "household" is not ai~lbiguous.
See Mutual of Enumclaw Lns. Co. v. Roberts, 128 Idaho 232,235-36, 912 P.2d 119, 12223 (1996).

The adjective "household" is defined by Black's Law Dictionary as

"[b]elonging to the house and family; domestic." BLACK'SLAWDICTIONARY
744 (7thed.

Both parties offer various dictionary definitions for the term "appliance." An
appliance is defined, in turn, as: 1) refemng to "machinery and all instruments used in
operating it.

. . . Things applied to or used as a means to an end. . . . a mechanical thing, a

device or apparatus;"' 2) a "device, esp. one operated by electricity and designed for
household use"' 3) a "device or instrument designed to perform a specific function,
especially an electrical device, such as a toaster, for household use;"'

and 4) an

"instn~mentor device designed for a particular use."4 In addition, the Plaintiffs cite to
Idaho's Property Condition Disclosure Act, which requires a seller of residential real
property to disclose "[all1 appliances and service systems included in the sale (such as
refngeratorlfreezer, rangeloven, dishwasher, . . . pooVhot tub, etc.)," as evidence that, as

' Defendants' Brief in Opposition at 15 (citing BLACK'SLAWDICTIONARY
127 (revised 4"' ed.
A).

WEBSTER'S
II NEWCOLLEGE
DICTIONARY
55 (1995).
Defendants' Brief in Opposition at 2l(citing THEAMERICAN
HERITAGE
DICTIONARY
OF THE
ENGLISH
LANGUAGE(4"' ed. 2000), available at http:l/www.bartleby.com~61199/A0379900.htm1.
' Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Support at 7 (citing WEBSTER'S9" COLLEGIATE
D~CT~ONARY
(1985)).
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a matter of law, Idaho considers a pool to be an appliance. (Plaintiffs Memorandum in
Support at 7 (citing Idaho Code 5 55-2508).)
While the Plaintiffs' argument is certainly creative and indicative of resoifrceft~l
and inventive legal skills, the Court nevertheless finds that the term "ho~~sehold
appliance" is neither ambiguous, nor commonly understood to include the Plaintiffs'
above-ground swimming pool within its meaning. There has been no evidence presented
to the Court that the Plaintiffs' pool was somehow operated by electricity. Nor is a
swimming pool generally considered a mechanical means to an end. As a result, the
discharge or overflow of water from the Plaintiffs' pool is not a discharge or overflovv
from a household appliance, which means that the policy exception to the water damage
exclusion does not apply, and Farmers is not obligated, on these facts, to compensate the
Plaintiffs for their claimed loss to their dwelling.
,

As the "household appliance" language is also used in a provision relating to

coverage for loss of personal property, the Court's finding also means that a peril
necessary to invoke coverage for loss to the Plaintiffs' personal property has not
occurred, and Farmers is not obligated to compensate the Plaintiffs for their claimed loss
of personal property.
IV.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment is
denied. Although the Plaintiffs request a declaratory judgment in their motion for partial
summary judgment without having pleaded such a cause of action in their Complaint, the
Court sees no reason to treat the Plaintiffs' motion differently than any other motion for
partial summary judgment. It is an essential element of at least the Plaintiffs' breach of
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contract cause of action that Fanners had a duty under the Plaintiffs' policy to cover the
losses claimed by the Plaintiffs. In seeking a declaratory judgment on the issue of
coverage under the policy, the Plaintiffs were effectively seeking a partial summary
judgment on the issue of this alleged duty. Moreover, the Court's decision denying
Plaintiffs' motion renders the Defendants' argument on this point moot.
The Defendants' objection to the Court hearing the Plaintiffs' motion based on the
Plaintiffs' failure to file their motion for summary judgment conc~lrrentlywith their brief
in support is overmled, as the Defendants were given notice of the Plaintiffs' motion
when the Plaintiffs filed their brief and both parties were given full opportunity to argue
the substantive merits of the Plaintiffs' motion before the Court. It is presumed that the
Defendants had ample time to prepare for the scheduled hearing, as they did not request a
continuance. As a result, especially in light of the Court's ruling on the Plaintiffs'
mation, the Defendants have failed to show how they suffered any prejudice as a result of
the Plaintiffs' filing mishap.
Entered this

a/

day of March, 2005

C+q.p,p
..

Charles W. Hosack, District Judge
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CERTIHCATE OF MAILINGIDELIVERY

On this

2

day of March, 2005. a true and correct copy of the foregoing was

mailed in the U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, sent via facsimile, or sent via interoffice mail as
indicated below to the following counsel:

?-a
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..

Douglas Marfice
PO BOX 1336
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-1336

66Y-GXY

Patrick Miller
PO Box E
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-0328
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DOUGLAS S. MARFICE, ISB #4072
APRIL M. LINSCOTT, ISB #7036
RAMSDEN & LYONS, LLP
618 North 4thStreet
Post Office Box 1336
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816-1336
Telephone: (208) 664-5818
Facsimile: (208) 664-5884
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE

STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
Case No. CV 03-92 14

BRIAN ARMSTRONG and GLENDA
ARMSTRONG, husband and wife,

MOTION TO DISQUALIFY
ALTERNATE JUDGE

Plaintiffs,
VS.

FARMERS INSURANCE COMPANY OF
IDAHO, an Idaho corporation; CORPORATE
DOES I - X, whose true names are unknown,
Defendants.
-

COME NOW the above-entitled Plaintiffs BRIAN and GLENDA ARMSTRONG, by
and through their counsel of record, and hereby move the Court pursuant to I.R.C.P. 40
(d)(l), for its order disqualifying the Honorable John T. Mitchell from the above-captioned

matter.
DATED this a ' a y of January, 2007.
RAMSDEN & LYONS, LLP

~ t t o k e for
~ splaintiffs

-

MOTION TO DISQUALIFY ALTERNATE JUDGE 1

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
@

I hereby certify that on the $ & d a y of January 2007,I served a true and correct copy of
the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:

&S Mail
-Overnight Mail
-Hand Delivered
-Facsimile (208) 664-6338

Patrick E. Miller, Esq.
701.Front Avenue, Suite 101
P.O. Box E
Coeur d'Alene, ID 838 16-0328

Douglas $. Marfice '

-

MOTION TO DISQUALIFY ALTERNATE JUDGE 2

DOUGLAS S. MARFICE, ISB #4072
APRIL M. LINSCOTT, ISB #7036
RAMSDEN & LYONS, LLP
618 North 4th Street
Post Office Box 1336
Coeur dlAlene,Idaho 838 16-1336
Telephone: (208) 664-58 18
Facsimile: (208) 664-5884
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

Case No. CV 03-92 14

BRIAN ARMSTRONG and GLENDA
ARMSTRONG, husband and wife,

ORDER TO DISQUALIFY
ALTERNATE JUDGE

Plaintiffs,
VS.
FARMERS INSURANCE COMPANY OF
IDAHO, an Idaho corporation; CORPORATE
DOES I - X, whose true names are unknown,
Defendants.

The foregoing Motion to Disqualify Alternate Judge having duly and regularly come
before this Court, and good cause appearing therefore,
IT IS HEPSBY CRDERED, :hat The Honorable Job T. Mitchell be disqualifiec!
from the above-captioned matter.
DATED this Kday

of

4 (.\ ul-r,

I

,2007.

u

D strict C urt Judge

ORDER TO DISQUALIFY ALTERNATE JUDGE - 1

185

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

($d+L

2007,L served a true and correct
1hereby certiiy that on the& day of
copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:

-US Mail

Patrick E. Miller, Esq.
701 Front Avenue, Suite 101
P.O. Box E
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-0328

-Overnight Mail
Hand Delivered
J Facsimile (208) 664-6338

-US Mail

Douglas S. Marfice
Ramsden & Lyons
P.O. Box 1336
Coeur d'Alene, ID 838 16-1336

-Overnight Mail
Iland Delivered
J Facsimile (208) 664-5884

-

-

ORDER T o DISQUALIFY ALTERNATE JUDGE 2
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P A T R I ~ KE. MILLFR - ISB *I771
PAINE HAMBLEN LLP
701 Fro61 Avenue, Suite 101
P.O.B O E
~
Coeur d!Alenc, ID 83816-0328
~ e l e ~ h o ' h(208)
e : 664-8115
~acsimiie:(208) 664-6338

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, lN AND FOR THE COUNTY OP KOOTENAI

BRIAN ARMSTRONG and GLENDA
ARMQRONG, husband and wife,
!

Plaintiffs,
VS.

1
) Case No. CV-03-9214
)
) DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR
) SUMMARY JUDGMENT
)

1
F

~ INSURANCE
S
COMPANY OF

ID AH^, an Idaho corporation; CORPORATE

I
DOESlI-X,
whose truc names are unknown,

)
)
)

1
Defendants.

)

,

COMES NOW, the defendant, F m e r s Insurance Company of Idaho, pursuant to RuIe56(b).

I.R.C.P., and moves rhe Court, for summary judgment in behalf ol this defendant, dismissing
plaintiffs' claims against this defendanr.
This defendanr requests oral argument.

02/02/2007

10 53 FAY

P A I N E HHMBLEN CDA

2086646338

I
~ A T E Dthis &day

of &42..&9,2.007.

Attorney for Defendants

!

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

&

~~HEREEY
CERTIFY that on the
,2007, I causcd to bc
day of &U
served aitrue and correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated elow, and addressed co
the follo i n g

PI

.

Douglas S.Marfice
$icichael A. Ealy
fCnrnsden & Lyons
d l 8 North 4" Street
I?. 0. Box 1336
&cur d7Alene,ID 83816-1336

I

&

U.S. MAIL
HAND D E L M R E D
OVERNIGHTMAIL

TELECOPY (FAX) to:664-5884

I

-

NT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 2
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R - TSB #I771

Avenue, Suite 101

ID 838 16-0328
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INTHE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST IUO1CIAL DISTRICT OF

/

THE STATE OF IDAHO, lN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

and GLENDA

)
) Case No. CV-03-9214
)

) MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF

Plaintiffs,
VS.

)

DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR

)

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

1
)

1
1
)

1

Defendanrs.

dOMES NOW. the defendant, Fanoerr Insurance Company of Idaho, pursuant to ththc

I

i

Idaho R les of Civil Procedure and the mles of this Court, and submits this memorandum of
thorities and srgument in support of this defendant's motion for summary jud,omenr.

"""?

NDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S
MOT10 FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 1

-

0 2 / 2 0 0 7 1 0 5 3 FAX

2OS664633S

P A I N E HAMBLEN C D A

I
I
I
1

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

I

diuintiffs, hy their complaint, asserted that they had purchased a policy of insurance from

I

a

Defenda t: that an ahove ground pool at their residence had collapsed; that defendant denied ihe
claim b stating thar there was no coverage for the claims.
laintiffs asserted that defendant's denial constituted a breach of contract, a breach of

good lai

and fair dealing, ncgfigcnt investigation and claim adjustment, and unfair trade

as wcll as fraud.

laindffs have generally argued in this matter that these constitute u claim of "bad faith".

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS
reviously, the plaintiffs moved for panial summary judgment asserting that the language
provided coverage of the claim.
is Court issued its Memorandum Decision on March 21,2005 and by that
decision, construed the policy, according to its language. and determined thar rhere
for the claimed loss.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

si

ummary judgment is proper "if the pleadings, depositions and admissions on file,

E.

together ith the affidavits, if any, show rhar there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and
that the

I

oving party is entitled to jud,ment as a matter of law." Rule 56(c),LR.C.P.

/02/2007 10 53 F A X

2086646338

PAINE

H$,MBLEN CDA

~OOi/Olo

I

RAGE OF THE CLAIM, PURSUANT TO TWE PQLlCY LANGUAGE, IS AN
ESS~NTIALREQUZREMENTFOR PLAINTIFFS TO ASSERT CLAMS ARISING
OUT OF BREACH OF CONTRACT, OR BAD FAITH.

I

t
i
4
i
i
I
t

his Court has previously addrcssed the question of coverage, as asserted by ihe

plaintiff . This Court, by its Memorandum Decision, found [hat there was no coverage for the
evencs hich led then to the plaintiffs' claimed loss.

I Robinson v. State Farm Mu~ualAutomobile Ins. Co., 137 Idaho 173, 45 P.3d 829

(S.Ct. 2 02), the court addressed the question of coverage as an element of a claim of bad faith.

4he court noted bar a plaintiff can bring one of two types of bad faith claims,

unreaso able denial or unreasonable delay. The court then stated:
However, the coverage a plaintiff will have to provc in order to
establish a prima facie case is not dependent on rhe nature of the
bad faith claim.

Robinson v. State F m Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., supra at p. 178.
I'he court then held that fundamental LO the claim of bad faith is the requirement that

i

there m st be coverage of the claim under the policy. Therefore, wjlhout coverage, there cannot
tion of duties by an insurance carrier, which leads to any variation of a claim asserred as

"bad fa$".

i

oreover, in Robinson v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., rapra, the court also

1

held tha ,in order to recover for breach of contract claims, there must be coverage under the
policy.

2/02/2007

1 0 53 FAX

P A I N E HhMBLEN COP,

2056646335

II

I
+his defendant submits that the marter is straightforward. Without coverage, there cannot
I

i

be a bash for the plaintiffs' claims. Without coverage, as the court in Robinson noted, the

I

plaintiff ciinnot establish a prima facic claim asserted us breach of contract, or bad faith, in m y
variatio of the language of those claims.
*his defendant submits that without coverage, the plaintiffs' claims must be dismissed

l

and thatlthis court grant this defendant's motion for summary judgment.

ATED this

2@byof
PATRICK E. 6lILLER
Attorney for Dcfcndants

I

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

k

d
,2007, I caused to be
I .HEREBY CERTIFY that on the & day of
served a true and correct copy of the foregoing by rhe method indicated %elow,and addressed to
the foll ing:

i

ouglas S. Mwfice
ichael A. Ealy
amsden & Lyons
18 Nonh 4"' Street
. 0.Box 1336
.oeur d'Alene, ID 83816-1336

U.S.MAIL
HAPID DELIVERED
OVERNIGHT MAIL
TELECOPY (FAX) to: 664-5884

I

I
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MEMO A&DUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S
MOT10 FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 4

I

-
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STATE OF iCAN0

~:OUHTY OF HODTEN;~,)SS

DOUGLAS S. MARFICE, ISB #4072
APRIL M. LEVSCOTT, ISB #7036
RAMSDEN & LYONS, LLP
618 North 4'" Street
Post Office Box 1336
Coeur d'Aiene, Idaho 83816-1336
Telephone: (208) 664-5818
Facsimile: (208) 664-5884

et!-~;i.

Attorneys for Plalntlffs

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OFIDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

BRIAN ARMSTRONG and GLENDA
ARMSTRONG, husband and wife,
Plaintiffs,
VS.

Case No. CV 03-92 14
MEMORANDUM UV RESPONSE
TO DEFENDANTS MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

FARMERS INSURANCE COMPANY OF
IDAHO, an Idaho corporation; CORPORATE
DOES I - X, whose true names are unknown,
Defendants.

COME NOW Plaintiffs, Brian and Glenda Armstrong ("Armstrongs"), and submit
this Memorandum in Response to Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment.
Armstrongs incorporate by reference the briefing, proof and argument previously
submitted in support of their Motion for Summary Judgment (Argued February I , 2005). In
response to that blotion the Court addressed the question of insurance coverage and ruled as
a matter of law that there was no coverage for the events and circumstances which lead to the
Armstrongs' loss.

195

- - ------,"c r n nFFFNnANTS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 1

Almstrongs acknowledge that the Court's ruling on their summary judgment was, for
all intents and purposes, dispositive of their claims including the claim of bad faith,
unreasonable denial and inr reasonable delay in the adjustment of insurance claims.
Armstrongs assert that the District Court was in error in its interpretation of the
subject policy, however, and intend to take an appeal once the Court's Order is deemed final.
To the extent the District Court did not intend its Order on Annstrongs sumnary judgment
motion to be dispositive of their claims, the Order nevertheless appears to be so.

DATED this &%ay

of February, 2007
RAMSDEN & LYONS, LLP

BY

=k?

5*&

~ o u a d S.
s M a r f i c d ~the
f Firm
~ t t o k e y for
s plaintiffs

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on the /d%y of February 2007, I served a true and correct copy of
the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:
Patrick E. Miller, Esq.
701 Front Avenue, Suite 101
P.O. Box E
Coeur d'Aiene, ID 83816-0328

y/GS Mail
-Overnight Mail
-Hand Delivered
Facsimile (208) 664-6338

5' - fly

Douglas S. Marfice

MEMORANDUM IN RESPONSE TO DEFENDANTS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 2

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FlRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
TElE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

CRLAN AR31STRONG and GLENDPL
ARMSTRONG, husband and wife,

Plaintiffs,
vs .

)
) Case No. CV-03-9214
)
) JUDGMENT FOR DEFENDANT
) FARMERS INSURANCE COMPANY
) OF IDAHO

1
FARMERS INSURANCE COMPANY OF
)
IDAHO, an Idaho corporation; CORPORATE )
DOES I-X, whose true names are unknown,
)
Defendants.

1
1

On March 27, 2007, this matter came before the court pursuant to the defendant's motion
for summary judgment, and the court having considered its March 21,2005 memorandum opinion
and order, including the Findings of Fact, and Conclusions of Law, as stated therein, and the briefs
and arguments of the parties which are hereby incorporated by reference,
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that judgment be,
and is, entered in favor of the defendant, Farmers Insurance Company of Idaho, and that plaintiffs

JUDGMENT FOR DEFENDANT FARMERS
INSURANCE COMPANY OF IDAHO - 1

Brian Armstrong and Glenda Armstrong, husband and wife, shall have and recover nothing against
the defendant Farmers Insurance Company of Idaho in this action.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that defendant shall recover
,A$

N e r ~ a r ,fin
~d

DATED this

3

C;UC~'C

w7

, as costs and disbursements.

from the plaintiffs the sum of

d

day of

,2007

District Judge

RULE 54(b) CERTIFICATE
With respect to the issues determined by the above judgment or order it is hereby
CERTIFED, in accordance with Rule 54(b), X.R.C.P., that the court has determined that there is no
just reason for delay of the entry of a final judgment and that the court has and does hereby direct
that the above judgment or order shall be a final judgment upon which execution may issue and an
appeal may be taken as provided by the Idaho Appellate Rules.

/ ~ l i f - ( , ~ z c c k ' *#?
~
A

f r ~ d,'-A

J

Lo

59&)

CHARLES W. HOSACK, District Judge

JUDGMENT FOR DEFENDANT FARMERS
INSURANCE COMPANY OF IDAHO - 2

'/
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CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

:b

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the
day of
ry'u h
,2007,I caused
to be served a true and correct copy of the foregoing by the dethod indicated below, and
addressed to the following:
Douglas S. Marfice
Ramsden & Lyons
618 N. 4" Street
P. 0 . Box 1336
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-1336

- U.S. MAIL
TELECOPY (FAX) to: 664-5884
Patrick E. Miller
Attorney at Law
701 Front Avenue, Suite 101
P.O. Box E
Coeur d'Alene. ID 83816-0328
0 U.S. Mail
.-

'3TELECOPY (FAX) to: (208) 664-6338
DANIEL J. ENGLISH
CLERK OF THE DISTRICT CO

By:

JUDGMENT FOR DEFENDANT FARMERS
INSURANCE COMPANY OF IDAHO - 3
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DOUGLAS S: MARFICE, ISB #4072
APRIL M. LINSCOTT, ISB #7036
RAMSDEN & LYONS, LLP
Attorneys for PlaintiffsIAppellant
618 North 4"' Street
Post Office Box I336
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816-1336
Telephone: (208) 664-58 18
Facsimile: (208) 664-5884

~
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

BRIAN ARMSTRONG and GLENDA
ARMSTRONG, husband and wife,
Plaintiffs/Appellants,
VS. .
FARMERS INSURANCE COMPANY OF
IDAHO, an Idaho corporation; CORPORATE
DOES I - X, whose true names are i~nknown,

Case No. CV 03-92 14
NOTICE OF APPEAL
Fee Category: T
Fee: $101.00

DefendantsiRespondents.
TO:

THE ABOVE NAMED DEFENDANTSmESPOADENTS, FARMERS
INSURANCE COMPANY OF IDAHO, an Idaho corporation;
CORPORATE DOES I - X, whose true names are unknown

AND TO:

THE DEFENDANTSIRESPONDENTS ATTORNEYS, Patrick E.
Miller of the firm Paine Hanibian, LLP, 701 Front Avenue, Suite 101,
Post Office Box E, Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-0328.

AND TO:

THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE ENTITLED COURT

NnTTPF nF APPFAT

.1

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT:
1.

. The above named PlaintiffsiAppellants, Brian and Glenda Armstrong appeal

against the above named DefendantsRespondents to the Idaho Supreme Court from the
Judgment for Defendant Farmers Insurance Company of Idaho, entered in the above-entitled
action on the 12"' day of April, 2007, Honorable Judge Charles W. Hosack presiding.
2.

That the party has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the

judgments or orders described in paragraph 1 above are appealable orders under and pursuant
to Rule 1l(a) I.A.R.
3.

Preliminary statement of issues on appeal.
(A)

Whether the escape or overflow of water from the Plaintiffs' swimming
pool constitutes "water damage" as defined by the Plaintiffs' insurance
policy and is excluded from coverage of real and personal property.

(B)

Whether the Plaintiffs' insurance policy provides coverage for their loss
due to an exception to the water damage exclusion.

4.

A reporter's transcript is requested. The appellant requests the preparation of the.

following portions of the reporter's transcript: Transcripts of Hearing on Plaintiffs' Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment February 1, 2005 at 3:30 p.m.; and Transcripts of Hearing on
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment March 27,2007.

5.

The PlaintiffiAppellant requests the following documents to be included in the

clerk's record in addition to those automatically included under Rule 28, I.A.R.:
(a)

Affidavit of Douglas S. Marfice in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment

(b)

Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment

(c)

Submission of Materials in Support of Defendant Farmers Insurance
Company of Idaho's Brief in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment

(d)

Defendant Fanners Insurance Company of Idaho's Brief in Opposition
To Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment

(e)

Motion for Partial Summary Judgment

(0

Ex Parte Motion to Shorten Time for Filing of "Motion"

(g)

Affidavit of Douglas S. Marfice in Support of Ex Parte Motion to
Shorten Time

(h)

Supplemental Affidavit of Douglas S. Marfice

(i)

Reply to Defendant's Motion in Opposition To Partial Summary
Judgment

6.

(j)

Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment

(k)

Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment

(1)

Memorandum in Response to Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment

No order has been entered in this matter sealing all or any part of the record or

transcript.
7.

I certify:

(a)

Thata copy of this Notice of Appeal has been served on the reporter;

(b)

That arrangements have been made to pay the Clerk of the District the estimated
fee for preparation of the reporter's transcript; (I.A.R. 24@), LC. 4 1-1105)

NOTICE OF APPEAL - 3

( )

That the estimated fee for the preparation of the clerk's record has been paid;

(d)

That the Appellants' filing fee has been paid; and

(e)

That service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant to
I.A.R. 20.

DATED this

&day of May, 2007.
RAMSDEN & LYONS, LLP

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on t h e a d a y of May 2007, I served a true and correct copy of the
foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:

&

Patrick E. Miller, Esq.
701 Front Avenue, Suite 101
P.O. Box E
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-0328

US Mail
Overnight Mail
-Hand Delivered
-Facsimile (208) 664-6338

Joann Schaller
Kootenai County District Court
501 Government Way
PO Box 9000
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-900

Z U S Mail
-Overnight Mail
Hand Delivered
-Facsimile (208) 446- 1138

-

NOTICE OF APPEAL 4

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
BRIAN ARMSTRONG and GLENDA
ARMSTRONG, husband and wife,
SUPREME COURT NO.
34250
FARMERS INSURANCE COMPANY
OF IDAHO, an Idaho corporation;
CORPORATE DOES I-X, whose true
names are unknown,

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE
I, Daniel J. English, Clerk of the District Court of the First Judicial District of the State of
Idaho, in and for the County of Kootenai, do hereby certify that the above and foregoing
record in the above entitled cause was compiled and bound under my direction as, and is
a true, full and correct record of the pleadings and documents under Rule 28 of the Idaho
Appellate Rules.
I further certify that exhibits were not offered in this case.
I certify that the Attorneys for the Appellant and Respondent were notified that the
Clerk's Record was complete and ready to be picked up, or if the attorney is out of town,
the copies were mailed by U.S. mail, postage prepaid. on the
S-PAQ+

,2007.

f3

day of

I do further certify that the Clerk's Record will be duly lodged with the Clerk of the
Supreme Court.
In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of said Court at
Kootenai County, Idaho this

1 G\

day

Seir>-8,2007.
DANIEL J. ENGLISH
Clerk of the District Court

By:

cath,y ~j~~~~~~
Deputy Clerk

IN THE SUPPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
BRIAN ARMSTRONG and GLENDA
ARMSTRONG, husband and wife,
SUPREME COURT NO.
34250
FARMERS INSURANCE COMPANY
OF IDAHO, an Idaho corporation;
CORPORATE DOES I-X, whose true
names are unknown,

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, Daniel J. English, Clerk of the District Court of the First Judicial District of the
State of Idaho, in and for the County of Kootenai, do hereby certify that I have personally
served or mailed, by United States mail, one copy of the Clerk's Record to each of the
Attorneys of record in this cause as follows:
Douglas S Marfice
PO Box 1336
Coeur d'Alene ID 83816-1336

Patrick E Miller, Esq.
PO Box E
Coeur d'Alene ID 838 16-0328

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have unto set my hand and affixed the seal of the
said Court this 1
day of ?,-,+ ,2007.
Daniel J. English

